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THE NEW YORK TIMES AND CREDIT RATING AGENCIES:




Much has been said about the importance of the First Amendment
to our society. This very first amendment o our Constitution may be the
most significant piece of legislation ever written by our legislators. The
First Amendment not only shapes the political discourse in our country,
it informs who we are as citizens of a democracy. The First Amendment
is the foundation of a society in which freedom of speech and of the
press are fundamental rights. Yet, the safeguards of the First Amendment
have, in some cases, been misapplied. Rather than simply protecting the
right to freely express honestly believed opinions, the First Amendment
has been used as a shield against liability for falsity. In particular, the
credit rating agencies have used the First Amendment to avoid liability
for false or misleading credit ratings. Hence, this Article will question
the theoretical underpinnings of applying the protections of the First
Amendment in the context of the credit rating agencies.
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INTRODUCTION
If one were to ask the public which two are analogous-the New
York Times, a credit rating agency, or an auditor-I venture most people
would believe the credit rating agency and the auditor are the apples, and
the newspaper is the orange. Yet, according to the courts, those people
would be mistaken. Under First Amendment jurisprudence as applied by
the lower courts, credit rating agencies are indistinguishable from the
New York Times.'
Credit rating agencies are bond market professionals paid to provide
an assessment regarding the creditworthiness of a debt security, or the
issuer of a debt security, based on factual information.2 Nevertheless,
both the judiciary and the regulatory branches of our government have
afforded the credit rating agencies protections from liability. 3 The judici-
ary has considered credit ratings to be pure statements of opinion and
1. See Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig.), 511 F.
Supp. 2d 742, 818 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (observing that some courts have characterized credit rating
agencies as "publishers or journalists" and provided the rating agencies with protection under the
First Amendment); Cty. of Orange v. McGraw Hill Cos., 245 B.R. 151, 154-57 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
1999) (considering Standard & Poor's to be a "financial publisher" and applying the protections of
the First Amendment); Pan Am Corp. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. (In re Pan Am Corp.), 161 B.R. 577,
586 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that the credit rating agency functioned as a publisher of
publicly disseminated ratings and, thus, "as a matter of law," should be afforded "the full breadth of
First Amendment safeguards").
2. Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 888 F. Supp. 2d 431, 455
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (explaining that a "[credit] rating agency ... analyze[s] data, conduct[s] an assess-
ment, and [provides] a fact-based conclusion as to creditworthiness"); Commercial Fin. Servs., Inc.
v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 94 P.3d 106, I10 (Okla. Civ. App. 2004) (finding that the rating agencies
provided their opinions regarding the creditworthiness of the plaintiffs bonds "as professionals
being paid to provide their opinions to a client"); U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT ON THE
ROLE AND FUNCTION OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES IN THE OPERATION OF THE SECURITIES
MARKETS 5 (2003) [hereinafter ROLE & FUNCTION] ("For almost a century, credit rating agencies
have been providing opinions on the creditworthiness of issuers of [debt] securities and their finan-
cial obligations.").
3. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 107TH CONG., REP. ON FINANCIAL
OVERSIGHT OF ENRON: THE SEC AND PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS 96-98 (Comm. Print 2002)
[hereinafter PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS] (noting the courts have shielded the credit rating agen-
cies from legal accountability by affording the agencies with protections under the First Amendment
and that the Securities and Exchange Commission has permitted the credit rating agencies to "es-
cape[] regulation").
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provided the rating agencies with First Amendment protections. These
protections are the same First Amendment protections provided to jour-
nalists. In the words of the credit rating agencies, a credit rating has
been deemed "the world's shortest editorial" and, thus, entitled to First
Amendment protection. However, credit rating agencies should not be
viewed as journalists impartially reporting the news or providing an ob-
jective opinion regarding the current issues of our society. Credit ratings
are not pure statements of opinion akin to a statement of opinion regard-
ing a social or political matter. Moreover, the issuer of a security hires
and pays the rating agencies to assign a credit rating.7 Thus, credit rating
agencies function very differently than newspapers. Furthermore, in the
years preceding the recent financial crisis, the credit rating agencies were
significantly involved in structuring mortgage-backed securities, "plac-
ing the [a]gencies in the [conflicting] position of 'rating their own
work.' 8
Simply stated, credit ratings are not editorials. Rather, credit ratings
are "fact-based opinions" made by professionals.9 Thus, as providers of a
commercial service, credit rating agencies should be subject to the same
liability as other businesses. For example, security analysts that evaluate
equity securities and auditors that provide opinions concerning financial
4. See Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody's Inv'r's Serys., Inc., 175 F.3d 848, 855-
56 (10th Cit. 1999) (holding that a credit rating agency's article regarding the creditworthiness of an
issuer of bonds "constitutes a protected expression of opinion" under the First Amendment); Enron
Corp., 511 F. Supp. 2d at 816-17 (finding that the courts generally have afforded the credit rating
agencies protection under the First Amendment in cases of alleged fraud or professional negligence);
Pan Am Corp., 161 B.R. at 586 (holding that the rating agency functioned as a publisher of credit
ratings that are publicly disseminated and, thus, should receive the full protections of the First
Amendment "as a matter of law").
5. See Enron Corp., 511 F. Supp. 2d at 818 (noting that some courts have viewed the credit
rating agencies as "publishers orjournalists" and provided the rating agencies with First Amendment
protection); Cty. of Orange, 245 B.R. at 154-57 (referring to Standard & Poor's as a "financial
publisher" and applying the safeguards of the First Amendment); Pan Am Corp., 161 B.R. at 581-82
(finding a credit rating agency "functions as a journalist when gathering information in connection
with its rating process . . . with the intent to use the material to disseminate information to the pub-
lic").
6. PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS, supra note 3, at 96 (quoting Statements of Charles
Brown, Fitch General Counsel).
7. Commercial Fin. Serys., Inc., 94 P.3d at 110 (finding that the credit rating agencies as-
signed a rating concerning the creditworthiness of the bonds "as professionals being paid to provide
their opinions to a client"); see also infra notes 577-78 and accompanying text.
8. Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund v. Standard & Poor's Fin. Servs. LLC, 700 F.3d 829,
833-34 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Complaint para. 80, Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund v. Standard &
Poor's Fin. Serys., LLC, 813 F. Supp. 2d 871 (S.D. Ohio 2011) (No. 2:09-cv-1054)) ("[T]o attract
the significant rating fees paid by [mortgage-backed securities] arrangers, the [a]gencies 'became
intimately involved in the issuance of [mortgage-backed securities]' by assisting arrangers in struc-
turing their securities to achieve certain credit ratings, turning the process into a form of negotiation
and placing the [a]gencies in the position of 'rating their own work."' (quoting Complaint, supra,
paras. 56, 80)).
9. Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 888 F. Supp. 2d 431, 455
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (emphasis omitted) ("Ratings should best be understood as fact-based opinions.
When a rating agency issues a rating, it is not merely a statement of that agency's unsupported
belief, but rather a statement that the rating agency has analyzed data, conducted an assessment, and
reached afact-based conclusion as to creditworthiness.").
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statements are held liable for any damages.o Why should the credit
rating agencies, which occupy a role analogous to security analysts and
auditors," be regarded in a different light? Yet, the misapplication of
First Amendment protections by the courts has shielded the credit rating
agencies from liability in actions for fraudulent or negligently prepared
ratings.12
Moreover, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Commis-
sion) has provided the credit rating agencies with regulatory protections
by exempting the rating agencies from liability for false or misleading
statements in a registration statement.'3 These protections afforded to the
credit rating agencies are even more incongruous when one considers the
conflicts of interest inherent in the "issuer-pays" model of the credit rat-
ing agencies. 14 In response to this issue and many others that ultimately
culminated in the financial crisis, 15 Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the Dodd-Frank
Act).16 The Dodd-Frank Act was intended "[t]o promote the financial
stability of the United States by improving accountability and transpar-
ency."'7 However, despite the express intention of Congress to hold the
credit rating agencies accountable,'8 the Commission has, to a large ex-
tent, nullified those intentions.19
Accordingly, this Article will argue that the legal and regulatory
protections provided to the credit rating agencies are misguided. As we
consider the factors that contributed to the financial crisis, the evidence is
clear that the credit rating agencies inaccurately rated "tens of billions"
of structured securities, such as mortgage-backed securities.2 0 Many in-
10. See infra notes 387-88, 483 and accompanying text.
I. See infra notes 332, 498-502 and accompanying text.
12. See Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig.), 511 F.
Supp. 2d 742, 815-18 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (explaining that "while there is no automatic, blanket, abso-
lute First Amendment protection" for publications issued by the credit rating agencies, the majority
of courts have historically shielded the rating agencies from liability for the allegedly fraudulent or
negligent ratings disseminated in those publications); see also PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS, supra
note 3, at 96 (finding that courts have shielded the credit rating agencies from liability by affording
the rating agencies protection under the First Amendment).
13. See SEC Written Consents Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 230.436(g)(1) (2015) (providing the credit
rating agencies with an exemption from liability under Section II of the Securities Act of 1933 for
false or misleading statements in a registration statement).
14. See infra Section III.A.
15. See John Rogers, A New Era of Fiduciary Capitalism? Let's Hope So, FIN. ANALYSTS J.,
May/June 2014, at 6 ("[T]he causes of the... financial crisis were many and complex.").
16. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank ) Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
17. Id. pmbl.
18. See id. § 939G (repealing the Commission's Rule 436(g) exemption from Section II
liability for credit rating agencies); see also 17 C.F.R. § 2 30.436(g)(1) (2015).
19. See Ford Motor Credit Co. LLC, SEC No-Action Letter, 2010 WL 2882538, at *1-2
(Nov. 23, 2010) [hereinafter SEC No-Action Letter] (reestablishing the credit rating agencies' ex-
emption from Section II liability).
20. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank ) Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, title IX, § 931(5), 124 Stat. 1872 ("In the recent financial crisis, the ratings on struc-
tured financial products have proven to be inaccurate."); Martin Pfinsgraff, Deputy Comptroller for
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vestors relied upon these inaccurate ratings, which ultimately contributed
to substantial losses.2 ' Yet, the misapplication of the First Amendment
has provided the credit rating agencies with "absolute immunity" from
22
legal actions. Moreover, the regulatory protections provided by the
Commission23 have further shielded the credit rating agencies from lia-
bility. Instead, the courts should hold credit rating agencies liable for
fraudulent or negligently prepared credit ratings that are false or mislead-
ing. Similarly, the Commission should respect the express intentions of
Congress and eliminate the exemption from liability provided to the
credit rating agencies for false or misleading statements in a registration
statement. Finally, while Congress has attempted to address the conflicts
involved in the credit rating agencies, the recently issued Credit Rating
Agency Reform Rules of 201424 fail to eliminate the inherent conflicts of
interest in a business model in which the issuer of the security hires and
pays the fee of the agency that determines the rating of the security.
This Article will begin by exploring some of the basic protections of
the freedom of speech embodied in the First Amendment. Part I will first
discuss the protections afforded to the press, including the "journalist's
privilege" and the extension of this privilege to the credit rating agencies.
This Article will then explore the protections provided to fully protected
speech, as compared to commercial speech, and consider the level of
protection that courts should afford to speech by a credit rating agency.
Next, this Article will discuss the contours of protection provided to
statements of opinion, including the actual malice standard, and the con-
text in which the actual malice standard has been applied to the credit
rating agencies. This part will then examine statements of opinion by
professionals and the application of this concept to cases involving the
credit rating agencies. Finally, this part will consider whether the First
Amendment protections afforded to the credit rating agencies are justi-
fied and conclude that the First Amendment should not shield the credit
rating agencies.
Credit and Market Risk, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks Before the Risk Maga-
zine Credit Risk Conference 2 (May 22, 2012), http://www.occ.treas.gov/news-
issuances/speeches/2012/pub-speech-2012-81 .pdf (stating the proposition that credit rating agencies
"mis-rate[d] tens of billions of subprime securitizations and their derivative [collateralized debt
obligations]").
21. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, TESTIMONY OF JOHN WALSli
ACTING COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND




written.pdf ("Issues surrounding credit ratings were a significant factor in market overconfidence
that contributed to subsequent losses in the markets for mortgage-backed securities in 2008-2009.").
22. See Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund v. Standard & Poor's Fin. Servs., LLC, 813 F. Supp.
2d 871, 877 & n.1 (S.D. Ohio 2011) (noting the rating agencies' argument that credit "ratings enjoy
absolute immunity under the First Amendment" and explaining that "[c]ourts have traditionally
extended First Amendment protection to credit ratings").
23. See, e.g., SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 19, at *1-2.
24. Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 79 Fed. Reg. 55,078, 55,078
(Sept. 15, 2014) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 232, 240, 249 & 249b).
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In Part II, this Article will examine the regulatory protections pro-
vided to the credit rating agencies. This part will argue that, despite the
attempts of Congress to hold the credit rating agencies accountable for
false or misleading statements in a registration statement, the Commis-
sion has persisted in shielding the agencies from liability. Finally, in
Part III, this Article will discuss the conflicts of interest inherent in the
issuer-pays model and the minimal reforms implemented to address this
significant issue.
I. THE JUDICIARY PROTECTIONS
The freedom of speech, established by the First Amendment,2 5 is a
right that many may take for granted, but few may realize the extent of
its use in protecting the credit rating agencies. The following part will
explore the doctrine of free speech in the context of the credit rating
agencies.
A. The First Amendment
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides, in
relevant part, that "Congress shall make no law . .. abridging the free-
,,26dom of speech, or of the press. Thus, in its simplest form, the First
Amendment protects the right of citizens and of the press to free
speech.2 7 However, this right to free speech is not absolute.28 For exam-
25. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of griev-
ances.").
26. Id.
27. See id.; see also Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759
(1985) ("[S]peech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-
government." (alteration in original) (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964)));
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) ("The general proposition that freedom of
expression upon public questions is secured by the First Amendment has long been settled by our
decisions."); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) ("The protection given speech and
press was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and
social changes desired by the people."); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939) (noting
that the Supreme Court has considered free speech and a free press to be "fundamental personal
rights and liberties").
28. Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 233 (1985) (White, J., concurring) ("Not all restrictions on
speech are impermissible."); Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 150 (1967) ("Federal securi-
ties regulation, mail fraud statutes, and common-law actions for deceit and misrepresentation are
only some examples of our understanding that the right to communicate information of public inter-
est is not 'unconditional."' (footnotes omitted)); Near v. Minn. ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 708
(1931) ("Liberty of speech and of the press is also not an absolute right, and the state may punish its
abuse."); see also WILLIAM B. LOCKHART ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 614 (8th ed. 1996) ("Laws
forbidding speech . . . are commonplace."). But see Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 61
(1961) (Black, J., dissenting) ("[T]he First Amendment's unequivocal command that there shall be
no abridgment of the rights of free speech... shows that the men who drafted our Bill of Rights did
all the 'balancing' that was to be done in this field. . . . [T]he very object of adopting the First
Amendment . . . was to put the freedoms protected there completely out of the area of any congres-
sional control . . , .").
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ple, a citizen is "not free to yell 'fire' falsely in a crowded theater."2 9
Likewise, laws against fraud effectively limit free speech.30 Moreover,
the Supreme Court has noted that the constitutionality of laws that pro-
hibit fraud is "beyond question."31 Notwithstanding the qualified nature
of the right to free speech, the credit rating agencies have successfully
used the First Amendment as a shield against liability for issuing what
many would consider fraudulent or, at the very least, negligent credit
32
ratings.
The First Amendment protection of credit rating agencies emanates
from the "freedom of . .. the press"3 3 clause. This clause was intended
"to preserve an untrammeled press as a vital source of public infor-
mation."34 While a credit rating agency does not issue a daily newspaper
reporting on a wide variety of information ranging from world news to
sports, the Supreme Court has found that "[t]he liberty of the press is not
confined to newspapers and periodicals . . . [t]he press in its historic con-
notation comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle
of information and opinion. "3 Courts have found that the role of a credit
rating agency is to gather information and to use that information to pub-
36lish a credit rating. Thus, some courts have characterized credit rating
29. LOCKHART ET AL., supra note 28, at 614 (explaining that notwithstanding the freedom of
speech protections of the first amendment, citizens are not "free to say anything, anywhere, at any
time"); see also Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) ("The most stringent protection of
free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.").
30. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2547 (2012) ("Where false claims are
made to effect a fraud . . . it is well established that the Government may restrict speech without
affronting the First Amendment." (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (noting that the government may prohibit misleading or
deceptive speech))); see also LOCKHART ET AL., supra note 28, at 614 (noting that laws prohibiting
fraud restrict free speech).
31. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2561 ("Laws prohibiting fraud . . . were in existence when the First
Amendment was adopted, and their constitutionality is now beyond question." (citing Donaldson v.
Read Magazine, Inc., 333 U.S. 178, 190 (1948) (explaining that the power of the government "to
protect people against fraud . . . has always been recognized in this country and is firmly estab-
lished"))).
32. See Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig.), 511 F.
Supp. 2d 742, 815-18 (S.D. Tex. 2005) ("[T]his Court finds that generally the courts have not held
credit rating agencies accountable for alleged professional negligence or fraud and that plaintiffs
have not prevailed in litigation against them."); see also PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS, supra note
3, at 96 ("[C]ourts have extended First Amendment protections to credit ratings, shielding the agen-
cies from liability.").
33. See U.S. CONsT. amend. 1.
34. Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250-51 (1936) (holding that a license tax im-
posed upon the press is unconstitutional); see also Near v. Minn. ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 713
(1931) (Butler, J., dissenting) (explaining the "chief purpose" of the constitutional guarantee of
"liberty of the press" is "to prevent previous restraints upon publication"); von Bulow ex rel. Auer-
sperg v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 142 (2d Cir. 1987) (noting "the strong public policy supporting
the unfettered communication of information by the journalist to the public").
35. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938) (holding a city ordinance prohibiting
the distribution of handbooks, circulars, literature, or advertising without a permit to be void on its
face).
36. Pan Am Corp. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. (In re Pan Am Corp.), 161 B.R. 577, 581-82
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993) (describing Standard & Poor's "gathering of a wide range of information
from a variety of sources . . . for the purpose and with the intent of publishing a [credit] rating").
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agencies as "publishers or journalists" and provided the rating agencies
with First Amendment protection37
However, the First Amendment does not provide publishers with
automatic protection from liability when there is a violation of laws gen-
erally.38 The Supreme Court has found that "[a] business 'is not immune
from regulation' simply because it is a member of the press.39 "The pub-
lisher of a newspaper has no special immunity from the application of
general laws."40 Moreover, the "enforcement of . .. general laws against
the press is not subject to stricter scrutiny than [what] would be applied
to . .. other [entities]."41 Thus, a publisher must abide by "nondiscrimi-
natory, neutral laws" that do not have an impact on the "impartial distri-
bution of news."42 For example, a publisher has no First Amendment
protection for libel.4 3 A publisher also may be subject to penalties for
contempt of court."4 Therefore, "[t]he First Amendment does not grant
the press . . . limitless protection."45 Similarly, a credit rating agency is
not entitled to protection under the First Amendment simply because of
its "status as a financial publisher."4 6 Thus, a publisher's First Amend-
ment protection is qualified.47
37. Enron Corp., 511 F. Supp. 2d at 818 (citing Pan Am Corp., 161 B.R. at 581-82 (finding
that a credit rating agency "functions as a journalist when gathering information in connection with
its rating process .. . with the intent to use the material to disseminate information to the public"));
Cty. of Orange v. McGraw Hill Cos., 245 B.R. 151, 154-56 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1999) (referring to
Standard & Poor's as a "financial publisher" and applying the protections of the First Amendment).
38. Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 150 (1967); see also First Nat'l Bank of Boston
v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 802 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("[T]he First Amendment does not
'belong' to any definable category of persons or entities . . . .").
39. Curtis Publ'g Co., 388 U.S. at 150 (quoting Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132
(1937) ("[T]he Associated Press is not immune from regulation because it is an agency of the
press.")).
40. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 670 (1991) (quoting Associated Press, 301
U.S. at 132-33 ("[The publisher of a newspaper] has no special privilege to invade the rights and
liberties of others.")).
41. Compuware Corp. v. Moody's Inv'rs Servs., Inc., 499 F.3d 520, 529 (6th Cir. 2007)
(quoting Cohen, 501 U.S. at 670).
42. Cty. of Orange, 245 B.R. at 154 (citing Cohen, 501 U.S. at 670 (holding that newspaper
publishers must abide by general laws)); Associated Press, 301 U.S. at 130-33 (holding that pub-
lishers are subject to the National Labor Relations Act).
43. Associated Press, 301 U.S. at 132-33 (noting that a newspaper publisher "must answer for
libel"); Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897) ("[T]he freedom of speech and of the press
... does not permit the publication of libels. . . .").
44. Associated Press, 301 U.S. at 132-33 (noting that a newspaper publisher "may be pun-
ished for contempt of court").
45. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 665, 671 (finding that the First Amendment does not protect a news-
paper from liability for "breach of a promise of confidentiality").
46. Cty. of Orange, 245 B.R. at 154 ("[T]he question is not whether the defendant is a pub-
lisher but whether the cause of action impacts expression." (quoting Cty. of Orange v. McGraw-hill
Cos. (In re Cty. of Orange), 245 B.R. 138, 144 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1997))).
47. Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig.), 511 F.
Supp. 2d 742, 818 (S.D. Tex. 2005) ("The journalist privilege is a qualified one." (quoting Am. Say.
Bank, FSB v. UBS Painewebber, Inc., No. M8-85, 2002 WL 31833223, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16,
2002))); Pan Am Corp. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. (In re Pan Am Corp.), 161 B.R. 577, 584 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding "the journalist's privilege [to be] a qualified one"); In re Scott Paper Co.
Sec. Litig., 145 F.R.D. 366, 370 (E.D. Pa. 1992) ("The journalist privilege is a qualified one. . . .").
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1. The Journalist's Privilege
One example of a qualified privilege is the journalist's privilege to
withhold "confidential sources and information in judicial proceed-
ings."48 The qualified First Amendment right to engage in the "process of
newsgathering" forms the basis of the journalist's privilege.4 9 The intent
of the person or entity at the very beginning of the "information-
gathering process" determines whether that person or entity is considered
a journalist and, therefore, entitled to the protection of the journalist's
privilege.50 In particular, the ability to invoke the journalist's privilege is
based on the established intent to gather information and material for
public dissemination, and that specific intent must be present from the
start of the "newsgathering process."5' Thus, at the point when the in-
formation is received, the person or entity must be "professionally en-
gaged in newsgathering."52 Moreover, the journalist's privilege may be
available if the individual or entity is engaged in traditional newsgather-
ing and dissemination functions even if the individual or entity is not
usually considered a part of the "institutionalized press.,5 3
Credit rating agencies generally have been afforded the journalist's
privilege in cases concerning the subpoena of information.54 For exam-
ple, in In re Pan Am Corp.,55 the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York held that Standard & Poor's was entitled to invoke
the journalist's privilege to withhold information sought through a sub-
48. von Bulow ex rel. Auersperg v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 141 (2d Cir. 1987); see also
Pan Am Corp., 161 B.R. at 584 ("[T]he journalist's privilege is a qualified one and may be over-
come by a showing of need by the party seeking disclosure.").
49. von Bulow, 811 F.2d at 142 ("[T]he process of newsgathering is a protected right under
the First Amendment, albeit a qualified one. This qualified right, which results in the journalist's
privilege, emanates from the strong public policy supporting the unfettered communication of in-
formation by the journalist to the public."); see also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972)
(acknowledging that "without some protection for seeking out he news, freedom of the press could
be eviscerated").
50. von Bulow, 811 F.2d at 142 (explaining the standards of the journalist's privilege).
51. Id. at 144 ("We hold that the individual claiming the privilege must demonstrate ... the
intent to use material-sought, gathered or eceived-to disseminate information to the public and
that such intent existed at the inception of the newsgathering process.").
52. Pan Am Corp., 161 B.R. at 580 (quoting Don King Prods., Inc. v. Douglas, 131 F.R.D.
421, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)).
53. von Bulow, 811 F.2d at 142. But cf Am. Say. Bank, FSB v. UBS PaineWebber, Inc. (In re
Fitch, Inc.), 330 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (finding that a credit rating agency was
not acting in the role of "professional journalist" engaged in "newsgathering activities" when it
gathered information used to publish ratings and, thus, was not entitled to assert the journalist's
privilege and not addressing the question of whether a credit rating agency "could ever be" afforded
the journalist's privilege).
54. PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS, supra note 3, at 96-97 ("Courts have even refused to
require that credit rating agencies produce records in connection with their work, citing the 'journal-
ist's' privilege."); see, e.g., Pan Am Corp., 161 B.R. at 582, 586 (finding "the journalist's privilege
to be applicable" in quashing a subpoena seeking information from Standard & Poor's in connection
with its credit rating of Pan Am).
55. 161 B.R. 577 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993).
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poena.5 6 The court found that Standard & Poor's gathered information
and communicated it to the public by means of several periodicals that
were circulated on a regular basis to the general public." Standard &
Poor's included in its publications not only information provided by the
issuers of securities rated by Standard & Poor's but also information
based on the agency's own research with the intention of publishing "ob-
jective ratings for the [public's] benefit."58 Thus, the court found that
Standard & Poor's possessed the "requisite newsgathering intent" from
the inception of the process; therefore, the agency should be accorded the
journalist's privilege.5 9 The fact that some of the information sought
through the subpoena was gathered on a confidential basis and, thus,
without the intent to disseminate to the public, did not eviscerate the ap-
plicability of the journalist's privilege.60 The privilege extends to confi-
dential information as well as to other nonpublished information that is
used for resource purposes.
Moreover, the district court rejected the bankruptcy court's conclu-
sion that Standard & Poor's issues credit ratings primarily for economic
gain and, thus, was not entitled to "heightened First Amendment protec-
tion." 62 The district court found that Standard & Poor's does not issue
56. Id. at 581-82, 586; accord In re Scott Paper Co. Sec. Litig., 145 F.R.D. 366, 367-71 (E.D.
Pa. 1992) (finding the journalist's privilege applicable to Standard & Poor's with respect to docu-
ments associated with Standard & Poor's credit rating of Scott Paper Co.'s debt securities).
57. Pan Am Corp., 161 BR. at 579, 584 ("[S&P] publishes its ratings and other financial
information in periodicals like CreditWeek, High Yield Quarterly, and Ratings Handbook. ... S&P
... regularly publishes [these] periodicals containing subjective financial analysis and commentary
for widespread distribution to the public at large."); see also Scott Paper Co., 145 F.R.D. at 370
("S&P publishes periodicals with a regular circulation to a general population.").
58. Pan Am Corp., 161 B.R. at 583 ("S&P does not merely depend on information provided
by issuers to fill its publications, but rather conducts its own independent research with an eye to-
ward publishing objective ratings for the benefit of the public."); see also Scott Paper Co., 145
F.R.D. at 370 ("S&P publishes information for the benefit of the general public.").
59. Pan Am Corp., 161 B.R. at 581-83, 586 ("As a publisher of publicly distributed financial
ratings, analysis and commentary, S&P is, as a matter of law, deserving of the full breadth of First
Amendment safeguards."); see also Scott Paper Co., 145 F.R.D. at 370 ("S&P falls within [the First
Amendment's] umbrella of protection.").
60. Pan Am Corp., 161 B.R. at 582-83 ("Thus, the fact that S&P may not have accepted all of
the information Pan Am seeks with specific intent to disclose that particular information does not
render the privilege inapplicable because . . . the information sought by the subpoena was received
as part of S&P's newsgathering process with the intent to disseminate information to the public.").
61. von Bulow ex rel. Auersperg v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 143-44 (2d Cir. 1987) ("Jour-
nalists who seek to guard information that has not been published likewise have been accorded the
protective shroud. 'Like the compelled disclosure of confidential sources, [the compelled production
of a reporter's resource materials] may substantially undercut the public policy favoring the free
flow of information to the public that is the foundation of the privilege."' (alteration in original)
(quoting United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 1980))); see also Am. Say. Bank,
FSB v. UBS PaineWebber, Inc. (In re Fitch, Inc.), 330 F.3d 104, 108-09 (2d Cir. 2003) (per curiam)
(noting that the journalist's privilege prevents the discovery of confidential information and "un-
published nonconfidential information" (citing Gonzales v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 194 F.3d 29, 32 (2d
Cir. 1998) (agreeing that he journalist's privilege "applies to nonconfidential as well as to confiden-
tial materials"))).
62. Pan Am Corp., 161 B.R. at 583 ("[T]he Bankruptcy Court's findings ... that S&P re-
ceives a fee for its ratings activity and its conclusion that economic factors predominate in its ratings
activities are clearly erroneous.").
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ratings only when requested by an issuer for a fee; rather, the rating
agency typically provides unsolicited ratings without any fee.63 For ex-
ample, Standard & Poor's assigns credit ratings to nearly all issues of
preferred stock and debt securities regardless of whether the rating agen-
cy has been hired to do so and irrespective of receiving a fee. Moreo-
ver, the court found that the journalist's privilege is fully applicable to
publications of a financial nature.65 Thus, the court held that Standard &
Poor's acted in the role of a journalist when it gathered information to
produce its ratings with the specific intent to use that material to circulate
information to the general public and, thus, was entitled to invoke the
journalist's privilege to withhold information sought by a subpoena.
66
However, some courts have declined to extend the journalist's privi-
67lege to the credit rating agencies. For example, the Second Circuit has
held that the journalist's privilege is inapplicable when the credit rating
agency is unable to demonstrate that it gathered the subpoenaed infor-
mation as part of the "newsgathering activities of a professional journal-
ist.",
6 In re Fitch, Inc.,69 provides a case in point concerning the "outer
boundaries" of the journalist's privilege and the limits to asserting the
privilege by an entity that is not regarded as part of the traditional me-
dia.70
In examining the nature of the information gathering activities at is-
sue, the Second Circuit found that Fitch gathered information to publish
ratings based on the needs of its clients rather than on the basis of the
63. Id. ("The record is uncontradicted that S&P does not merely provide ratings to issuers
who pay a fee.").
64. Id. ("Similarly, even without a request or fee from an issuer, S&P revises, updates and
reviews a prior rating or analysis of an issuer or debt instrument on S&P's determination that such
information is important to its readers or subscribers.").
65. Id. at 584 ("[S]ubstantial authority [has held] that the financial press is fully shielded by
the umbrella of the First Amendment." (citing McGraw-Hill, Inc. v. Arizona (In re Petroleum Prods.
Antitrust Litig.), 680 F.2d 5, 7-8 (2d Cir. 1982) (finding the journalist's privilege applicable to a
division of McGraw-Hill, Inc. with respect to documents regarding the "names of confidential
sources of information"))); see also In re Scott Paper Co. Sec. Litig., 145 F.R.D. 366, 369-71 (E.D.
Pa. 1992) (finding the journalist's privilege applicable to Standard & Poor's with respect to docu-
ments associated with Standard & Poor's credit rating of Scott Paper Co.'s debt securities).
66. Pan Am Corp., 161 B.R. at 581-86. The court also found that Pan Am was unable to
"pierce the journalist's privilege" because Pan Am failed to show that the information it sought was
unavailable through other sources. Id at 586.
67. Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig.), 511 F.
Supp. 2d 742, 818 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (noting that other courts "have questioned in particular the
extension of the 'journalist's privilege' recognized by some courts to extend to credit rating agen-
cies").
68. Am. Say. Bank, FSB v. UBS PaineWebber, Inc. (In re Fitch, Inc.), 330 F.3d 104, Ill (2d
Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (holding that the journalist's privilege is inapplicable to quash a subpoena
against a credit rating agency where the agency failed to show that it gathered the requested infor-
mation "pursuant to the newsgathering activities of a professional journalist").
69. 330 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2003) (per curiam).
70. Id. at 105 (noting that the court was deciding the "outer boundaries" of the journalist's
privilege "and the extent to which information-gathering organizations that are not traditionally
considered part of the media may claim that privilege").
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"newsworthiness" of the information. Distinguishing the Pan Am case,
in which Standard & Poor's published ratings for "virtually all public
debt financing and preferred stock issues" regardless of whether or not
the issuers were clients, the court found that "Fitch only 'covers' its own
clients."72
Moreover, the court found that Fitch was actively engaged in help-
73
ing the client structure the relevant transaction. For example, an em-
ployee of Fitch offered suggestions to the client regarding changes to the
transaction that would be necessary to obtain the ratings desired by the
client.74 The Second Circuit concluded that the "level of involvement"
Fitch displayed with respect to its client's transaction was not character-
istic of the relationship normally observed between a "professional jour-
nalist" and the news reported by the journalist.75
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Second Circuit held that Fitch
failed to establish that it functioned in the role of a professional journalist
engaged in "newsgathering activities" when it gathered the requested
material, and thus, the rating agency could not use the journalist's privi-
lege to prevent the discovery of the information.7 6 Additionally, the Se-
cond Circuit explained that it was not determining whether, as a general
matter, the journalist's privilege is applicable to a credit rating agency
under New York law.n As the court stated, the question of whether a
credit rating agency "could ever be entitled to assert the . . . privilege" in
New York is yet to be determined. While the Second Circuit expressly
maintained that it was not deciding the larger question of whether the
journalist's privilege is generally applicable to a credit rating agency
under New York law, the emphasis of the word "ever" in the court's
71. Id. at 109-10 ("Fitch's information-disseminating activity does not seem to be based on a
judgment about newsworthiness, but rather on client needs.").
72. Id. (noting the lack of evidence "to support Fitch's claim that it regularly analyzes or
publishes a rating for a transaction it is not paid to rate" and contrasting "Standard & Poor's practice
... of rating nearly all public debt issuances regardless of whether it was hired to do so or not"); see
also Pan Am Corp. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. (In re Pan Am Corp.), 161 B.R. 577, 583 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1993) (explaining that Standard & Poor's regularly publishes ratings regardless of whether
it receives a fee).
73. Fitch, 330 F.3d at 110-11 ("Fitch played an active role in helping (the client] decide how
to structure the transaction.").
74. Id. (noting that a Fitch employee commented on the potential transactions and offered
"suggestions about how to model the transactions to reach the desired ratings").
75. Id. ("Fitch has an extremely close relationship with the companies it rates.... [Its] level
of involvement with the client's transactions . . . is not typical of the relationship between a journal-
ist and the activities upon which the journalist reports.").
76. Id. at 111 (concluding that "the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that
Fitch was not entitled to assert the journalist's privilege" for the subpoenaed information).
77. Id. ("For the sake of clarity, we note that we are not deciding the general status of a credit
rating agency like Fitch under New York's [journalist's privilege] . . . .").
78. Id. ("Whether Fitch, or one of its rivals, could ever be entitled to assert the newsgathering
privilege is a question we leave for another day.").
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statement appears to imply that the ability of a credit rating agency to
assert the privilege in the future may be somewhat limited."
The Supreme Court has not yet determined whether it would con-
sider credit rating agencies to be members of the press and, therefore,
entitled to the same protections under the First Amendment.80
2. Fully Protected Speech v. Commercial Speech
As noted in Section I.A. 1, the First Amendment protects publica-
tions specifically concerning economic or business matters.8 1 However,
the courts have recognized that the First Amendment does not fully pro-
82
tect every type of publication. For example, the Supreme Court has
distinguished commercial speech from other types of speech and found
that commercial speech is deserving of a different level of protection
under the First Amendment.8  Accordingly, the Supreme Court has de-
veloped two canons of law in this area, namely the doctrine of fully pro-
tected speech and the commercial speech doctrine.84 A restriction on
fully protected speech may be permitted "only if the government can
show that the regulation is a precisely drawn means of serving a compel-
ling state interest."8 5
79. See id. (emphasizing the word "ever" in its statement regarding whether a credit rating
agency would be able to assert the journalist's privilege in the future).
80. In re Scott Paper Co. Sec. Litig., 145 F.R.D. 366, 369 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (noting that the
Supreme Court has yet to analyze whether the credit rating agencies "constitute the press under the
First Amendment").
81. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770
(1976) (finding that "commercial speech . . . is protected"); Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron
Corp. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig.), 511 F. Supp. 2d 742, 810 (S.D. Tex. 2005) ("First
Amendment protections reach publications related to business or economic issues."); Scott Paper
Co., 145 F.R.D. at 369 ("[D]isseminators of corporate financial information should . . . have as
strong a claim to First Amendment protection as do disseminators of other kinds of information....
Economic ... information, for example, has as great a claim to First Amendment protection as does
political discourse."); see also supra note 65 and accompanying text.
82. Scott Paper Co., 145 F.R.D. at 369 (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-72
& n.24 (finding that commercial speech is not fully protected by the First Amendment)) ("[N]ot
every publication which purports to disclose information automatically qualifies as the press with
full First Amendment protection."); see also Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,
472 U.S. 749, 758 (1985) ("[N]ot all speech is of equal First Amendment importance.").
83. Scott Paper Co., 145 F.R.D. at 369 ("[T]he Supreme Court has held that commercial
speech is only afforded limited First Amendment protection." (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425
U.S. at 771-72 & n.24 (clarifying that while "commercial speech enjoys First Amendment protec-
tion ... it is [not] wholly undifferentiable from other forms" of speech))).
84. See Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 233-35 (1985) (White, J., concurring) (acknowledging
the doctrine of fully protected speech and the commercial speech doctrine); see also Va. State Bd of
Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-72 & n.24 (discussing commercial speech).
85. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 540
(1980); see, e.g., People v. Foley, 257 A.D.2d 243, 246, 252 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (holding that a
statute prohibiting dissemination of "indecent material to minors" over the Internet "is a precisely
drawn means of serving a compelling [state] interest" and "is thus constitutional under the First
Amendment"); cf Consol. Edison Co. of N Y., 447 U.S. at 540, 544 (holding that a government
proscription of "bill inserts that discuss controversial issues of public policy" is not "a narrowly
drawn prohibition justified by a compelling state interest" and, thus, "directly infringes the freedom
of speech protected by the First . . .Amendment[]").
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Under the commercial speech doctrine, the government may prevent
commercial speech when it is "false, deceptive, or misleading,"86 or
when it "proposes an illegal transaction."87 In the case of commercial
speech that is not false, deceptive, or misleading and does not involve an
unlawful transaction, the government may still restrict such speech but
only when "a substantial governmental interest" exists and the re-
strictions "directly advance that interest,,8 8 Thus, the First Amendment
protects commercial speech; however, the protections afforded to such
speech are relatively less than the safeguards provided for fully protected
or noncommercial speech.8 9 Accordingly, the government may regulate
commercial speech by means that might not be deemed tolerable in the
context of noncommercial speech.90
The commercial speech doctrine was developed in the context of
advertisements in that such communications suggest a commercial trans-
action between the receiver of the communication and the speaker.9 1
86. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626,
638 (1985); see also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
563 (1980) (noting that the government may prohibit commercial speech "likely to deceive the
public"); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 9 (1979) (noting that restrictions on deceptive, misleading,
or false commercial speech are permissible); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977)
("[T]he public and private benefits from commercial speech derive from confidence in its accuracy
and reliability. Thus, the leeway for untruthful or misleading expression that has been allowed in
other contexts has little force in the commercial arena."); Va. State Bd. ofPharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771
("Untruthful speech, commercial or otherwise, has never been protected for its own sake.... [Mjuch
commercial speech is not provably false, or even wholly false, but only deceptive or misleading. We
foresee no obstacle to a State's dealing effectively with this problem." (citations omitted)).
87. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 638 (citing Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human
Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 389 (1973) ("Any First Amendment interest which might be served by
advertising an ordinary commercial proposal and which might arguably outweigh the governmental
interest supporting the regulation is altogether absent when the commercial activity itself is illegal
and the restriction on advertising is incidental to a valid limitation on economic activity.")); see also
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 563-64 (noting the government may prohibit "com-
mercial speech related to illegal activity").
88. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 638; Lowe, 472 U.S. at 233 (White, J., concurring) ("Under the
commercial speech doctrine, restrictions on commercial speech that directly advance a substantial
governmental interest may be upheld."); see also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 564
("The State must assert a substantial interest to be achieved by restrictions on commercial speech...
[T]he restriction must directly advance [that] . . . interest . . .. ").
89. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 637 ("There is no longer any room to doubt that what has come to
be known as 'commercial speech' is entitled to the protection of the First Amendment, albeit to
protection somewhat less extensive than that afforded 'noncommercial speech."'); see also Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758 n.5 (1985) (noting that "[i]n the area
of protected speech," commercial speech is deserving of "reduced protection" because "[s]uch
speech . . . occupies a 'subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values' (quoting
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978))); Lowe, 472 U.S. at 233-34 (White, J.,
concurring) (acknowledging that commercial speech is afforded less protection than fully protected
speech); Va. State Bd ofPharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770-71 & n.24 (explaining that commercial speech
is protected under the First Amendment but is afforded a "different degree of protection" than other
forms of speech).
90. Greenmoss Builders Inc., 472 U.S. at 758 n.5 (explaining that commercial speech "may be
regulated in ways that might be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression" (citing
Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456)).
91. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 561, 563 (defining commercial speech
as "expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience" and finding
that "promotional advertising" constitutes commercial speech (citing Va. State Bd. ofPharmacy, 425
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However, the commercial speech doctrine has been considered in other
contexts as well.92 For example, in Lowe v. SEC,93 the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to address the question of whether a securities newslet-
ter containing commentary and investment advice constituted protected
speech under the First Amendment.94 The majority of the Court decided
the case on statutory grounds95 and, thus, did not squarely address the
constitutional question. However, the majority noted that the newsletter
and a securities chart service offered by the petitioner would constitute
protected communications under the First Amendment to the extent that
the publications contained "factual information" and commentary regard-
ing the securities market.9 7 Thus, without directly deciding the issue, the
majority indicated that a financial newsletter may constitute an "expres-
sion of opinion" that should be protected under the First Amendment.98
The Court's use of the language "expression of opinion" appears to im-
ply that, if squarely addressing the issue, the Court would consider a fi-
nancial newsletter containing commentary regarding the securities mar-
ket to be fully protected speech under the First Amendment.9 9
U.S. at 761-62 (finding that "speech which does 'no more than propose a commercial transaction"'
is commercial speech protected under the First Amendment and, thus, an advertisement containing
the prices of prescription drugs is considered commercial speech (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co., 413
U.S. at 385)))); see also Bates, 433 U.S. at 363-64, 384 (noting that commercial speech should not
be excluded from protection under the First Amendment "merely because it propose[s] a mundane
commercial transaction [and] . . . the speaker's interest is largely economic"; therefore, advertising
by attorneys is commercial speech protected by the First Amendment).
92. See Lowe, 472 U.S. at 233-35 (White, J., concurring) (discussing the commercial speech
doctrine in the context of financial newsletters); see also In re Scott Paper Co. Sec. Litig., 145
F.R.D. 366, 369-70 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (discussing the commercial speech doctrine in the context of the
journalist's privilege).
93. 472 U.S. 181 (1985).
94. Id. at 185, 188-89 ("A typical issue of the [newsletter] . . . contained general commentary
about the securities ... market[], reviews of market indicators and investment strategies, and specific
recommendations for buying, selling, or holding stocks .... .").
95. Id. at 183, 211 (concluding that the "publications fall within the statutory exclusion for
bona fide publications" under the Investment Advisors Act of 1940; thus, the petitioners were not
"investment adviser[s]" under the Act, and the newsletters could not be enjoined for failure to regis-
ter as investment advisers); see also Scott Paper Co., 145 F.R.D. at 369-70 (discussing Lowe and
explaining that "[t]he majority of the court, as a matter of statutory interpretation, held that an in-
vestment newsletter was not subject to regulation by the Securities and Exchange Commission under
the Investment Advisor's Act of 1940").
96. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 211 (stating that the Court "need not specifically address the constitu-
tional question"); see also Scott Paper Co., 145 F.R.D. at 369-70 (discussing Lowe and noting that
"the Supreme Court considered, but declined to determine, whether investment newsletters fell
within the definition of the press for First Amendment purposes").
97. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 210 ("To the extent that the chart service contains factual information
about past transactions and market trends, and the newsletters contain commentary on general mar-
ket conditions, there can be no doubt about the protected character of the communications . . .. ").
98. Id. at 210 n.58 ("[W]e have squarely held that the expression of opinion about a commer-
cial product such as a loudspeaker is protected by the First Amendment; [therefore,] it is difficult to
see why the expression of an opinion about a marketable security should not also be protected."
(citation omitted) (citing Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 513 (1984))).
99. See Scott Paper Co., 145 F.R.D. at 370 ("[T]he Supreme Court would be likely to hold, if
squarely faced with the issue, that he investment newsletters . . . would . . . be protected by the free
press clause of the First Amendment."); see also Lowe, 472 U.S. at 210 & n.58; R&W Tech. Servs.
Ltd. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 205 F.3d 165, 175 (5th Cir. 2000) ("[T]he publication
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The concurring opinion authored by Justice White, and joined by
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, directly considered the con-
stitutional issue of whether the financial newsletters were protected
speech under the First Amendment.'" Justice White sidestepped the
more narrow issue of whether the newsletters contained commercial
speech or fully protected speech maintaining that it was unnecessary to
determine the specific type of speech in order to resolve the primary is-
sue of whether the First Amendment protected the newsletters.10 If the
newsletters contained fully protected speech, then the government prohi-
bition, which extended not only to deceptive, manipulative, or fraudulent
speech but also to "legitimate, disinterested advice," is "presumptively
invalid" as a "flat prohibition or prior restraint on speech."l02 Alterna-
tively, if the newsletters were commercial speech, then any restrictions
on such speech must be "narrowly tailored to advance a legitimate gov-
ernmental interest."0 3 While the interest in this case was legitimate in
that the government desired to protect investors from unscrupulous indi-
viduals that may publish misleading or fraudulent advice, the means used
by the government to achieve its objective were "extreme."'1 The gov-
ernment restriction was intended to prevent the petitioner from publish-
ing advice altogether, irrespective of whether or not the advice was mis-
leading or fraudulent.05 Even with the "reduced level of scrutiny" em-
ployed with restrictions concerning commercial speech, Justice White
of impersonal advice about specific investments is fully protected speech under the First Amend-
ment.").
100. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 211 (White, J., concurring) ("I concur in the judgment ... because to
prevent petitioner from publishing at all is inconsistent with the First Amendment.").
101. Id. at 234 (maintaining that the determination of whether financial newsletters constitute
commercial speech or fully protected speech is unnecessary).
102. Id. (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J., concur-
ring) ("Both the history and language of the First Amendment support the view that the press must
be left free to publish news . . . without censorship, injunctions, or prior restraints.")) (finding that a
ban on "legitimate, disinterested advice" is "a flat prohibition or prior restraint on speech" and, "as
applied to fully protected speech, [is] presumptively invalid and may be sustained only under the
most extraordinary circumstances"); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939) ("To re-
quire a censorship through license which makes impossible the free and unhampered distribution of
pamphlets strikes at the very heart of the constitutional guarantees."); Near v. Minn. ex rel. Olson,
283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931) (noting that the "chief purpose" of the "constitutional protection" is "to
prevent previous restraints upon publication").
103. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 234 (White, J., concurring) ("[E]ven where mere 'commercial speech'
is concerned, the First Amendment permits restraints on speech only when they are narrowly tailored
to advance a legitimate governmental interest."); see also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 565 (1980) (recognizing that the First Amendment requires
restrictions on speech to be "narrowly drawn" (quoting In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 438 (1978))).
104. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 234-35 (White, J., concurring) (finding a legitimate government inter-
est in desiring "to prevent investors from falling into the hands of scoundrels and swindlers" while
also finding "[t]he means chosen [to be] extreme").
105. Id. ("Based on petitioner's past misconduct, the Government fears that he may in the
future publish advice that is fraudulent or misleading; and it therefore seeks to prevent him from
publishing any advice, regardless of whether it is actually objectionable.").
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found the government's prohibition to be "too blunt an instrument to
survive" constitutional scrutiny.106
Similarly, in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,107
the Supreme Court did not directly address the issue of whether a credit
report issued by a credit reporting agency would be considered fully pro-
tected speech or commercial speech.108 However, the Court appeared to
imply that it would deem such speech to be commercial speech.109 The
Court explained that, similar to advertising, a credit report that provides
subscribers with financial information regarding businesses "is hardy and
unlikely to be deterred by incidental state regulation."10 Moreover, such
speech is "motivated by the desire for profit" and, therefore, is not as
easily deterred as other forms of speech.' The Court also explained that
the market creates a strong incentive for a credit reporting agency to is-
sue an accurate report because an inaccurate report would have no val-
ue.112 Therefore, the possibility of an "incremental 'chilling' effect" on
such speech because of the potential for a lawsuit merits a reduced level
of concern.
The Supreme Court has yet to address the issue of whether speech
by a credit rating agency regarding the credit rating of an issuer or issue
of securities is fully protected speech or commercial speech. Notably, in
Lowe, the majority's use of the language "expression of opinion" when
referring to a financial newsletter containing commentary regarding se-
curities may imply that the Court would consider credit ratings to be ful-
ly protected speech under the First Amendment.114 Conversely, in
Greenmoss Builders, the Court's comparison of a credit report issued by
a credit reporting agency to commercial advertising may imply that the
Court would view a credit rating issued by a credit rating agency as
106. Id. at 235 (reasoning that "less drastic remedies than outright suppression . . . are [likely]
available to achieve the Government's asserted purpose of protecting investors").
107. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
108. See id. at 762-63.
109. See id (explaining how the speech at issue is similar to advertising); see also Oberman v.
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 460 F.2d 1381, 1384 (7th Cir. 1972) (expressing a lack of acceptance of the
proposition that a "credit rating . . . was entitled to the same treatment that he Supreme Court has
afforded newspapers and magazines").
110. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 762-63 (1985) (citing
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 & n.24
(1976) ("[T]he greater objectivity and hardiness of commercial speech[] may make it less necessary
to tolerate inaccurate statements for fear of silencing the speaker.")).
111. Id. at 762-63 (citing Va. State Bd. ofPharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-72 & n.24 (noting that
since commercial speech is inextricably linked to "commercial profits, there is little likelihood of its
being chilled by proper regulation and foregone ntirely")).
112. Id. ("[Tlhe market provides a powerful incentive to a credit reporting agency to be accu-
rate, since false credit reporting is of no use to creditors.").
113. Id. at 763 (noting that "any incremental 'chilling' effect of libel suits would be of de-
creased significance" with respect to speech contained in a credit report).
114. See Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 210 & n.58 (1985) (referring to the commentary con-
tained in a financial newsletter as an "expression of opinion").
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commercial speech.115 A financial newsletter and a credit report issued
by a credit reporting agency are substantially similar in that they both
provide an assessment of creditworthiness. However, a credit report,
such as that provided by Dun & Bradstreet (D&B) in Greenmoss Build-
ers,116 contains not only financial information but also a rating that pro-
vides an "indicator of financial strength and viability" of a business"'
similar to a credit rating issued by a credit rating agency."' The D&B
Rating provides a "composite credit appraisal" of the credit risk of a
business.'l9 Moreover, D&B provides "predictive scores" of the future
financial health of a business.120 Thus, the speech contained in a credit
rating assigned by a credit reporting agency, such as D&B, and the
speech included in a credit rating issued by a credit rating agency, such
as Standard & Poor's, appear to be strikingly similar if not virtually the
same. Therefore, courts should treat the speech of a credit rating agency
the same as the speech of a credit reporting agency: as commercial
speech.
Although a credit rating does not propose a commercial transaction
between the credit rating agency (as the speaker) and its audience (the
investing public), a credit rating, in effect, proposes a commercial trans-
action between the issuer of the security and the investing public. As the
issuer of the rating, the credit rating agency is, effectively, the speaker.
Thus, a credit rating could certainly be considered a form of commercial
speech. Moreover, credit ratings assigned for a fee paid by the issuer of
the security contain the attributes of commercial speech. A credit rating
issued for a fee is clearly "motivated by the desire for profit." 2 1
Furthermore, when the issuer of the security pays the fee, an inherent
conflict of interest is present,122 which defies the concept of a pure ex-
pression of opinion.
115. See Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. at 762-63 (comparing a credit report to advertis-
ing).
116. See id. at 751 (explaining the general information contained in a credit report).
117. Samples and Descriptions, DUN & BRADSTREET, INC.,
https://www.dnb.com/product/availrpt.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2016) (explaining that the "D&B
Rating" is a "widely-used indicator of financial strength and viability" of a company).
118. See infra notes 145, 303 and accompanying text.
119. Samples and Descriptions, supra note 117 (noting that the "D&B Rating" is "[a] powerful
indicator of a firm's . .. composite credit appraisal that can help assess credit risk quickly and effec-
tively").
120. Id ("Predictive scores [are] based on statistically proven mathematical models that indi-
cate the likelihood of a firm paying in a severely delinquent manner . . . and the likelihood of a
company experiencing financial stress within an 18 month period . . . .").
121. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. at 762-63 (noting that commercial speech "is hardy
and unlikely to be deterred by incidental state regulation" and that "[i]t is solely motivated by the
desire for profit, which . . . is a force less likely to be deterred than others").
122. See Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig.), 511 F.
Supp. 2d 742, 823 & n.81 (S.D. Tex. 2005) ("[T]here is a potential conflict of interest created by
compensation of credit rating agencies."); Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets:
The Rating Agency Paradox, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 15 (noting the "conflict of interest inherent" in
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Nevertheless, as discussed in Section I.A.3.b, many courts have
treated the credit ratings assigned by the credit rating agencies as opin-
ions, and as such, fully protected by the First Amendment.1 23 However,
the classification of credit ratings as statements of opinion by the lower
courts should not end the analysis. If the Supreme Court ultimately de-
termines that credit ratings are fully protected speech, then a government
prohibition extending only to false, deceptive, or misleading speech
would not be analogous to any kind of "flat prohibition or prior restraint
on speech" that would be "presumptively invalid" in the context of fully
protected speech.124 In contrast, such a prohibition on fully protected
speech would appear to be "a precisely drawn means of serving a com-
pelling [state] interest"1 25: the protection of investors.
The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the issue of whether it
considers the protection of investors a compelling state interest in the
context of fully protected speech. However, in the Dodd-Frank Act,
Congress determined that credit ratings have "systemic importance."1 26
Congress further found that the appropriate functioning and accuracy of
the credit rating agencies "are matters of national public interest." 27
Thus, the Supreme Court may determine that the protection of investors
may be reasonably considered a compelling state interest. Moreover, the
means used would be precisely drawn in that the restriction would pro-
hibit only those credit ratings that are false, deceptive, or misleading.'28
Therefore, a prohibition against false, deceptive, or misleading credit
ratings would not infringe the safeguards of the First Amendment.
the fact that credit rating agencies are "virtually always paid their fee by the issuer of securities");
see also infra Section III.A.
123. See, e.g., Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody's Inv'r's Servs., Inc., 175 F.3d 848,
855-56 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that a credit rating agency's article regarding the creditworthiness
of an issuer of bonds "constitutes a protected expression of opinion" under the First Amendment); In
re Scott Paper Co. Sec. Litig., 145 F.R.D. 366, 370-71 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (asserting that the credit
rating issued by Standard & Poor's is not commercial speech; yet, finding that "the importance of S
& P's ratings to an issuer's ability to market its commercial paper and debt instruments suggests that
the possibility of disclosure may not chill the continued flow of financial information" and, thus,
"the danger to the First Amendment. . . may be less than in other situations").
124. Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 234 (1985) (White, J., concurring) (citing N.Y. Times Co. v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam)) (finding that a ban extending not only to
"fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative speech" but also to "legitimate, disinterested advice" is "a
flat prohibition or prior restraint on speech" and, "as applied to fully protected speech, [is] presump-
tively invalid and may be sustained only under the most extraordinary circumstances"); see also
supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
125. See, e.g., People v. Foley, 257 A.D.2d 243, 246, 252 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (holding that
a statute prohibiting dissemination of "indecent material to minors" over the Internet "is a precisely
drawn means of serving a compelling [state] interest" and "is thus constitutional under the First
Amendment"); cf Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 540, 544 (1980)
(holding that a government proscription of "bill inserts that discuss controversial issues of public
policy" is not "a narrowly drawn prohibition justified by a compelling state interest" and, thus,
"directly infringes the freedom of speech protected by the First . . . Amendment[]").
126. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, title IX, § 931(1), 124 Stat. 1872 (2010).
127. Id. ("[C]redit rating agencies are central to capital formation, investor confidence, and the
efficient performance of the United States economy.").
128. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
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Alternatively, if the Supreme Court determines that credit ratings
are commercial speech, then the restrictions on such speech must be
"narrowly tailored to advance a legitimate governmental interest.",2 9 As
the concurring opinion found in Lowe, the protection of investors is a
legitimate governmental interest. 130 Thus, with respect to credit ratings,
the interest may be considered legitimate in that the government desires
to protect investors from false, deceptive, or misleading credit ratings in
a registration statement. Moreover, the means used would be narrowly
tailored since the restriction would prohibit only those credit ratings that
are false, deceptive, or misleading.'3 '
One of the rationales for affording commercial speech a lower level
of protection under the First Amendment is that such speech is less likely
to be "chilled" by appropriate regulation because advertising is consid-
ered closely associated with profits.' 3 2 Thus, disseminators of commer-
cial speech have a financial incentive to continue to advertise even
though subject to restrictions. Moreover, as the issuers of the infor-
mation, disseminators of commercial speech will be knowledgeable as to
the truth of such speech.
In the context of credit rating agencies, the necessity of obtaining a
credit rating in order to issue debt securitiesl34 suggests that restrictions
on the journalist's privilege that may result in disclosure of financial
information will not chill the issuer's provision of that information to the
rating agency.135 Likewise, the necessity of earning a profit by the credit
rating agencies suggests that regulation prohibiting the issuance of false,
deceptive, or misleading ratings will not chill the assignment of credit
ratings. In Part II, the issues confronting this assertion will be discussed.
Moreover, even though the credit rating agencies obtain financial
information from the issuers of the securities, the agencies are certainly
129. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 234 (White, J., concurring) ("[E]ven where mere 'commercial speech'
is concerned, the First Amendment permits restraints on speech only when they are narrowly tailored
to advance a legitimate governmental interest."); see also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 565 (1980) (recognizing that the First Amendment requires
restrictions on speech to be "narrowly drawn" (quoting In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 438 (1978))).
130. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 234 (White, J., concurring) (finding a legitimate government interest in
desiring "to prevent investors from falling into the hands of scoundrels and swindlers").
131. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
132. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771
n.24 (1976) ("[A]dvertising is the [s]ine qua non of commercial profits, [thus,] there is little likeli-
hood of its being chilled by proper regulation and foregone entirely.")
133. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 380-81 (1977) ("Since advertising is linked to
commercial well-being, it seems unlikely that such speech is particularly susceptible to being
crushed by overbroad regulation."); see also Va. State Bd ofPharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24 (noting
that "commercial speech may be more durable than other kinds" due to the associated profits and,
thus, proper regulations are less likely to "silenc[e] the speaker").
134. Compuware Corp. v. Moody's Inv'rs Servs., Inc., 499 F.3d 520, 522 (6th Cir. 2007)
("Often, a company seeking to borrow funds must, as part of the loan process, ask Moody's, or a
similar company, to publish its credit rating.")
135. In re Scott Paper Co. Sec. Litig., 145 F.R.D. 366, 370-71 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
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knowledgeable as to whether the provided information represents credit-
worthiness of a stronger or a weaker character. For example, a debt secu-
rity, such as a mortgage-backed security,'36 with an underlying cash flow
derived from subprime mortgages would appear to have a much weaker
level of creditworthiness than a corporate bond issued by a Fortune 500
company such as Johnson & Johnson.!37 Individuals who received sub-
prime mortgage loans generally had "impaired or limited credit histories,
or high debt relative to their income."' 8 A layering of risk, including a
weak borrower, a high loan-to-value, and inadequate structuring of the
security,139 should not result in a credit rating of AAA.140 Yet, the as-
signment of the highest credit rating to a corporate bond issued by John-
son & Johnson and to a mortgage-backed security secured by subprime
debt141 appears to indicate a false, or at the very least misleading, credit
136. N.J. Carpenters Vacation Fund v. Royal Bank of Scot. Grp., PLC, 720 F. Supp. 2d 254,
258 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (explaining mortgage-backed securities as securities whose cash flow is de-
rived from underlying mortgage loans that are "pooled together" in the form of a security and subse-
quently sold on the secondary market to investors).
137. Fortune 500 2014, FORTUNE, http://fortune.com/fortune500/2014/Johnson-johnson-39/
(last visited Oct. 24, 2015) (listing Johnson & Johnson as thirty-ninth on the list of Fortune 500
companies).
138. U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY & U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEV., JOINT REPORT ON
RECOMMENDATIONS TO CURB PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING 26 (2000),
http://archives.hud.gov/reports/treasrpt.pdf; see also Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 471
(2004) (explaining that subprime loans are made "to borrowers with poor credit ratings"); N.J.
Carpenters Vacation Fund, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 260 (noting that subprime loans involved "a higher
risk of default based on weak credit history and personal finances, or fraud because borrowers either
self-reported their income or were allowed to provide less information than in a typical loan").
139. Many mortgage-backed securities suffered from inadequate subordination in the structure
ofthe security. These securities failed to have a sufficiently large enough subordinate (i.e., lowest or
most junior) tranche, which would absorb the first defaults that occurred in the pool of mortgages.
This subordination was intended to insulate the highest or most senior tranches of the security from
default. However, the level of subordination in these structured securities was clearly inadequate.
See generally ADAM ASHCRAFT ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., MBS RATINGS AND THE
MORTGAGE CREDIT BooM 2-3, 6 (2010) (noting subordination "declines significantly between the
start of 2005 and mid-2007" and "[d]uring this ... period, the average riskiness of new [mortgage-
backed security] deals increases significantly").
140. AAA is the highest credit rating that Standard & Poor's may assign to a financial obliga-
tion. Standard & Poor's Ratings Definitions, STANDARD & POOR'S RATINGS SERVS. (Nov. 20, 2014,
6:46 AM), https://www.standardandpoors.com/en US/web/guest/article/-/view/sourceld/504352.
According to Standard & Poor's, when an obligation is assigned a credit rating of AAA, the capacity
of the issuer to satisfy its "financial commitment" on the security is "extremely strong." Id Similar-
ly, AAA is the highest credit rating that Moody's may assign to a financial obligation. MOODY'S
INV. SERV., RATING SYMBOLS AND DEFINITIONS 5 (2016),
https://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBC79004. According to
Moody's, obligations that are assigned a credit rating of AAA are considered to be the "highest
quality" obligations with the "lowest level of credit risk" or risk of default d.
141. See John Morgan, Path to Extinction: Only 3 US Companies Still Have AAA Credit Rat-
ings, NEWSMAX (Apr. 15, 2014, 11:48 AM), http://www.moneynews.com/EconomylS-P-rating-
companies-Moodys/2014/04/15/id/565714/ (noting that Johnson & Johnson is one of only three
companies that Standard & Poor's still rates as "AAA, which is reserved for companies with the
unassailable financial strength and discipline"); Patrick Kingsley, How Credit Ratings Agencies Rule
the World, GUARDIAN (Feb. 15, 2012, 3:00 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/feb/15/credit-ratings-agencies-moodys ("In the run-up to
2008, a staggering proportion of mortgage-based debts were rated AAA, when in fact they were
junk."); Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller of the Currency, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
Remarks Before the American Securitization Forum 2 (Jan. 28, 2013), http://www2.occ.gov/news-
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rating in the case of the mortgage-backed security backed by subprime
debt. Such speech, whether ultimately deemed commercial speech or not,
should be subject to regulation restricting the issuance of false, decep-
tive, or misleading ratings.
3. Statements of Opinion
As noted by Justice Brennan, ever since the Supreme Court "first
hinted that the First Amendment provides some manner of protection for
statements of opinion . .. courts and commentators have struggled with
the contours of this protection. . . within our First Amendment jurispru-
dence."I42 This part will explore the relevant standards established by the
Supreme Court in the context of statements of opinion and the applica-
tion of those standards to the credit rating agencies.
a. The Actual Malice Standard
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,14 3 the Supreme Court first ad-
dressed the issue of whether the First Amendment protections of freedom
of speech and of the press restrict the power of a state to provide damag-
es in an action for libel against critics of a public official with respect to
his official conduct.1" The New York Times printed allegedly false
statements in an advertisement.145 Upon review of the evidence, the
Court determined that some of the statements printed in the newspaper
were not accurate portrayals of certain events occurring in Montgomery,
Alabama, during the civil rights movement.146
issuances/speeches/2013/pub-speech-2013-19.pdf (noting that the "flawed credit ratings" assigned to
mortgage-backed securities "suggest[ed] that the mortgage securities in question were as safe as
investment-grade corporate bonds").
142. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 23 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote
omitted); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 325 (1974) ("[The] Court has struggled
for nearly a decade to define the proper accommodation between the law of defamation and the
freedoms of speech and press protected by the First Amendment."). Milkovich held that state libel
laws are not prohibited by the First Amendment in a case where a newspaper article implied that the
coach of a high school wrestling team lied while under oath in the course of a judicial proceeding.
Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 3.
143. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
144. Id. at 256 (noting that this case is the first time the Court will determine "the extent to
which the constitutional protections for speech and press limit a State's power to award damages in a
libel action brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct"); see also Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S 749, 755 (1985) (stating that the N. Y Times
case was the first time the Supreme Court "held that the First Amendment limits the reach of state
defamation laws").
145. N. Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 256, 258 (discussing a libel complaint by a city Commissioner
of Montgomery, Alabama, based on statements in an advertisement published by the New York
Times); see also Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. at 755 (describing the N. Y. Times case in which
a public official sought "damages for the publication of an advertisement criticizing police conduct
in a civil rights demonstration"); Gertz, 418 U.S. at 334 ("The Times ran a political advertisement
endorsing civil rights demonstrations by black students in Alabama and impliedly condemning the
performance of local law-enforcement officials.").
146. N. Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 258-59 ("It is uncontroverted that some of the statements
contained in the [advertisement] . . . were not accurate descriptions of events which occurred in
Montgomery. . . . [For example,] [a]lthough nine students were expelled by the State Board of Edu-
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Nevertheless, the Court held that the Constitution prohibits award-
ing damages to a public official for defamatory statements concerning his
official conduct even when those statements are shown to be false unless
the public official can prove that the false statements were "made with
'actual malice.'1 4 7 The Supreme Court defined "actual malice" as mak-
ing a statement with knowledge that he statement is false or with reck-
less disregard concerning whether or not the statement is false. 148 Apply-
ing the actual malice standard, the Court held that the New York Times
did not publish the false statements with actual malice.149 The Court
found that even if the defamatory statements were not shown to be "sub-
stantially correct," the contrary opinion held by one of the newspaper's
employees "was at least a reasonable one."i50
Moreover, the Supreme Court held that the statements do not lose
constitutional protection because they were contained in a "paid adver-
tisement." 15 1 As the Court noted, the advertisement contained expres-
sions of opinion and provided information concerning the civil rights
movement, the "existence and objectives [of which] are matters of the
highest public interest and concern."152 Furthermore, the fact that the
cation, this was not for leading [a] demonstration at the Capitol [as the advertisement stated], but for
demanding service at a lunch counter in the Montgomery County Courthouse on another day.").
147. Id. at 279-80 ("The constitutional guarantees require . . . a federal rule that prohibits a
public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct
unless he proves that he statement was made with 'actual malice' . . . ."); see also Cty. of Orange v.
McGraw Hill Cos., 245 B.R. 151, 154-55 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1999) (noting that a publisher will not
be liable for printing false statements unless those statements were "made with 'actual malice"'
(quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (concluding that "public figures
and public officials may not recover for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress . . .
without showing .. . that the publication contains a false statement of fact that was made with 'actual
malice'))).
148. N.Y Times Co., 376 U.S. at 280 (defining actual malice); see also Milkovich v. Lorain
Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 14 (1990); Hustler Magazine, Inc., 485 U.S. at 56; Gertz, 418 U.S. at 328;
Compuware Corp. v. Moody's lnv'rs Servs., Inc., 499 F.3d 520, 526 (6th Cir. 2007); Jefferson Cty.
Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody's Inv'r's Servs., Inc., 175 F.3d 848, 857 (10th Cir. 1999); Cty. of
Orange, 245 B.R. at 155.
149. N.Y Times Co., 376 U.S. at 286-88 ("[T]he facts do not support a finding of actual mal-
ice. . . . [T]he evidence against the Times supports at most a finding of negligence in failing to dis-
cover the misstatements, and is constitutionally insufficient to show the recklessness that is required
for a finding of actual malice.").
150. Id. at 286 (noting that the Times' Secretary stated that "he thought the advertisement was
'substantially correct"'); see also Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964) (noting that "utter-
ances honestly believed contribute to the free interchange of ideas and the ascertainment of truth").
151. N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 266 (holding that "allegedly libelous statements" do not
sacrifice First Amendment protections simply due to the statements being disseminated in a "paid
advertisement"); see also Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952) ("That books,
newspapers, and magazines are published and sold for profit does not prevent them from being a
form of expression whose liberty is safeguarded by the First Amendment."); Cty. of Orange v.
McGraw-Hill Cos. (In re Cty. of Orange), 245 B.R. 138, 143 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1997) (noting the
protections of the First Amendment are "not diminished when the expression at issue is published
and sold for profit" (citing Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 397 (1967))).
152. N. Y Times Co., 376 U.S. at 266 (citingNAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428-29, 433-36
(1963) (holding "that the activities of the NAACP, its affiliates and legal staff ... are modes of
expression and association protected by the First . . . Amendment[]" and, therefore, striking down a
state statute that prohibits advising individuals that their rights have been infringed and referring
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newspaper eceived a payment to publish the advertisement is no differ-
ent than the payments received when selling newspapers and books, and
thus, the payment is similarly "immaterial" to whether the statements
contained therein are deserving of constitutional protection.
Thus, the actual malice standard protects false statements unless it
can be proven that the speaker made those statements with knowledge of
the falsity of the statements or with a reckless disregard concerning
whether or not the statements were accurate.154 Notably, the Supreme
Court has plainly stated that false statements concerning factual matters
are bereft of any value under the Constitution.155 Such false statements
"interfere with the truth-seeking function of the marketplace of ideas."'56
However, the Court has also recognized that, despite the lack of value in
false statements, such statements are "inevitable in free debate."'5 ' Thus,
the Court was concerned that a strict liability standard for publishers of
false factual statements would likely have the unwanted effect of
"chilling" speech that possessed "constitutional value."'58 As expressed
by the Court, "Freedoms of expression require 'breathing space."'l
59
them to a specific attorney for representation because such a statute "could well freeze out of exist-
ence" all activities in support of the civil rights movement)).
153. Id. at 266 (citing Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150 (1959) (noting that it is "no
matter that he dissemination [of books and other forms of the printed word) takes place under com-
mercial auspices")).
154. Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 153 (1967) (explaining that recovery is permit-
ted under the actual malice standard only when the plaintiff can "prove that the publication involved
was deliberately falsified, or published recklessly despite the publisher's awareness of probably
falsity" (citing N. Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279-80 (finding that the constitution protects false state-
ments unless the petitioner can prove that the statements were "made with 'actual malice' in that
the speaker made the statements knowing they were false or with a reckless disregard concerning the
falsity of the statements))).
155. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988) ("False statements of fact are
particularly valueless .... ); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (find-
ing "no constitutional value in false statements of fact").
156. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 485 U.S. at 52 (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340 ("[False statements]
belong to that category of utterances which 'are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are
of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality."' (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (noting that, inter alia, obscene, profane, and libelous speech are not
protected under the First Amendment)))) (finding that false statements "cause damage to an individ-
ual's reputation that cannot easily be repaired by counterspeech").
157. Id. at 52 (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340 ("Although the erroneous statement of fact is not
worthy of constitutional protection, it is nevertheless inevitable in free debate.")); see also Curtis
Publ g Co., 388 U.S. at 152 (stating that the Court has "recognized 'the inevitability of some error in
the situation presented in free debate' (quoting Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 406 (1967))); N.Y
Times Co., 376 U.S. at 271-72 (acknowledging that false speech is "inevitable in free debate").
158. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 485 U.S. at 52 ("[A] rule that would impose strict liability on a
publisher for false factual assertions would have an undoubted 'chilling' effect on speech relating to
public figures that does have constitutional value."); see also Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497
U.S. 1, 14 (1990) (explaining that the actual malice standard was grounded on the concern that a
state law requiring the speaker to warrant that all factual statements were true would have the effect
of deterring speech deserving of First Amendment protection (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 334)).
159. Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 772 (1986) (quoting N.Y. Times Co., 376
U.S. at 271-72 (recognizing that false statements are "inevitable in free debate" and that such state-
ments "must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the 'breathing space' that they
'need . . . to survive"' (alteration in original) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
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Thus, the Supreme Court established the actual malice standard to avoid
chilling valuable speech.'" Accordingly, the actual malice rule provides
publishers with protection from liability for innocent misstatements as
well as for negligent falsehoods. 161
Although the Supreme Court has observed that both the "intentional
lie" and the "careless error" lack constitutional value,'62 the Court has
defined the reckless disregard prong of the actual malice rule to require
more than simply a "failure to investigate."6 3 Reckless disregard under
the actual malice standard means the publisher has a "high degree of
awareness" that the statements are likely false.16" For example, in New
York Times, the evidence did not support a finding that the publisher was
"aware of the likelihood" that the information was false; thus, the plain-
tiff failed to prove reckless disregard. 165 Reckless disregard of the truth
433(1963)))); see also Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341 ("The First Amendment requires that we protect some
falsehood in order to protect speech that matters."); Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec.,
Derivative & "ERISA" Litig.), 511 F. Supp. 2d 742, 822 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (observing the need "to
preserve the 'breathing space' essential for freedom of expression" (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc.,
485 U.S. at 52)).
160. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 485 U.S. at 52 (explaining that the needed "breathing space is
provided by a constitutional rule that allows public figures to recover for libel or defamation only
when they can prove both that the statement was false and that the statement was made with the
requisite level of culpability"); see also Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 14 (noting that this rule was based on
a concern that constitutionally protected speech regarding public officials would be deterred if the
speaker was required to certify the truth of every statement of fact (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 334));
Cty. of Orange v. McGraw Hill Cos., 245 B.R. 151, 154-55 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1999) ("To accom-
modate the 'breathing-space' the First Amendment requires, a publisher will not incur liability for a
false statement unless the statement was made with 'actual malice' . (quoting Hustler Maga-
zine, Inc., 485 U.S. at 52)).
161. Enron Corp., 511 F. Supp. 2d at 811 (explaining that the actual malice rule "protects
publishers from liability for 'either innocent or negligent misstatement' so as not to chill the press'
exercise of constitutional guarantees" (quoting Time, Inc., 385 U.S. at 389)).
162. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340 ("Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error materially ad-
vances society's interest in 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' debate on public issues." (quoting
N. Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 270)); see also St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732 (1968) ("Nei-
ther lies nor false communications serve the ends of the First Amendment . . . ."); Time, Inc., 385
U.S. at 390 ("[T]he knowingly false statement and the false statement made with reckless disregard
of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection." (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75
(1964))).
163. Harte-Hanks Commc'ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 688 (1989) ("[F]ailure to
investigate before publishing, even when a reasonably prudent person would have done so, is not
sufficient to establish reckless disregard."); Gertz, 418 U.S. at 332 ("[M]ere proof of failure to inves-
tigate, without more, cannot establish reckless disregard for the truth."); see also St. Amant, 390 U.S.
at 733 ("Failure to investigate does not in itself establish bad faith." (citing N. Y. Times Co., 376 U.S.
at 287-88 ("[N]egligence in failing to discover the misstatements . . . is constitutionally insufficient
to show the recklessness that is required for a finding of actual malice."))); Curtis Publ'g Co. v.
Associated Press, 388 U.S. 130, 153 (1967) (noting that "[i]nvestigatory failures alone" are not
sufficient to meet the actual malice standard); Compuware Corp. v. Moody's Inv'rs Servs., Inc., 499
F.3d 520, 526 (6th Cir. 2007) ("[A] defendant's failure to investigate, without more, does not estab-
lish a reckless disregard of the truth.").
164. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 332 (noting reckless disregard requires that "the publisher must act
with a 'high degree of awareness of. . . probable falsity' (alteration in original) (quoting St. Amant,
390 U.S. at 731)); see also Garrison, 379 U.S. at 74 ("[O]nly those false statements made with [a]
high degree of awareness of their probable falsity . . . may be the subject of either civil or criminal
sanctions.").
165. St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731 (citing N. Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 287 ("The mere presence of
... stories in the files does not ... establish that the Times 'knew' the advertisement was false."))
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or falsity of a statement is a "subjective standard."166 As expressed by the
Supreme Court, the measure of reckless behavior is not founded on the
"reasonably prudent man" standard.16 7 Whether or not a reasonably pru-
dent man would have investigated or would have decided to publish is
not the touchstone applied when determining reckless disregard.168 Ra-
ther, to prove reckless disregard, "more than a departure from reasonably
prudent conduct" is needed.'69 Reckless disregard requires proof that the
publisher "entertained serious doubts" regarding the truth of the infor-
mation.o70 If a publisher ignores these doubts and nevertheless publishes
the information, then the plaintiff can show a reckless disregard for
whether the information was true or false, and prove actual malice.'7 '
Moreover, if a publisher purposely avoids the truth, this "may be suffi-
cient" to show actual malice. 172 However, it is not necessary for a pub-
lisher to "include every relevant and potentially positive detail" to pre-
vent liability.1 73
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the high bar of the reck-
less disregard standard may prove insurmountable for many plaintiffs.174
However, the overriding interest in protecting freedom of expression
concerning public matters against the possibility of self-censorship
necessitates a rejection of the reasonably prudent man standard.175 Thus,
the First Amendment inevitably will protect some false publications in
(explaining that the plaintiff in the N. Y. Times case "did not satisfy his burden because the record
failed to show that the publisher was aware of the likelihood that he was circulating false infor-
mation").
166. Compuware Corp., 499 F.3d at 526 (citing Harte-Hanks Commc'ns, Inc., 491 U.S. at
688).
167. St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731.
168. Compuware Corp., 499 F.3d at 526 (citing St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731 ("[R]eckless con-
duct is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent man would have published, or would have
investigated before publishing.")).
169. Harte-Hanks Commc'ns, Inc., 491 U.S. at 688 (citing St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731).
170. Compuware Corp., 499 F.3d at 526 (quoting St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731 ("There must be
sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as
to the truth of his publication.")).
171. St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731 (noting that publishing with "serious doubts" regarding wheth-
er or not the information is true "shows reckless disregard for truth or falsity and demonstrates actual
malice").
172. Compuware Corp., 499 F.3d at 526 (citing Harte-Hanks Commc ns, Inc., 491 U.S. at 692
(noting that "purposeful avoidance of the truth is in a different category" than a "failure to investi-
gate")).
173. Id. at 527 (citing Perk v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 931 F.2d 408, 412 (6th Cir. 1991) (ob-
serving that a publisher does not have a "legal obligation to present a balanced view")).
174. See St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731 ("Concededly the reckless disregard standard may permit
recovery in fewer situations than would a rule that publishers must satisfy the standard of the reason-
able man or the prudent publisher."); see also PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS, supra note 3, at 96
(observing that the actual malice rule "poses such a high barrier that it virtually insulates the speaker
from liability").
175. See St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731-32 ("[T]he stake of the people in public business and the
conduct of public officials is so great that neither the defense of truth nor the standard of ordinary
care would protect against self-censorship and thus adequately implement First Amendment poli-
cies.").
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order to guarantee the protection of truthful publications regarding mat-
ters of public interest. 176
However, the Supreme Court has rejected the idea that a statement
that may be characterized as an opinion automatically deserves full con-
stitutional protection.'77 The Court has recognized that "expressions of
'opinion' may often imply an assertion of objective fact."'7 8 For exam-
ple, suppose a newspaper article makes the following assertion: "In my
opinion, the Governor is a liar." This statement implies knowledge of
certain facts, which led to the conclusion that the Governor is a liar.179 If
the statement is based on incomplete or inaccurate facts, or if the article's
evaluation of the facts is incorrect, then the statement may imply an as-
sertion of fact that is false.80 Moreover, expressing the statement in
words that appear to indicate that an opinion is being proffered, such as
using the words "in my opinion" or "I think," does not negate the possi-
bility that "the statement may . . . imply a false assertion of fact."' For
example, the fact that a credit rating agency refers to its evaluation of a
bond issue as an opinion does not, in and of itself, establish that the rat-
ing agency's statements are entitled to constitutional protection.182 If the
credit rating agency's statements were proven to have "materially false
components," the rating agency would not be protected from liability
simply by using the word "opinion." 83
176. Id. at 732 ("[T]o insure the ascertainment and publication of the truth about public affairs,
it is essential that the First Amendment protect some erroneous publications as well as true ones.").
177. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18 (1990) (explaining that the Court did not
intend "to create a wholesale defamation exemption for anything that might be labeled 'opinion"');
see also Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody's Inv'r's Servs., Inc., 175 F.3d 848, 852 (10th
Cir. 1999); Cty. of Orange v. McGraw-Hill Cos. (In re Cty. of Orange), No. SA CV 96-0765-GLT,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22459, at * 12 (C.D. Cal. June 2, 1997).
178. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 18-19 (rejecting "the creation of an artificial dichotomy between
'opinion' and fact"); see also Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist., 175 F.3d at 852; Newby v. Enron Corp. (in re
Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig.), 511 F. Supp. 2d 742, 819 (S.D. Tex. 2005);
McGraw-Hill Cos., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22459, at * 12-13 ("[T]he threshold question is whether a
'reasonable fact-finder could conclude that the statement implies an assertion of objective fact."'
(quoting Unelko Corp. v. Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 1990))).
179. See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 18-19.
180. Id. ("Even if the speaker states the facts upon which he bases his opinion, if those facts are
either incorrect or incomplete, or if his assessment of them is erroneous, the statement may still
imply a false assertion of fact.").
181. Id. (explaining that "[s]imply couching ... statements in terms of opinion does not dispel"
the implication of "a false assertion of fact"); Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist., 175 F.3d at 854 ("[C]ourts
have . . . applied Milkovich to conclude that certain statements, even though couched as expressions
of opinion, are provably false and therefore are not protected from defamation claims by the First
Amendment.").
182. Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist., 175 F.3d at 856 ("[T]he fact that Moody's article describes its
evaluation as an opinion is not sufficient, standing alone, to establish that Moody's statements are
protected."); see also Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19.
183. Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist., 175 F.3d at 856 (noting that if a statement expressed as "an
opinion were shown to have materially false components, the issuer should not be shielded from
liability by raising the word 'opinion' as a shibboleth"); Enron Corp., 511 F. Supp. 2d at 822 ("[A]
publisher may be liable for a statement of opinion if that statement reasonably implies false facts or
relies on stated facts that are provably false."); McGraw-Hill Cos., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22459, at
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However, the statement "in my opinion, the Governor is making a
mistake by painting the Governor's mansion orange," would be fully
protected.18 4 Thus, a "statement of opinion" concerning public matters,
which does not imply an assertion of fact that may be proven as false,
will be fully protected under the First Amendment.'8 5 In contrast, a
statement of opinion regarding a matter of public concern, which implies
an assertion of fact that may be proven as false or depends on stated facts
that may be proven as false, may be subject to liability under the actual
malice standard.186
As intimated above, the actual malice standard is generally applied
to false statements regarding "matters of public concern."8 7 As stated by
the Supreme Court, the First Amendment protects "the free flow of ideas
and opinions on matters of public interest and concern."188 Thus, in New
York Times, the Court applied the actual malice rule to false statements
against a public official.189 Shortly thereafter, in Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts,'90 the Supreme Court first considered whether the actual malice
standard should be extended to defamatory statements against individuals
who are not public officials but nevertheless are considered public fig-
ures because these individuals have some type of involvement in a matter
of public interest.'9' As an initial matter, the Court explained the need to
consider "the factors which arise in the particular context" rather than
engage in a "blind application" of the New York Times actual malice
*12-13 (explaining that a statement of opinion is actionable if the statement contains a factual asser-
tion that may be proven as false).
184. See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20.
185. Id. (discussing Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 768-69 (1986) (holding
that "where a newspaper publishes speech of public concern, a private-figure plaintiff cannot recover
damages without also showing that the statements at issue are false")); Enron Corp., 511 F. Supp. 2d
at 819 ("[IJf a statement 'cannot reasonably [be] interpreted as stating actual facts,' it is shielded by
the First Amendment." (alteration in original) (quoting Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20)).
186. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20 ("[W]here a statement of 'opinion' on a matter of public con-
cern reasonably implies false and defamatory facts . . . [the plaintiff] must show that such statements
were made with knowledge of their false implications or with reckless disregard of their truth.").
187. Cty. of Orange v. McGraw Hill Cos., 245 B.R. 151, 155 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1999) (citing
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 281-82 (1964)); see also Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 755 (1985) (explaining that the advertisement in N.Y Times
"concerned 'one of the major public issues of our time' and, thus, the Court in that case applied the
actual malice standard to the issue of whether a public official may recover damages for false state-
ments contained in the advertisement (quoting N. Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 271)).
188. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988) ("At the heart of the First
Amendment is the recognition of the fundamental importance of the free flow of ideas and opinions
on matters of public interest and concem."); see also Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. at 755
(explaining "that 'freedom of expression upon public questions is secured by the First Amendment,'
and that 'debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' (citation omitted)
(quoting N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 269-70)); N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 264-66 (finding that an
advertisement containing expressions of opinion and information concerning the civil rights move-
ment, "whose existence and objectives are matters of the highest public interest and concern," was
protected under the First Amendment).
189. N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279-80.
190. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
191. Id. at 134.
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standard.192 In reviewing the circumstances of this case, the Court found
that the individuals involved had a sufficient degree of "continuing pub-
lic interest" as a result of their position or activities as well as "sufficient
access to the [channels] of counterargument" to have the ability to
expose the falsity of the defamatory assertions.'9 Therefore, the Court
considered the individuals to be "public figures."19 As expressed by
Chief Justice Warren in concurrence, the importance of permitting "un-
inhibited debate" concerning the involvement of such individuals in pub-
lic matters "is as crucial as it is in the case of 'public officials."'l 95 Thus,
"a majority of the Court" agreed to apply the actual malice standard to
defamatory actions brought by public figures.196 Hence, the actual malice
rule has been applied to false statements against public officials as well
as to falsehoods against public figures.'97 Moreover, both a public offi-
cial and a public figure must show actual malice by "a clear and convinc-
ing standard of proof." 98
However, the Supreme Court has found that the actual malice
standard is inappropriate in the case of a defamatory false statement that
causes injury to a private person even when the statement concerns a
192. Id at 148 (quoting Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 390-91 (1967) (applying the actual
malice standard "not through blind application" of N. Y. Times, but upon considering "the factors
which arise in the particular context of the application of the New York [Right to Privacy] statute in
cases involving private individuals")).
193. Id. at 135, 140, 154-55 (explaining that one of the consolidated cases involved the Uni-
versity of Georgia athletic director who was accused "of conspiring to 'fix' a football game" and the
other involved "a man of some political prominence" who had been present at the University of
Mississippi during a "massive riot").
194. Id. at 154 (noting that both individuals "commanded a substantial amount of independent
public interest at the time of the publications" and, therefore, would be considered "public figures").
195. Id. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring) ("Our citizenry has a legitimate and substantial
interest in the conduct of such persons, and freedom of the press to engage in uninhibited debate
about their involvement in public issues and events is as crucial as it is in the case of 'public offi-
cials."').
196. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 14 (1990) (stating that in Curtis, "a majority
of the Court" concluded that he actual malice standard should be applied in defamatory actions
brought by public figures); see also Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988) (as-
serting that since the decision in N. Y. Times, the Court has "consistently ruled that a public figure
may hold a speaker liable for the damage to reputation caused by publication of a defamatory false-
hood, but only if' the plaintiff can show that the statement was made with actual malice); Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 336 & n.7 (1974) ("[A] majority of the [Curtis] Court agreed ...
that the New York Times test should apply to criticism of 'public figures' as well as 'public offi-
cials."').
197. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 485 U.S. at 56-57 (applying the actual malice standard to false
statements against a public figure); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan,, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (ap-
plying the actual malice rule to false statements against a public official); Jefferson Cry. Sch. Dist.
No. R-1 v. Moody's Inv'r's Servs., Inc., 175 F.3d 848, 852 (10th Cir. 1999) ("[T]he First Amend-
ment prohibits public officials and public figures from recovering damages for false and defamatory
statements unless they demonstrate that the statement was made with actual malice.").
198. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 15, 20 (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342) (explaining that "where a
statement of 'opinion' on a matter of public concern reasonably implies false and defamatory facts
regarding public figures or officials, those individuals must show that such statements were made
with" actual malice and the showing of actual "malice is subject to a clear and convincing standard
of proof"); Compuware Corp. v. Moody's Inv'rs Servs., Inc., 499 F.3d 520, 525 (6th Cir. 2007) ("A
plaintiff who qualifies as a public official or public figure may recover for defamation only if he
produces clear and convincing evidence that the defendant acted with actual malice.").
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public matter.199 For example, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,200 the Su-
preme Court held that a publisher of false defamatory statements con-
cerning a private individual was not entitled to a constitutional privilege
to avoid liability for any harm caused by the false statements.2 01 The
Court overturned its earlier ruling in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. ,202
in which the Court extended the actual malice standard to false defama-
tory statements against a private individual concerning a matter of public
interest.203
In Gertz, the Court reasoned that the actual malice standard is a very
high bar to overcome, and a private individual normally would not have
the same opportunity as a public official or public figure to correct a de-
famatory falsehood.20 Moreover, the Court acknowledged the normative
concern that, in contrast to a public official or a public figure, a private
individual has not voluntarily exposed himself or herself to public scruti-
ny and to the corresponding enhanced risk of a false defamatory state-
ment injurious to that individual.205 Thus, weighing the competing inter-
ests between freedom of speech and of the press, on the one hand, and
the legitimate state interest in compensating a private individual who is
harmed by a defamatory falsehood, on the other hand, the Court held that
the New York Times actual malice standard does not apply to false de-
famatory statements that cause injury to private individuals.206 The fact
199. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 15 (noting the actual malice rule "was inappropriate for a private
person attempting to prove he was defamed on matters of public interest" (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at
345-47 (finding the actual malice standard inapplicable in cases concerning a defamatory falsehood
injurious to a private individual despite the statement concerning a matter of public interest))).
200. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
201. Id. at 326-27, 345-46 (concluding "that the States should retain substantial latitude in
their efforts to enforce a legal remedy for defamatory falsehood injurious to . . . a private individu-
al").
202. 403 U.S. 29 (1971), abrogatedby Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
203. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 337, 345-46 (explaining the reasoning of the plurality of the Court
in the Rosenbloom decision and finding "unacceptable" the extension of the actual malice standard
to defamatory false statements that harm a private person's reputation); see also Rosenbloom, 403
U.S. at 43-44.
204. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342-44 ("[M]any deserving plaintiffs, including some intentionally
subjected to injury, will be unable to surmount the barrier of the New York Times test. . . . Public
officials and public figures usually enjoy significantly greater access to the channels of effective
communication and hence have a more realistic opportunity to counteract false statements then [sic]
private individuals normally enjoy."); see also Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,
472 U.S. 749, 756 (1985) (explaining that private individuals "generally lack effective opportunities
for rebutting" defamatory statements).
205. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344-45 (distinguishing between public and private individuals and
noting "the communications media are entitled to act on the assumption that public officials and
public figures have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury from defamatory
falsehood[s]" whereas the same assumption does not obtain in the case of private individuals); see
also Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. at 756 (explaining that private individuals "have not volun-
tarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury from defamatory statements").
206. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342-49 (holding that the States are free to determine the "appropriate
standard of liability" to be applied in the case of a publisher of a false defamatory statement that
causes harm to a private individual); see also Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. at 756 (explaining
that the state's interest in compensating a private individual for an injurious falsehood is stronger
than the First Amendment interest in protecting free speech (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348-49)).
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that a statement concerns a public matter, in and of itself, is not sufficient
to justify the application of the actual malice standard to a private per-
207son.
However, the Court limited the recovery to compensatory damages
for injury actually suffered and did not provide for recovery of presumed
or punitive damages absent a showing of actual malice.208 Moreover, the
state may not hold a defendant liable absent some fault.209 Thus, the
states may not impose a strict liability standard.210 Further, the Supreme
Court has held that in the case of a public matter concerning a private
person, the plaintiff also must prove the statements are false, at least
when a media defendant is implicated.2 11 Hence, a plaintiff must show
both falsity and fault in order to recover damages.212
Later, in Greenmoss Builders, the Supreme Court addressed the
issue of whether the actual malice standard applies to false statements
213
injurious to a private person in a private matter. The Court employed
the balancing approach of Gertz and found that the state's legitimate
interest in providing compensation to a private person who is harmed by
a defamatory falsehood is stronger than the constitutional interest in pro-
207. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. at 756 (noting that speech regarding "a public issue
[does] not by itself entitle the libel defendant to the constitutional protections of New York Times"
(citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343 (explaining that a test which bases the application of the actual malice
standard solely on whether the statement concerns a public matter does not adequately address the
competing concerns))).
208. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 16 (1990) (noting that "recovery of pre-
sumed or punitive damages [was not permitted] on less than a showing of New York Times malice"
(citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349-50 (finding a plaintiff may be compensated only for "actual injury"
when actual malice is not shown))).
209. Id. at 20 (noting that where a statement of opinion implies facts that are defamatory and
false and such statement "involves a private figure on a matter of public concern, a plaintiff must
show that the false connotations were made with some level of fault"); Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,
472 U.S. at 766 (White, J., concurring) (explaining that in Gertz, the Court "for the first time [held]
that [private individuals in defamation actions] could no longer recover by proving a false statement
.... They must, in addition, prove some 'fault,' at least negligence" (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347
("[S]o long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the
appropriate standard of liability for a publisher . . . of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private
individual"))).
210. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347-48 ("This approach . . . recognizes the strength of the legitimate
state interest in compensating private individuals for wrongful injury to reputation, yet shields the
press . . . from the rigors of strict liability for defamation.").
211. Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 768"9 (1986); see also Milkovich, 497
U.S. at 19-20 ("Hepps stands for the proposition that a statement on matters of public concern must
be provable as false before there can be liability under state defamation law, at least in situations ...
where a media defendant is involved."); Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody's Inv'r's Servs.,
Inc., 175 F.3d 848, 852 (10th Cir. 1999) ("[I]n defamation actions against media defendants, the
First Amendment requires that a plaintiff bear the burden of proving that the statement in question
was false . . . .").
212. Hepps, 475 U.S. at 776 ("We believe that the common law's rule on falsity-that the
defendant must bear the burden of proving truth-must . . . fall here to a constitutional requirement
that the plaintiff bear the burden of showing falsity, as well as fault, before recovering damages.").
213. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. at 751.
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214
tecting speech concerning private matters. The Court explained that
"not all speech is of equal First Amendment importance."215 Speech con-
cerning public matters is "at the heart of the First Amendment's protec-
tion." 2 16 Such speech inhabits "the highest rung of the hierarchy of First
Amendment values."2 17 Accordingly, speech regarding matters of public
concern is due "special protection."218 In contrast, speech concerning
private matters is less important, and thus, its protections are not as
strict.219 Permitting state law remedies for such speech does not interfere
with the "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" discussion and "debate on
public issues" nor is there any concern that possible liability might cause
the press to engage in self-censorship.220 Thus, balancing the state's sub-
stantial interest in awarding damages for a defamatory falsehood com-
pared to the reduced First Amendment value of speech concerning purely
private matters, the Supreme Court held that presumed and punitive
damages may be awarded even though actual malice is not shown.221
The question then becomes whether the statements concern a public
or a private matter. As the Supreme Court has held, in order to determine
the type of speech involved, the court must review "the content, form,
and context" of the speech as shown by the entire record before the
222court. Applying these factors to the case of Greenmoss Builders, the
Court found that the credit report did not concern a public matter.223 The
214. Id. at 757-58 (finding the constitutional interest in protecting speech regarding private
matters "is less important than" the interest in protecting speech concerning public matters (citing
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348)).
215. Id. at 758 & n.5 ("[The Supreme] Court on many occasions has recognized that certain
kinds of speech are less central to the interests of the First Amendment than others.. . . In the area of
protected speech, the most prominent example of reduced protection for certain kinds of speech
concerns commercial speech." (citations omitted)); see also Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485
U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (noting certain types of speech are not deserving of absolute protection under the
First Amendment (citing FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 747 (1978))).
216. First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978) ("[F]reedom of speech and
of the press guaranteed by the Constitution embraces .. . the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully
all matters of public concern ..... (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101 (1940))).
217. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982) (quoting Carey v. Brown,
447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980)).
218. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. at 759 (citing Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 913).
219. Id. at 759-60 (noting speech regarding private matters is less of a constitutional concern
and even though "such speech is not totally unprotected by the First Amendment, its protections are
less stringent" (citation omitted)); see also Oberman v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 460 F.2d 1381, 1384
(7th Cir. 1972) (finding a lack of justification for providing First Amendment protection in a libel
action brought by a private individual on a private matter).
220. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. at 760-62 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 270 (1964)) (finding the State's interest in providing presumed and punitive damages is
substantial compared to the "incidental effect" such remedies might have on speech conceming
private matters which is of "significantly less" First Amendment interest).
221. Id. at 760-61 ("[T]he reduced constitutional value of speech involving no matters of
public concern . . . adequately supports awards of presumed and punitive damages-even absent a
showing of 'actual malice."').
222. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983) ("Whether ... speech addresses a matter
of public concern must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement, as
revealed by the whole record.").
223. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. at 761-62 (finding the form, content, and context of
the speech show that the "credit report concerns no public issue").
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credit report contained speech that was in the specific interest of D&B,
the commercial speaker, and a particular business audience.2 24 The credit
report was provided to five subscribers who were not permitted to further
disseminate the information.225 The Court found that the credit report did
not involve any matter of public concern; there was no "strong interest in
the free flow of commercial information."226 Thus, the actual malice
standard did not apply.227
Similarly, in Oberman v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.,228 the Seventh
Circuit found that First Amendment protection was not justified in a pri-
vate matter concerning a private person.229 Notably, the Seventh Circuit
initially expressed its lack of acceptance of the notion that a credit rating
is due the same protection that the Supreme Court has provided to news-
papers.230 However, assuming so for the sake of argument, the Seventh
Circuit found that the private nature of this case did not justify the pro-
tection. The Seventh Circuit further explained that under Illinois law, if a
"publisher does not believe in the truth of the . . . [statement], or has no
reasonable grounds for believing it to be true," then the publisher's
"qualified . . . privilege was abused," and the publisher may be liable.231
A court may infer such abuse based on a lack of appropriate investiga-
232
tion. Thus, D&B may incur liability if it failed to properly investigate
before issuing its credit rating.2 33
The Oberman case exemplifies the divergence in viewpoints among
the lower courts. Here, the Seventh Circuit did not accept the idea that a
credit rating should receive the same First Amendment protection afford-
ed to newspapers.234 This case also illustrates the high bar of the Su-
224. Id. at 762 (finding the speech at issue was "solely in the individual interest of the speaker
and its specific business audience"); see also Oberman, 460 F.2d at 1384 (observing that the plain-
tiffs financial affairs delineated in the credit report were not "of any interest" to anyone other than
those involved in the specific business transaction at issue, those who provide credit to his business,
or those who receive "his trade paper").
225. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. at 762 ("[T]he credit report was made available to
only five subscribers, who, under the terms of the subscription agreement, could not disseminate it
further."); see also Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig.),
511 F. Supp. 2d 742, 819 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (explaining the credit report in Greenmoss "was sent to
only five subscribers who were under agreement o keep the information confidential").
226. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. at 762 (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va.
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 764 (1976)).
227. Id at 761-63; see also Oberman, 460 F.2d at 1382-85 (finding the actual malice standard
inapplicable in a libel case brought by a private person concerning a private matter).
228. 460 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1972).
229. Id at 1384 (finding First Amendment protection in a "case brought by a private person
upon a matter not of public interest can[not] be justified").
230. Id. (stating that the court was "not persuaded that the credit rating of [a] business was
entitled to the same treatment that the Supreme Court has afforded newspapers and magazines").
231. Id. at 1385.
232. Id; see also Cook v. E. Shore Newspapers, Inc., 64 N.E.2d 751, 765 (Ill. App. Ct. 1945)
("All circumstances surrounding the transaction are proper for consideration, including the failure to
make a proper investigation.").
233. See Oberman, 460 F.2d at 1385.
234. Id. at 1384.
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preme Court's actual malice standard235 relative to the "less rigorous"
state law.236 As discussed earlier in this section, the Supreme Court has
stated that a "failure to investigate" is insufficient to prove reckless dis-
regard under the actual malice standard.237 Yet, under Illinois law, liabil-
ity may be inferred from a "failure to make a proper investigation."
238
The actual malice standard emanated from the laws of defamation
and libel. 2 39 The defamation laws serve to protect an individual's reputa-
tion and provide for a cause of action when false statements have caused
damage to that reputation.24 0 The libel laws similarly provide for com-
pensation when a published defamatory false statement has injured an
individual.2 4 1 The actual malice standard also has been applied in other
types of actions for compensatory damages resulting from false state-
242ments. In particular, many courts have applied the actual malice stand-
ard in various causes of action against the credit rating agencies.243 The
next section will explore the application of the actual malice standard to
actions involving the credit rating agencies.
235. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 337, 342 (1974) (acknowledging that
"many deserving plaintiffs, including some intentionally subjected to injury, will be unable to sur-
mount the barrier of the New York Times test"); see also St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731
(1968) ("Concededly the reckless disregard standard may permit recovery in fewer situations than
would a rule that publishers must satisfy the standard of the reasonable man or the prudent publish-
er.").
236. See Oberman, 460 F.2d at 1382-85.
237. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 332 ("[M]ere proof of failure to investigate, without more, cannot
establish reckless disregard for the truth."); see also St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 733 ("Failure to investi-
gate does not in itself establish bad faith." (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 287-88
(1964) ("[N]egligence in failing to discover the misstatements ... is constitutionally insufficient to
show the recklessness that is required for a finding of actual malice."))).
238. Oberman, 460 F.2d at 1385 (quoting Cook v. E. Shore Newspapers, 64 N.E.2d 751, 765
(1ll. App. Ct. 1945)).
239. See generally Cty. of Orange v. McGraw Hill Cos., 245 B.R. 151, 155 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
1999) (noting that issues regarding false statements "traditionally arise" in actions for defamation or
libel).
240. Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody's Inv'r's Servs., 175 F.3d 848, 852 (10th Cir.
1999) (citing Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 11-14 (1990) ("Defamation law devel-
oped not only as a means of allowing an individual to vindicate his good name, but also for the
purpose of obtaining redress for harm caused by such statements.")).
241. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341-42 ("The legitimate state interest underlying the law of libel is the
compensation of individuals for the harm inflicted on them by defamatory falsehood. . . . '[L]ibel
remains premised on the content of speech and limits the freedom of the publisher to express certain
sentiments, at least without guaranteeing legal proof of their substantial accuracy."' (quoting Curtis
Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 152 (1967))).
242. Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig.), 511 F.
Supp. 2d 742, 811 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (explaining the actual malice rule has been applied to causes of
action beyond defamation, slander, and libel, such as breach of contract and negligent misrepresenta-
tion); Cty. of Orange, 245 B.R. at 155 (noting the actual malice standard has been applied to causes
of action other than defamation and libel (citing Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56
(1988) (applying the actual malice standard in cause of action regarding intentional infliction of
emotional distress))).
243. See, e.g., Compuware Corp. v. Moody's Inv'rs Servs., Inc., 499 F.3d 520, 525-29 (6th
Cir. 2007) (applying the actual malice standard in a case involving a publicly held corporation);
Enron Corp., 511 F. Supp. 2d at 825 (concluding the actual malice rule applies "because the nation-
ally published credit ratings focus upon matters of public concern, a top Fortune 500 company's
creditworthiness"); Cty. ofOrange, 245 B.R. at 156-57 (finding the actual malice standard applies to
a breach of contract action and a professional negligence action against a credit rating agency).
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b. Application of the Actual Malice Standard to Credit Rating
Agencies
The lower courts generally have treated the credit rating agencies as
publishers and their credit ratings as statements of opinion entitled to full
First Amendment protection.244 For example, in Jefferson County School
District Number R-1 v. Moody's Investor's Services, Inc.,245 the Tenth
Circuit employed a First Amendment analysis in reviewing claims
against Moody's arising from its unsolicited article referring to the "neg-
ative outlook" of bonds issued by a school district and the district's "on-
going financial pressures."246 According to the school district, the article
falsely implied that it was not a creditworthy issuer, and this "implied
assertion" may be proven as false; thus, the article was not a protected
expression of opinion.2 47
According to the Tenth Circuit, neither the implied assertion that the
school district was not creditworthy, nor the express statements regarding
the negative outlook of the bonds and the school district's ongoing finan-
cial pressures, was sufficiently specific to be provable as false.2 48 Never-
theless, the court "emphasize[d] that the phrases [such as] 'negative out-
look' [and] 'ongoing financial pressures' are not necessarily too indefi-
nite to imply a false statement of fact." 24 9 If those phrases were combined
with "specific factual assertions," then those statements may not be enti-
tled to constitutional protection.2 50 However, based on the school dis-
trict's inability to identify a "specific false statement" that could be "rea-
sonably implied" from the article and the indefiniteness of the express
"phrases 'negative outlook,' and 'ongoing financial pressures,"' the cred-
it rating agency's article was deemed "a protected expression of opin-
11251
ion.
244. See, e.g., Compuware Corp., 499 F.3d at 522 ("Moody's is a financial publisher ... [and
its] rating is a predictive opinion of a company's future creditworthiness."); Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist.,
175 F.3d at 855-56 (holding that a credit rating agency's article regarding the creditworthiness of an
issuer of bonds "constitutes a protected expression of opinion" under the First Amendment); Cty. of
Orange, 245 B.R. at 154 (referring to Standard & Poor's as a "financial publisher").
245. 175 F.3d 848 (10th Cir. 1999).
246. Id. at 850 (noting the rating agency "had not been asked to rate the bonds" and was not
paid a fee); see also Commercial Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 94 P.3d 106, 110 (Okla.
Civ. App. 2004) (discussing Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist. and explaining that "[t]he article gave the
bonds and the school district's financial condition negative evaluations").
247. Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist., 175 F.3d at 850, 854.
248. Id. at 855 ("Like the statement of a product's value, a statement regarding the creditwor-
thiness of a bond issuer could well depend on a myriad of factors, many of them not provably true or
false.").
249. Id. at 856.
250. Id ("If coupled with specific factual assertions, such statements might not be immunized
from defamation claims by the First Amendment.").
251. Id; see also Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990) (finding a "statement
of 'opinion' concerning public matters which does not imply an assertion of fact that may be prov-
en as false will be fully protected under the First Amendment).
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As the lower courts generally consider credit rating agencies to be
publishers and their ratings to be statements of opinion, these courts gen-
erally have applied the actual malice standard in actions against the rat-
- 21ing agencies.252 The bankruptcy case of County of Orange v. McGraw
Hill Cos., Inc. ,253 provides an example of the application of the actual
malice rule in both a professional negligence action and a breach of con-
tract action against Standard & Poor's. 254 As an initial matter, the district
court accepted, without discussion, that Standard & Poor's merits the
status of a "publisher" under First Amendment jurisprudence.255 Howev-
er, the district court acknowledged that an entity's "status as a financial
publisher" does not automatically provide that entity with heightened
First Amendment protection in the form of the actual malice standard.256
The County argued that a breach of contract action falls under the
rubric of a "law of general applicability," and thus, the general laws of
contract should govern this action.257 Moreover, the County argued that
the rating agency was subject to an implied duty under contract law to
competently perform the analytical services upon which the rating is
based and, thus, breached the agreement by providing an inaccurate rat-
ing.258 Despite these arguments, the district court employed a First
Amendment analysis in considering the breach of contract claim.259 The
court found that the debt securities were matters of "public concern"
because either party was free to make the rating public. 260 As a result, the
court concluded that the actual malice rule applies to the breach of con-
tract action unless a "special circumstance" was present, that is, if the
rating agency "voluntarily waived" the protections of the First Amend-
261ment. Upon reviewing the agreements, the court found no evidence
that the rating agency expressly waived its constitutional protections.
2 62
252. See supra Section 1.A.3.b.
253. 245 B.R. 151 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1999).
254. Id. at 156-57 ("The actual malice standard will apply to the County's breach of contract
claim . . . unless the Court finds S&P voluntarily waived its First Amendment protection. . . . [Tihe
actual malice standard applies to any professional negligence claim concerning S&P's protected
speech.").
255. Id. at 154 (referring to Standard & Poor's as a "financial publisher").
256. Id. at 154-55; see also First Nat'I Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 802 (1978)
(Burger, C.J., concurring) ("[T]he First Amendment does not 'belong' to any definable category of
persons or entities . . . .").
257. Cty of Orange, 245 B.R. at 156 (citing the standard of Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501
U.S. 663, 670 (1991) (holding "that 'the publisher of a newspaper has no special immunity from the
application of general laws' (quoting Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132 (1937)))).
258. Compuware Corp. v. Moody's Inv'rs Servs., Inc., 499 F.3d 520, 530-31 (6th Cir. 2007)
(citing Cty. of Orange, 245 B.R. at 154 (noting the County's argument that Standard & Poor's "as-
sumed a duty to adequately perform the services called for in the contract")).
259. Cty. of Orange, 245 B.R. at 155-56 (noting the ability of either party to "publicize the
rating" and, thus, finding the rating to be a matter of public concern potentially subject to the actual
malice rule).
260. Id at 155.
261. Id. at 156.
262. Id ("A waiver of a constitutional right 'is not to be implied and is not lightly to be
found."' (quoting Gete v. INS, 121 F.3d 1285, 1293 (9th Cir. 1997))); see also Marilyn Manson, Inc.
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The court noted that if the rating agency had expressly agreed to provide
the County with analytical services, separate from the rating itself, such
an undertaking would be viewed as a special circumstance that "might
have avoided" the application of the actual malice rule.263 However, in
this case, there was no separate agreement to provide financial services;
there was only an agreement to provide the rating.264 Thus, the court held
that the actual malice standard applied to the County's breach of contract
claim because the rating was a matter of public concern and no special
circumstances were present.265
Additionally, the district court held that the actual malice standard
applied to the County's claim for professional negligence.266 The court
found that the County's injury resulted from the rating agency's "expres-
sive activity"; therefore, the professional negligence action also was sub-
ject to the actual malice rule.
26 7
Similarly, in Compuware Corp. v. Moody's Investors Services,
Inc.,268 the Sixth Circuit stated, without analysis, that "Moody's is a fi-
nancial publisher."269 The court further stated that Compuware is a public
corporation and, thus, would be considered a "public figure" under a
First Amendment analysis.27 0 Therefore, the Sixth Circuit applied the
actual malice rule in a defamation action against Moody's concerning
statements in its rating report.27 1 The court also noted that, in contrast to
the rating report, a defamation claim could not even be recognized with
respect to the actual rating.272 As expressed by the Sixth Circuit, a "credit
rating is a predictive opinion" regarding the expected creditworthiness of
a company and is based upon "a subjective and discretionary weighing of
complex factors."273 As a result, the court found that the credit rating
v. N.J. Sports & Exposition Auth., 971 F. Supp. 875, 889 (D.N.J. 1997) (explaining the waiver of a
constitutional right needs to be "voluntary, knowing, and intelligent" (quoting Erie Telecomms., Inc.
v. City of Erie, 853 F.2d 1084, 1094 (3d Cir. 1988))).
263. Cly. of Orange, 245 B.R. at 156.
264. Id. ("Since there is no claim or showing S&P undertook a separate duty to provide a
competent rating, the only element of the County's breach of contract claim is the providing of the
rating itself Any duty to perform competently would be part of the Constitutionally-protected
rendering of a rating, not a separate obligation.").
265. Id. ("A claim that S&P breached its duty to provide a rating in a competent manner is
subject to the actual malice standard.").
266. Id. at 157.
267. Id.
268. 499 F.3d 520 (6th Cir. 2007).
269. See id. at 522.
270. Id. at 525.
271. Id. at 525-26.
272. Id. at 529 ("To the extent Compuware alleges that the credit rating itself was defamatory,
as opposed to the facts or implications in the report, Compuware has failed to assert a cognizable
defamation claim.").
273. Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund v. Standard & Poor's Fin. Servs. LLC, 700 F.3d 829,
842 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Compuware Corp., 499 F.3d at 529) (dismissing claims against credit
rating agencies for negligent misrepresentation because credit ratings do not communicate a factual




does not imply any factual assertions that could be proven as false.2 74
The court stated that even if the rating conveyed a factual implication,
the "inherently subjective nature of Moody's ratings" determination
makes it impossible to prove as false any such factual inference.2 75
The Sixth Circuit also considered a breach of contract claim in
which Compuware alleged that Moody's breached the implied duty un-
der contract law to perform the agreement in a skillful, diligent, and
276workmanlike manner. As an initial matter, the court noted that
"[o]rdinarily, 'enforcement of... general laws against the press is not
subject to stricter scrutiny than [what] would be applied [in the case of
other entities]."' 277 Moreover, the Sixth Circuit observed that the
Supreme Court has never applied the actual malice rule to a breach of
contract action, nor has any circuit court.278 The only precedent in which
a court applied the actual malice standard to a breach of contract claim
was the California bankruptcy case of County of Orange v. McGraw Hill
Co., discussed earlier in this section.279 Nevertheless, the Sixth Circuit
held that the actual malice rule applied to the breach of contract action in
the instant case.
280
The Sixth Circuit found that the contract at issue involved matters
that concern the First Amendment.281 The parties contracted for Moody's
to evaluate Compuware's creditworthiness and to issue a credit rating
282
and a rating report. The Sixth Circuit considered the credit rating and
the contents of the rating report to be Moody's opinion. 283 Thus, the court
found that the "very subject matter and corresponding duties" of the
agreement implicate speech that is protected by the First Amendment.284
Moreover, the court found the parties contracted for Moody's to provide
274. Id. (citing Compuware Corp., 499 F.3d at 529 (finding "no basis . .. [to] conclude that the
credit rating itself communicates any provably false factual connotation")); see also Milkovich v.
Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990).
275. Compuware Corp., 499 F.3d at 529 ("Even if [the court] could draw any fact-based infer-
ences from this rating, such inferences could not be proven false because of the inherently subjective
nature of Moody's ratings calculation.").
276. Id. at 531 ("Compuware contends that Moody's breached this contract by incompetently
compiling, investigating, and evaluating Compuware's credit position, and by publishing an errone-
ous report.").
277. Id. at 529 (alteration in original) (quoting Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 670
(1991)).
278. Id. at 530.
279. See id.; Cty. of Orange v. McGraw Hill Cos., 245 B.R. 151, 154-56 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
1999) (applying the actual malice standard to a breach of contract claim).
280. Compuware Corp., 499 F.3d at 531.
281. Id. ("Moody's contracted to publish a credit rating for Compuware, which ... involves
activities protected by the First Amendment.").
282. Id.
283. Id. (finding the agreement "consists of Moody's promise to provide its opinion of Com-
puware's creditworthiness and to publish a report of that opinion").
284. Id. ("Moody's opinion and its publication are matters protected by the First Amendment;
thus the whole of this agreement-the very subject matter and corresponding duties-is intimately
tied to speech, expression, and publication.").
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"a credit rating;" the agreement did not expressly state that Moody's
would provide an accurate credit rating.285
The Sixth Circuit found Compuware's argument, that Moody's
breached the implied duty under contract law to competently perform
286under the contract, based in negligence. As a result, the court consid-
ered this breach of contract claim to be a claim for negligence and, as
such, to be essentially the same as a tort claim for defamation.28 The
Sixth Circuit further found that the harm suffered was an injury to the
reputation of Compuware rather than an injury due to a lack of perfor-
mance of the contract.288 Ultimately, the court viewed Compuware's
breach of contract claim as a defamation claim and held that the actual
malice rule applied.289
The Sixth Circuit emphasized that its holding was limited to the cir-
cumstances of this case.290 In contrast to the instant case, if the agreement
provided that the parties were to perform an obligation that did not
implicate protected speech, then the actual malice rule would not
apply.2 91 Similarly, if Compuware had alleged that he credit rating agen-
cy failed to perform an express provision of the agreement, then the ac-
tual malice rule would not be applicable.292
In this author's opinion, the extension of the actual malice rule to
breach of contract actions against the credit rating agencies is completely
unjustified and inappropriate.293 The application of the actual malice
standard in Compuware was "entirely unprecedented" with the exception
of the County of Orange bankruptcy case.294 Moreover, requiring a pub-
lic figure plaintiff to show actual malice to recover on a breach of con-
tract claim effectively eliminates the ability of that plaintiff to contract
for a credit rating agency to provide an accurate evaluation of that plain-
285. Id. at 531-32 ("Moody's agreed only to publish a credit rating; it did not agree to publish
a ... correctly appraised rating.").
286. Id. (arguing that "Moody's breached an implied contractual covenant to perform skillfully
and diligently"); see also Nash v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 174 N.W.2d 818, 821 (Mich. 1970) (noting
the implied duty in all contracts for services to perform the obligations "skillfully, carefully, diligent-
ly, and in a workmanlike manner").
287. Compuware Corp., 499 F.3d at 532 (seeing "no material difference between" Compu-
ware's claim for breach of contract and a tort claim for defamation).
288. Id. at 532-33.
289. Id. at 533 (concluding Compuware's "only injuries are defamation-type harm resulting
from Moody's publication of protected speech, and application of the actual-malice standard to [the]
breach of contract claim is appropriate").
290. Id
291. Id. at 533-34 ("[T]his holding would not apply to any breach of contract claim where ...
the parties [were required] to do something other than publish protected expression.").
292. Id at 534 (explaining that this holding would not be applicable "if Compuware alleged
that Moody's breached the express terms of the contract by, for example, failing to provide a rating
at all").
293. See id. at 535 (Rogers, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The extension of
First Amendment tort law principles to contract cases is unwarranted . . . .").
294. Id at 535; see also Cty. of Orange v. McGraw Hill Cos., 245 B.R. 151, 156 (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. 1999).
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tiff's creditworthiness.29 5 Instead, the actual malice standard grants the
credit rating agency the right to breach the agreement so long as the rat-
ing agency did not act with malice.296
The Sixth Circuit noted that the actual malice standard would not
apply if the credit rating agency failed to perform an express provision of
the agreement and stated that "failing to provide a rating at all" would be
an example of such a breach.297 Moreover, the court stated that a party
could contract for a specific result (for example, a positive result), and a
breach of that express obligation would not require the application of the
actual malice rule.298 However, this line of reasoning is not relevant to
agreements with credit rating agencies. A credit rating agency is not in
the business of providing a specific result. Instead, a credit rating agency
is in the business of evaluating the financial condition of a business and
its debt securities and providing a rating that conveys the agency's as-
sessment of the creditworthiness of that business and its debt securi-
ties.29 9 Thus, following the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit, the only rele-
vant circumstance in which a credit rating agency could be found to have
breached an agreement o provide a credit rating, free of the actual mal-
ice standard, is if the agency failed to provide the rating at all; the stand-
ard contract law principle of an implied duty to use reasonable care in
performing an agreement is not applicable to credit rating agencies.300
Instead, in stark contrast o other businesses, credit rating agencies may
act negligently in performing agreements without the fear of any liabil-
ity. 30t The fact that a credit rating agency's business is to publish a rating
295. See Compuware Corp., 499 F.3d at 535 (Rogers, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("Requiring a showing of actual malice to prevail on a contract claim ... effectively destroys
the ability of public figures to ... contract [for the other party to make accurate statements about the
public figure].").
296. See id. (arguing that the actual malice requirement imposes into "such contract[s] the right
to violate the contractual obligation as long as there is no malice").
297. Id. at 534 (majority opinion).
298. Id.
299. ROLE & FUNCTION, supra note 2, at 5 ("For almost a century, credit rating agencies have
been providing opinions on the creditworthiness of issuers of [debt] securities and their financial
obligations."); Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 888 F. Supp. 2d 431, 455
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (explaining that a credit rating agency "analyze[s] data, conduct[s] an assessment,
and [provides] a fact-based conclusion as to creditworthiness"); Commercial Fin. Sers., Inc. v.
Arthur Andersen LLP, 94 P.3d 106, 110 (Okla. Civ. App. 2004) (finding the rating agencies provid-
ed their opinions regarding the creditworthiness of the plaintiffs bonds "as professionals being paid
to provide their opinions to a client").
300. See Compuware Corp., 499 F.3d at 535-37 (Rogers, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (noting the "implied term" to perform an agreement with reasonable care and asserting that
"it is not clear why the First Amendment should . . . deprive parties of the ability to contract that a
certain standard of care be exercised").
301. See id. at 537 ("[R]equiring malice to recover for breach of contract in this case elevates
the protection Moody's enjoys against breach of contract claims above what other contracting parties
... would enjoy.... Under the majority's reasoning, Moody's is free to assign ratings based solely
on any nonmalicious basis, and a customer would have no recourse against the company at all. Such
freedom from contractual obligation is not provided generally to contracting parties.").
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should not eviscerate contractual obligations that are owed to the other
party and that other businesses must observe.302
Moreover, as the dissent noted, it does not follow that a claim for
breach of the implied duty to perform a contract using reasonable care is
the same as a tort claim for negligence.303 In a tort case, the obligation to
use reasonable care derives from a government-imposed duty to act in a
reasonable manner.304 in a contract case, the duty to use reasonable care
is derived from the contract itself and is a duty that the parties voluntarily
undertake.30 5 Thus, the difference between a tort action and a breach of
contract action is the source of the parties' obligations.30 6 The fact that a
contractual obligation uses the same terms as a duty in tort should not
preclude the validity of that contractual obligation.307
In County of Orange, the court found that the actual malice standard
applied to the breach of contract claim unless the plaintiff could show the
presence of a special circumstance such as if the rating agency expressly
waived the protections of the First Amendment.308 One may query why
the tort protections of the First Amendment are inherent in a contract and
must be expressly waived; yet, the established contractual duty to per-
form obligations with reasonable care is completely disregarded.3 09
The freedom to contract is a fundamental legal principle. In express-
ing the value of the freedom to enter into contracts, Professor Farnsworth
has noted, "From a utilitarian point of view, freedom to contract maxim-
izes the welfare of the parties and therefore the good of society . . . .
From a libertarian point of view, it accords to individuals a sphere of
influence in which they can act freely.,310 As the Supreme Court has
noted, "The parties themselves . .. determine the scope of their legal
obligations" in the context of a contract.3 1 If the parties did not wish to
undertake the established duty under contract law to perform their obli-
gations with reasonable care, then the parties were free to explicitly agree
302. See id. at 537 ("The fact that Moody's is in the business of publishing does not eliminate
any and all contractual obligations the company has towards those paying real money for its ser-
vices.").
303. Id. at 536 ("The fact that a contract requires 'reasonable care' does not mean that a claim
for breach of contract is the equivalent of a tort claim for negligence.").
304. Id. ("In tort cases the obligation comes from a duty imposed by the government to act
reasonably on pain of paying the costs of acting unreasonably.").
305. Id. ("In contract cases the obligation comes from a voluntarily entered-into undertaking.").
306. Id.
307. Id. ("Contracting parties should not be precluded from entering into ... contracts merely
because the obligation is stated in terms that the tort law also uses.").
308. Cty. of Orange v. McGraw Hill Cos., 245 B.R. 151, 156 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1999).
309. See Compuware Corp., 499 F.3d at 535 (Rogers, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); Cty. of Orange, 245 B.R. at 156.
310. 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 1.7, at 25 (1990) (discussing
the value of the freedom to contract).
311. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 671-72 (1991) (holding that where a reporter
promised not to reveal the identity of a source and then revealed that source's identity, the First
Amendment did not bar a promissory estoppel claim).
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that the implied contractual provision would not be applicable.3 12 Yet, the
fundamental freedom to contract has been virtually eliminated in the case
of contracts with credit rating agencies.
The professional negligence case of In re Enron Corp. Secs. De-
rivative & "ERISA " Litig.3 14 provides a further example of the misguided
protections afforded by the lower courts. In this action against Standard
& Poor's and Moody's for negligently assigning false and misleading
credit ratings to Enron's debt securities, the court initially found the
speech of a credit rating agency to be the same type of speech as that of a
credit reporting agency: commercial speech.3 15 The court then distin-
guished credit rating agencies by finding that rating agencies "do not
profit from the sale of the bonds" of companies that are rated. 16 Howev-
er, the court did not consider that the profit derives not from the actual
sale of the bonds but instead from the fees paid to provide the rating.317
Moreover, whether the profit is made from the sale of the bonds or from
the assignment of a rating is immaterial to whether the credit rating
agencies should be held liable for negligently prepared credit ratings that
are false or misleading.
The court further found that the actual malice rule applied because
Enron was a Fortune 500 company, and thus, the ratings involved "mat-
ters of public concern."318 Moreover, the credit ratings were publicly
distributed.31 9 Despite acknowledging that protections under the First
Amendment have not been universally applied to the credit rating agen-
cies, the court applied "what appears to be a policy of heightened protec-
tion for credit reports under the First Amendment. . . even if negligently
prepared."3 20 Although the court found the credit rating reports to be "a
combination of subjective, nonactionable evaluation and verifiable
facts," the court determined that the plaintiff did not identify any factual
statements that could be proven as false and did not show that the agen-
312. Compuware Corp., 499 F.3d at 537 (Rogers, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(asserting that "[t]he parties could have explicitly contracted away [the] implied term" to perform the
agreement with reasonable care).
313. See id. (arguing that the court should not apply "a newly created legal doctrine that effec-
tively makes unenforceable a wide swath of perfectly legitimate contracts").
314. 511 F. Supp. 2d 742 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
315. Id. at 820 (noting "the long established reduced protection for commercial speech"); see
also Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 762-63 (1985).
316. Enron Corp., 511 F. Supp. 2d at 820.
317. See RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS 372-73 (4th ed. 2009) ("Most credit rating agencies, particularly Moody's, Standard
& Poor's . . . and Fitch, earn money by charging issuers a fee in exchange for assigning a credit
rating to the debt obligations marketed by the issuer.").
318. Enron Corp., 511 F. Supp. 2d at 825 (asserting that the creditworthiness of a "top Fortune
500 company" is a "matter[] of public concern").
319. Id. at 820, 825 (explaining the credit rating reports "were not private or confidential,"
rather the reports were "nationally published").
320. Id. at 825 ("First Amendment protection for credit rating agencies as members of the
'financial press' performing 'traditional journalistic functions' is not universally acknowledged
...1)
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cies "knew or had significant suspicions" regarding the truth of their
statements; thus, the plaintiff failed to prove actual malice.321 The court
further noted that under the actual malice rule, the reasonable person
standard does not apply; thus, the credit rating agencies did not have a
duty to investigate.322
Given the lack of a duty to investigate under the actual malice
rule,323 whether the credit rating agencies would have uncovered the
fraud occurring at Enron324 had the rating agencies investigated will nev-
er be known. Yet, these circumstances further belie the judicial wisdom
of applying the actual malice rule to the credit rating agencies. Had the
rating agencies been required to investigate, there is a possibility that the
agencies would have uncovered the fraud at Enron, and many investors
would have avoided significant losses.325
Moreover, even if the plaintiff was able to show that the rating re-
ports contained false factual statements made with actual malice and,
thus, that the credit rating agencies were not deserving of First Amend-
ment protection, the plaintiff would face another stumbling block: the
court would need to find, as a matter of law, the existence of a duty of
care owed by the rating agencies to the plaintiff.32 6 While acknowledging
that the plaintiffs harm was a foreseeable consequence of the allegedly
misleading rating reports, the court found the relationship between the
rating agencies' alleged negligent misrepresentation and the harm suf-
fered by the plaintiff was "too remote, as a matter of public policy, to
impose a duty." 32 7 The court did not address the plaintiffs claim that it
had specifically hired Standard & Poor's and Moody's to rate the bonds;
instead, the court focused on the fact that the credit reports were publicly
distributed.328 The court also appeared to find it significant that the plain-
tiff did not purchase the bonds; rather, the plaintiff loaned money to En-
321. Id.
322. Id. at 825-26 (noting credit rating "[a]gencies are not held to a reasonable person standard
that might require investigation"); see also supra notes 163-69 and accompanying text.
323. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
324. Alexei Barrionuevo, Enron Chiefs Guilty of Fraud and Conspiracy, N.Y. TIMES (May 25,
2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/25/business/25cnd-enron.html?pagewanted=all&_r-0
(reporting that Kenneth Lay and Jeffrey Skilling, chief executives of Enron, were found guilty of
fraud and conspiracy following the company's "sudden collapse ... and revelation as little more
than a house of cards").
325. See id. (noting losses associated with the fraud at Enron resulted in "billions of dollars" in
civil suits).
326. Enron Corp., 511 F. Supp. 2d at 826 ("[A] crucial prerequisite for stating a negligent
misrepresentation claim is a court determination that under the facts and circumstances alleged, there
exists a duty of care owed to the plaintiff by the defendant."); see also Gomes v. Commercial Union
Ins. Co., 783 A.2d 462,469-70 (Conn. 2001).
327. Enron Corp., 511 F. Supp. 2d at 826-27 (explaining that imposing a duty of care requires
the court to find that the harm was foreseeable and that, on the basis of public policy, "the defend-
ant's responsibility for its negligent conduct should extend to the particular consequences or particu-
lar plaintiff in [the] case" (quoting Games, 783 A.2d at 470)).
328. See id. at 827 ("The credit reports were distributed to the world at large.").
317
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ron separate from the issuance of the bonds.3 29 While the court acknowl-
edged that new regulation of the credit rating agencies may be appropri-
ate to protect market participants, the court determined that it would not
be "beneficial to society" to permit anyone who claimed reliance on rat-
ing reports and suffered a loss "in any endeavor" to recover from the
credit rating agencies.330
However, many ancillary credit decisions are made based upon the
credit rating assigned by a rating agency to a particular issuer of debt
securities.3  Whether the plaintiff purchased the bonds is immaterial to
the fact that the plaintiff justifiably relied upon the credit rating in its
decision to make Enron a loan to the plaintiffs foreseeable detriment.33 2
Moreover, the plaintiff in this case is not just "anyone" who relied on the
rating reports and incurred a loss; the plaintiff in this case specifically
hired the rating agencies to provide a credit rating for the bonds issued
by Enron.3 33 Thus, it would appear that the plaintiff in this case had a
"relationship of privity" with the credit rating agencies and, therefore,
was owed a duty of care.334
As demonstrated above, "while there is no automatic, blanket, abso-
lute First Amendment protection" for publications issued by the credit
rating agencies, the majority of courts have historically shielded the rat-
ing agencies from liability for the allegedly fraudulent or negligent rat-
ings disseminated in those publications.335
329. Id
330. Id. ("While new regulation of the agencies may well be in order to '[protect] the safety of
the participants,' allowing anyone to sue credit rating agencies who had read the credit rating reports
and claimed to have relied upon them and lost money in any endeavor that person undertook would
be far more deleterious than beneficial to society as a whole." (alteration in original) (citation omit-
ted) (quoting Jaworski v. Kiernan, 696 A.2d 332, 337 (Conn. 1997))).
331. Many loan contracts include triggers based on debt ratings assigned by the credit rating
agencies. Pepa Kraft, Do Rating Agencies Cater? Evidence from Rating-Based Contracts 2 (May 3,
2011) (unpublished manuscript),
https://business.nd.eduluploadedFiles/AcademicCenters/StudyofFinancialRegulation/pdf and
ocuments/201 I _confPepa Kraft.pdf ("Private loan agreements increasingly use public debt ratings
as manifestations of a borrower's credit risk in order to calibrate pricing."), reprinted in 59 J. ACCT.
& ECON. 264 (2015).
332. See Enron Corp., 511 F. Supp. 2d at 809, 827 (noting the plaintiff relied on the credit
information published by the rating agencies in deciding to make a loan to Enron and that the harm
to the plaintiff could be considered foreseeable).
333. Id. at 824 (acknowledging that the plaintiff claims to have "specifically retained" the
credit rating agencies to assign a rating to Enron's bond issue).
334. See id. at 824-25 (noting the question of whether there is a "relationship of privity" that
would limit or bar the protections of the First Amendment but failing to specifically address the
issue); see also Commercial Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 94 P.3d 106, 110 (Okla. Civ.
App. 2004) (noting the plaintiff had asked the rating agencies to rate the bonds and had paid the
agencies for the rating and, thus, were in privity with the rating agencies and owed a duty of care).
335. Enron Corp., 511 F. Supp. 2d at 815-17; see also PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS, supra
note 3, at 96 (finding courts have shielded the credit rating agencies from liability by affording the
rating agencies protection under the First Amendment).
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c. When the Actual Malice Standard Does Not Apply
While the majority of courts have applied the heightened First
Amendment protections of the actual malice standard in actions involv-
ing the credit rating agencies, 336 there are some cases in which the courts
have rejected the actual malice rule. For example, in Commercial Finan-
cial Services, Inc. v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 337 the court found that the
First Amendment protections reserved for journalists did not apply to
claims against the credit rating agencies for negligent misrepresentation
338and negligence. According to the court, credit ratings "fall somewhere
between" opinions that are entitled to First Amendment protection and
opinions that do not deserve protection.3 39 The court distinguished be-
tween an editorial writer, who is entitled to full First Amendment protec-
tion with respect to speech concerning the conduct of public officials,
and an attorney providing title opinions, who is "not automatically ex-
empt" when there is a claim of negligence just because the attorney is
340
issuing an opinion.
Following this line of reasoning, the court made a "crucial distinc-
tion" between the instant case and Jefferson County, in which the credit
rating agency was not asked to assign a rating to the bonds and was not
paid a fee to rate the bonds.4 In contrast, the plaintiff in this case had
requested the credit rating agencies to provide a bond rating and had paid
342
a fee to the rating agencies for that bond rating. Thus, the court found
that the rating agencies provided their opinions regarding the creditwor-
thiness of the plaintiffs bonds "as professionals being paid to provide
their opinions to a client."343 As a result, the plaintiff and the credit rating
agencies are considered to be "in privity" based on an agreement en-
forceable by both parties. As expressed by the court, the relationship
336. See supra Section I.A.3.b.
337. 94 P.3d 106 (Okla. Civ. App. 2004).
338. Id. at 110 (finding the First Amendment does not "shield[] the agencies from potential
liability").
339. Id. at 109.
340. Id at 109-10.
341. Id. at I10; see also Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody's Inv'r's Servs., Inc., 175
F.3d 848, 850 (10th Cir. 1999) (noting Moody's "had not been asked to rate the bonds" and had not
been paid a fee).
342. Commercial Fin. Servs., 94 P.3d at 110 ("[Ijn the instant case the Rating Agencies [i.e.,
S&P, Moody's, and Fitch] had been asked to rate the bonds, at CFS's request and at CFS's ex-
pense.").
343. Id. ("If a journalist wrote an article for a newspaper about the bonds, the First Amendment
would presumably apply. But if CFS hired that journalist to write a company report about the bonds,
a different standard would apply.").
344. Id; cf Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund v. Standard & Poor's Fin. Servs. LLC, 700 F.3d
829, 840-42 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding purchasers of mortgage-backed securities rated by the credit
rating agencies failed to show a "special relationship" with the agencies necessary to be in privity
and, thus, were not owed a duty of care); Anschutz Corp. v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 690 F.3d 98, 114-
15 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that the purchaser of securities rated by the credit rating agencies failed to
state a claim for negligent misrepresentation against the credit rating agency because the purchaser




between the plaintiff and the credit rating agencies "goes beyond a rela-
tionship between a journalist and subject, and is more analogous to that
of a client and the client's certified public accountant."3 45 Therefore, the
court found that the credit rating agencies are not shielded from liability
by the First Amendment.3 46
The court further found that the credit rating agencies, "having
agreed to rate the bonds for a fee," owed a duty of care to the plaintiff,
"the entity paying for the rating." 347 Thus, although the rating agencies
did not agree to provide a particular rating, "it is implicit" in the "busi-
ness relationship" of the parties that the agencies would determine the
rating "in a non-negligent" manner.348 The court found that the parties
had "a special relationship" as delineated in dealings and communica-
tions between the parties, including a letter outlining the rights and obli-
gations of the parties.34 9 Thus, the court reasoned that, unlike the readers
of a general interest newspaper or the subscribers of a financial newslet-
ter, the rating agencies owed a duty to the plaintiff.350
Notably, even though the securities were issued in a private place-
ment, the credit rating agencies had the right to disseminate the rating to
the public.35 1 Thus, the rating could be circulated to "a potentially limit-
less audience."352 Nonetheless, the Restatement's requirement that the
negligent misrepresentation must be intended for "a limited group of
persons" does not bar the plaintiffs recovery.353 As expressed by the
court, "[N]o matter who else might eventually learn of the rating, the
rating was clearly intended for [the plaintiff]."354 The credit rating agen-
345. Commercial Fin. Servs., 94 P.3d at 110. But cf First Equity Corp. of Fla. v. Standard &
Poor's Corp., 869 F.2d 175, 179 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting a credit rating agency that issues a securities
newsletter falls "somewhere between" a newspaper publisher and an accountant and finding the First
Amendment protections of a newspaper publisher should apply).
346. Commercial Fin. Serys., 94 P.3d at 110 ("We do not believe the First Amendment shields
the agencies from potential liability.").
347. Id. (noting the court "cannot accept the argument that having agreed to rate the bonds for
a fee, the Rating Agencies owed no duty of care to CFS, the entity paying for the rating").
348. Id. at 111.
349. Id. at 110-12 ("A typical letter from a rating agency to CFS outlines the parties' relation-
ship. It states that the rating of the certificates was being made pursuant to a request by CFS; . . . that
the rating could be disseminated to interested parties[;] . . . that the agency retained the right to
advise the public of the rating; . . . and that a bill for the agency's work would be sent to CFS.").
350. Id. at 112 ("The Rating Agencies cannot be said to have no greater duty than that owed to
a reader of a general interest newspaper or a subscriber of a specialist newsletter."); see also Newby
v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig.), 511 F. Supp. 2d 742, 824
(S.D. Tex. 2005) (discussing Commercial Financial and explaining "the special relationship of
privity between the parties ... created a duty of care not owed to a general reader or a subscriber"
(citing Commercial Fin. Servs., 94 P.3d at 112)).
351. Commercial Fin. Serys., 94 P.3d at 111 (explaining that "(though the certificates were to
be placed privately) . .. the agency retained the right to advise the public of the rating").
352. Id. at 113.
353. Id. (explaining the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 provides that "the tort of
negligent misrepresentation is limited . .. to losses suffered 'by the person or one of a limited group
of persons' who the supplier of the false information intends to supply" (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(2)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1977))).
354. Id.
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cies prepared the rating at the request of the plaintiff and provided the
information regarding the rating to the plaintiff.3 55 Moreover, the plaintiff
hired the agencies to provide the rating and paid the agencies a consider-
ation for the rating.356 Thus, the Restatement's tort of negligent misrepre-
sentation is applicable to the credit rating agencies.
This court did not squarely address the belief held by other courts
that the rating agencies' right to disseminate the rating to the public
caused the rating to be a matter of public concern and, thus, appropriate
for the application of the actual malice rule.3 5 8 Rather, this court
acknowledged the possible dissemination of the rating to the public and
nevertheless found that the First Amendment did not shield the rating
agencies from potential liability.359
The court observed that the rating agencies, by providing a rating,
"also serve the public interest."360 Moreover, the court acknowledged the
public policy concern that the use of a negligence standard may cause the
agencies to provide ratings designed to avoid lawsuits.3 61 Nevertheless,
the court rejected the notion that an exception should be made to the tra-
ditional law of negligence in order to shield the credit rating agencies
from liability and held that the credit rating agencies owed a duty to the
plaintiff to provide an accurate rating for the securities.362
355. Id. ("[T]he communications between the parties unquestionably show the rating was done
at CFS's request, and the information concerning the rating was communicated by the agencies to
CFS.").
356. Id. (noting comment g to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 provides that
"[t]he person for whose guidance the information is supplied is often the person who has employed
the supplier to furnish it, in which case, if it is supplied for a consideration paid by that person, he
has at his election either a right of action under the rule stated in this Section [552] or a right of
action upon the contract under which the information is supplied" (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 552 CMT. g (AM. LAW INST. 1977))).
357. See id at 113-14 (rejecting the argument that the Restatement is not applicable); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1977) ("One who, in the course of his
business, profession or employment, or in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest,
supplies false information for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to
liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he
fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information.").
358. See, e.g., Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig.),
511 F. Supp. 2d 742, 820, 825 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (applying the actual malice rule because, among
other things, the credit rating reports "were not private or confidential," rather the reports were
"nationally published"); Cty. of Orange v. McGraw Hill Cos., 245 B.R. 151, 155-56 (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. 1999) (finding the debt securities were "matters of public concern" because either party was
free to make the rating public and, thus, the actual malice rule applies).
359. Commercial Fin. Serys., 94 P.3d at 110-12 (finding the First Amendment does not shield
the credit rating agencies from liability).
360. Id at 111.
361. Id at 112 ("A legitimate concern exists that applying the negligence standard may pres-
sure the agencies into issuing a more favorable rating than is deserved . . . out of fear of a lawsuit
brought by the security's issuer.").
362. Id. (finding the rating agencies owed a duty to CFS "to issue the rating the securities
deserved"); see also Enron Corp., 511 F. Supp. 2d at 822-23 (discussing the holding in Commercial
Financial Services "that the First Amendment does not protect rating agencies from liability for
alleged inaccuracies where they were asked to rate [securities] ... by a ... company,... were paid a
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Although the court in Commercial Financial found that the actual
malice rule did not apply despite the rating agencies' right to disseminate
the rating to the public, other cases in which courts found the actual mal-
ice rule to be inapplicable are limited to circumstances in which the
issuer of the securities is not a public figure and the securities are intend-
ed to be sold to a limited group of purchasers.36 3 In re National Century
Financial Enterprises, Inc.364 provides such an example of a district
court's rejection of the actual malice rule.36 5 The securities in this case
were not issued by a public company and were sold to a targeted group
of investors in a private placement.36 6 Moreover, the ratings were listed
only in the offering documents that were provided to the particular group
of investors.367 Thus, the ratings did not involve a matter of public con-
cern, and the actual malice rule did not apply.368
In considering a claim for negligent misrepresentation alleged by
the purchaser of the securities, the Southern District of Ohio also rejected
the rating agency's argument that a duty does not exist unless there is a
special relationship.36 9 The district court explained that a special relation-
ship is not "a formal element" of a claim for negligent misrepresenta-
tion.3 70 Rather, a special relationship is more aptly a characterization of
the necessary requirements of negligent misrepresentation; that is, the
defendant has given "false information in a business transaction for
plaintiffs guidance" and the plaintiff is a member "of a limited class for
whom defendant intended to supply the information."371 In this case, the
plaintiff sufficiently pled that it was a member of a limited group of pur-
chasers who foreseeably relied on the credit ratings.3 72 The rating agency
fee by that company, were therefore in privity with that company, and thus owed a duty of care to
that company to provide accurate ratings" (footnote omitted)).
363. See Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund v. Standard & Poor's Fin. Servs., LLC, 813 F. Supp.
2d 871, 877 n.l (S.D. Ohio 2011) ("Recently, courts have declined to extend [First Amendment]
protection at the motion to dismiss stage where the rating is allegedly the product of the issuer pays
model and is meant only for a select few investors." (citing In re Nat'l Century Fin. Enters., Inc.,
Inv. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 2d 630, 639-40 (S.D. Ohio 2008); and Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v.
Morgan Stanley & Co., 651 F. Supp. 2d 155, 175-76 (S.D.N.Y. 2009))); see also Anschutz Corp. v.
Merrill Lynch & Co., 785 F. Supp. 2d 799, 830-32 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
364. 580 F. Supp. 2d 630 (S.D. Ohio 2008).
365. See id. at 639-40 (finding the actual malice rule does not apply where the securities were
not "a matter of public concern"); see also Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472
U.S. 749, 762 (1985) (holding that a credit report provided to five subscribers did not concern a
public matter because it was intended for a particular business audience).
366. Nat '1 Century Fin. Enters., 580 F. Supp. 2d at 634, 639-40 (finding the securities "were
issued by a privately-held company, and ... targeted to a select class of institutional investors").
367. Id. at 640 ("[T]he only place that the ratings are alleged to have appeared were in the
offering materials given to the select class of investors.").
368. Id. at 639-40 (noting the complaint does not characterize the ratings "as a matter of public
concern").
369. Id. at 646-48.
370. Id. at 647 (quoting Nat'l Mulch & Seed, Inc. v. Rexius Forest By-Prods., Inc., 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 24904, at *29-30 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 22, 2007)).
371. Id. ("[M]isrepresentations to a person or limited category of people whom the speaker or
supplier intends to benefit or guide are actionable.").
372. Id. at 648.
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issued the credit ratings with the knowledge that the ratings would be
viewed on the offering documents provided to a limited group of inves-
tors.373
Moreover, the district court rejected the rating agency's argument
that there was no basis for justifiable reliance because the credit ratings
were "predictive opinions."3 74 As the Sixth Circuit has determined, opin-
ions can be actionable if "the opinion is not factually well-grounded."3 75
The National Century court found that the plaintiff sufficiently alleged
that the credit rating agency failed to exercise reasonable care in deter-
mining whether its ratings were factually well-grounded and, thus, failed
to exercise reasonable care in providing information to the plaintiff for
its guidance in determining whether to purchase the securities.376 It is
important to note that under the actual malice standard applied in other
cases, the credit rating agencies do not have a duty to exercise reasonable
377
care.
Similarly, in Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley &
Co., 378 the Southern District of New York rejected the argument of
Moody's and Standard & Poor's that the First Amendment provides the
agencies with absolute immunity.379 This case concerned an action for
common law fraud alleged by the purchasers of the securities.38 0 The
court found that the ratings were provided only to a "select group of in-
vestors" as part of a private placement; thus, the ratings were not a matter
of public concern, and the First Amendment did not shield the agencies
from liability.38 '
373. Id. ("Moody's prepared the bond ratings knowing that its ratings would be seen on the
offering materials given to only a select class of qualified investors, of whom [the plaintiff] was
one.").
374. Id.
375. Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 639 (6th Cir. 1993) ("[S]tatements which contain the
speaker's opinion are actionable . .. if the speaker does not believe the opinion and the opinion is not
factually well-grounded.").
376. Nat'l Century Fin. Enters., 580 F. Supp. 2d at 648 (finding the plaintiff sufficiently pled
that Moody's failed to exercise reasonable care because "if Moody's [had] used reasonable care in
assigning its ratings, it would have discovered multiple violations of the Master Indenture and could
not have legitimately given the [securities] the favorable ratings that it did").
377. See, e.g., Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig.),
511 F. Supp. 2d 742, 825-26 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (observing that credit rating "[a]gencies are not held
to a reasonable person standard"); see also supra note 300 and accompanying text.
378. 651 F. Supp. 2d 155 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
379. Id. at 175-76.
380. Id. at 163-64 (noting that plaintiffs are institutional investors that purchased the securities
at issue).
381. Id. at 175-76 ("[W]here a rating agency has disseminated their ratings to a select group of
investors rather than to the public at large, the rating agency is not afforded [First Amendment]
protection." (citing Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761-62
(1985) (holding that a credit report provided to five subscribers did not concern a public matter
because it was intended for a particular business audience); and In re Nat'l Century Fin. Enters.,
Inc., Inv. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 2d 630, 640 (S.D. Ohio 2008) (finding the actual malice rule did not
apply where the securities were "targeted to a select class of institutional investors"))).
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Addressing the fraud claim in a separate proceeding, the district
court considered whether credit ratings are statements of fact or opin-
ions.3 82 The court found that although credit "ratings are not objectively
measurable statements of fact, neither are they mere puffery or unsup-
portable statements of belief."383 As expressed by the court, credit ratings
are "fact-based opinions."384 A credit rating is a statement that the credit
rating agency has performed an analysis and assessment of the data and
made a "fact-based" determination regarding the issuer's creditworthi-
ness.385 If a credit rating agency assigns a credit rating that it knows is
either not based on a "reasoned analysis" or lacks a factual basis, then the
agency has "stat[ed] a fact-based opinion that it does not believe" is ac-
curate.386 Thus, the court found that the rating agencies may be held lia-
ble for common law fraud if the credit ratings were false or misleading
regarding the subject matter at issue and the ratings did not accurately
state the beliefs or opinions of the credit rating agency.3 87 As found by
the court, the plaintiffs provided sufficient evidence to permit a jury to
infer that the credit ratings were both "misleading and disbelieved" by
the credit rating agencies at the time they were assigned and, thus, may
be found to be "actionable misstatements."
Moreover, the district court found that the plaintiffs provided suffi-
cient evidence to permit a jury to infer scienter.389 The plaintiffs' evi-
dence permitted an inference that the individuals on the rating commit-
tees assigned the credit ratings in a reckless manner or did not believe the
assigned ratings were correct.390 For example, recklessness could be in-
382. Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 888 F. Supp. 2d 431, 453
(S.D.N.Y. 2012).
383. Id at 454-55 (footnotes omitted).
384. Id at 455 (emphasis removed) ("Ratings should best be understood as fact-based opin-
ions.").
385. Id. (emphasis removed) ("When a rating agency issues a rating, it is not merely a state-
ment of that agency's unsupported belief, but rather a statement that the rating agency has analyzed
data, conducted an assessment, and reached a fact-based conclusion as to creditworthiness.").
386. Id ("If a rating agency knowingly issues a rating that is either unsupported by reasoned
analysis or without a factual foundation, it is stating a fact-based opinion that it does not believe to
be true.").
387. Id at 456; cf Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1095 (1991) (finding
statements of belief or opinion can be the basis for a federal securities fraud action); Mayer v.
Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 639 (6th Cir. 1993) (finding in a securities fraud action that "statements which
contain the speaker's opinion are actionable under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act if
the speaker does not believe the opinion and the opinion is not factually well-grounded").
388. Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 456-58 (noting that plaintiffs had sub-
mitted "expert testimony that the ratings were not justified by the underlying facts when they were
issued," statements from rating agency employees explaining how the ratings should be determined
and the how the practices of the agencies did not meet the stated standard, and other statements from
rating agency employees indicating concern with the "paucity of data and the adequacy of the mod-
els used to rate" the securities at issue).
389. See id. at 458-62 (noting the scienter requirement may be satisfied with evidence of
recklessness or conscious misbehavior); see also Gould v. Winstar Commc'ns, Inc., 692 F.3d 148,
158 (2d Cir. 2012).
390. Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 459-60 ("Plaintiffs have offered exten-
sive evidence from which a jury could infer that the ratings were either disbelieved when made or
issued in a manner that was 'highly unreasonable and which represent[ed] an extreme departure from
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ferred from expert testimony indicating that the credit "ratings were
highly unreasonable when made" and from an e-mail by a Moody's ana-
lyst stating that the model assumptions for the securities were not sup-
ported by actual data.39 1 Furthermore, while a plaintiff is not required to
demonstrate motive in order to prove scienter, there is evidence that the
rating agencies had a monetary incentive to provide high ratings irrespec-
tive of whether those ratings were warranted.392 Thus, the evidence indi-
cated that the credit rating agencies "compromised the quality of their
ratings in pursuit of profits." 39 3 In addition, as noted in the court's earlier
decision, the plaintiffs sufficiently pled reasonable reliance on the credit
ratings because the rating agencies were privy to information that was
not publicly available.394
Although these courts did not apply the actual malice rule in actions
against the rating agencies, none of these cases involved a public figure
or the public dissemination of a credit rating; thus, these cases were gen-
erally consistent with First Amendment jurisprudence among the lower
courts with respect to credit rating agencies. However, a divergence from
other courts is seen in Commercial Financial where the rating agencies
had the right to disseminate the rating to the public, and the court never-
theless found the actual malice rule to be inapplicable.
d. Statements of Opinion by Professionals
Another series of cases addresses statements of opinion by profes-
sionals. As recognized by the Supreme Court, certain statements of opin-
ion are actionable when made by professionals.395 In Virginia Bank-
shares, Inc. v. Sandberg,396 the Supreme Court found that certain state-
ments, in particular those that are commercial in nature, "are reasonably
understood to rest on a factual basis that justifies them as accurate."397
Hence, if such statements were issued without a factual basis, the state-
the standards of ordinary care . . . to the extent that the danger was either known to the defendant or
so obvious that the defendant must have been aware of it."' (alterations in original) (quoting Chill v.
Gen. Elec. Co., 101 F.3d 263, 269 (2d Cir. 1996))).
391. Id. at 459.
392. Id. at 460-61 (noting the issuer could take its business to another agency if it did not
receive the desired high rating, the fees earned by the rating agencies would be substantially less if
the securities did not issue, and a statement by a Moody's analyst that "ratings on structured finan-
cial products ... were 'cash cows."').
393. Id. at 461.
394. Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 651 F. Supp. 2d 155, 181
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) ("[T]he market at large, including sophisticated investors, have come to rely on the
accuracy of credit ratings and the independence of rating agencies because of their NRSRO status
and, at least in this case, the [riating [a]gencies' access to non-public information that even sophisti-
cated investors cannot obtain.").
395. See Cty. of Orange v. McGraw-Hill Cos. (In re Cty. of Orange), No. SA CV 96-0765-
GLT, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22459, at *13 (C.D. Cal. June 2, 1997) ("[F]ederal and California state
courts recognized certain statements of opinion made by professionals are actionable.").
396. 501 U.S. 1083 (1991).
397. Id. at 1093; see also McGraw-Hill Cos., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22459, at *13.
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ments would be considered misleading.39 8 According to the Supreme
Court, certain statements of opinion may be considered factual based on
the context of the statements.399 For instance, the context may include the
subject of the statement, the speaker's identity, and the likely audience of
the statement.400 As acknowledged by the Supreme Court, "An opinion is
a fact . . .. When the parties are so situated that the buyer may reasona-
bly rely upon the expression of the seller's opinion, [thus,] it is no excuse
to give a false one."401
Consistent with Supreme Court doctrine, California federal district
courts have found that where a speaker is "specially qualified" and the
audience may be such to have reasonably relied on the speaker's "supe-
rior knowledge," a statement of opinion made by that speaker may be
actionable fraud or misrepresentation.402 For example, California federal
district courts have found statements of opinion made by financial advi-
sors and auditors to be actionable.403 In Bily v. Arthur Young & Co.,404
the court found an auditor who prepared an audit and audit opinion of a
corporation's financial statements liable to third-party investors for neg-
ligent misrepresentation.405 The elements of a claim of negligent misrep-
resentation are (i) the assertion of a fact (ii) which is false (iii) by a per-
son who does not have a reasonable basis for believing the assertion to
be true.406 The Bily court noted that in certain cases, a statement of "pro-
fessional opinion" is treated as a statement of fact.407 For example, if a
statement, even if couched "in the [guise] of an opinion, is 'not a casual
expression of belief' but [instead] 'a deliberate affirmation of the matters
stated,"' then such statement may be viewed as a factual assertion.408
Additionally, if a person has or professes to have "superior knowledge or
special information or expertise" concerning the subject of the statement
and a plaintiff is such that it "may reasonably rely" on the defendant's
398. Va. Bankshares, Inc., 501 U.S. at 1093 ("[Tlhe absence [of a factual basis] renders [cer-
tain statements made by professionals] misleading.").
399. Id.; see also McGraw-Hill Cos., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22459, at *14 ("Virginia Bank-
shares indicates the context of certain statements . . . renders some statements of opinion essentially
'factual."').
400. See Va. Bankshares, Inc., 501 U.S. at 1091-94; see also McGraw-Hill Cos., 1997 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 22459, at *14
401. Va. Bankshares, Inc., 501 U.S. at 1094 (first alteration in original) (quoting Vulcan Metals
Co. v. Simmons Mfg. Co., 248 F. 853, 856 (2d Cir. 1918)).
402. Moore v. Jogert, Inc. (In re Jogert, Inc.), 950 F.2d 1498, 1507 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting
Borba v. Thomas, 138 Cal. Rptr. 565 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977)); see also McGraw-Hill Cos., 1997 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 22459, at *14 (noting this exception to the general rule in California that opinions and
future predictions are not actionable as fraud or misrepresentation).
403. McGraw-Hill Cos., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22459, at *14-15.
404. 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992) (en banc).
405. Id. at 747, 768-770.
406. Id. at 768.
407. Id. ("Under certain circumstances, expressions of professional opinion are treated as
representations of fact.").
408. Id. (quoting Gagne v. Bertran, 275 P.2d 15, 21 (Cal. 1954)).
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expertise, information, or knowledge, then the defendant's statement of
professional opinion may be regarded as an assertion of fact.409
Although the Bily case is instructive regarding whether a statement
of professional opinion should be considered an assertion of fact, this
case did not involve a First Amendment issue because the corporation
was a private company at the time the audit opinion was issued.4 10 Nev-
ertheless, a California federal district court found the reasoning underly-
ing the professional opinion cases regarding financial advisors and audi-
tors, such as Bily, is similarly applicable to the cases concerning credit
ratings.411 Accordingly, the federal district court found that credit "rat-
ings do imply statements of fact even" when First Amendment issues are
implicated.4 12
The Ninth Circuit's First Amendment analysis employed in Unelko
Corp. v. Rooney413 provides further enlightenment regarding whether a
statement implies a factual assertion.414 The three-part test under Unelko
requires an assessment of whether (i) the "general tenor of the [entire
work]" indicates the assertion was not one of "objective fact;" (ii) the use
of "figurative or hyperbolic language" indicates the statement was not an
assertion of objective fact; and (iii) the statement is provably false or
true.415 Moreover, in assessing the "general tenor" of the work, the court
must evaluate the subject of the statement, the speaker's identity, and the
audience of the statement;416 these same factors are considered in the
417 i
professional opinion cases along with the professional status of the
speaker and the relationship of the speaker to its audience.
418
In Unelko, the Ninth Circuit held that a statement made by Andy
Rooney on the television show 60 Minutes was not protected opinion
409. Id. (citing Gagne, 275 P.2d at 21); see also Ashley v. Church (In re Ashley), 903 F.2d
599, 604 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding a defendant who professed to have financial knowledge made
statements of fact rather than opinion).
410. See Cty. of Orange v. McGraw-Hill Cos. (In re Cty. of Orange), No. SA CV 96-0765-
GLT, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22459, at *15-16 (C.D. Cal. June 2, 1997); Bily, 834 P.2d at 747.
411. See McGraw-Hill Cos., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22459, at *16; see also Bily, 834 P.2d at
768-73.
412. McGraw-Hill Cos., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22459, at *16 ("[For reasons similar to those
developed in the professional opinion cases, it is reasonable to conclude the [credit] ratings do imply
statements of fact even under the First Amendment cases.").
413. 912 F.2d 1049 (9th Cir. 1990).
414. See id. at 1053-55 (finding a statement made by Andy Rooney on the television show "60
Minutes" was not protected under the First Amendment).
415. McGraw-Hill Cos., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22459, at *1617; see also Unelko Corp. v.
Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 1990).
416. McGraw-Hill Cos., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22459, at *17.
417. See Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1091-96 (1991); see also McGraw-
Hill Cos., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22459, at *14.
418. McGraw-Hill Cos., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22459, at *17; see also Va. Bankshares, Inc.,
501 U.S. at 1094.
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under the First Amendment.4 19 The Ninth Circuit found Mr. Rooney's
statement that a particular item of merchandise "didn't work" may be
regarded "as implying an assertion of objective fact" based on the speak-
er's identity, the likely audience reactions, and the content of the speech
even though the general tenor of the segment was set in a humorous or
satirical context.420
In County of Orange v. McGraw-Hill Cos.,421 a federal district court
applied the Unelko framework in a case concerning a credit rating agen-
cy.422 The federal district court found the subject of the credit ratings was
the "likely creditworthiness of [particular issues] of debt [securities],"
and the audience for these credit ratings was comprised of the "issuers
and potential investors" in the securities who are respectively deciding
whether or not to offer the debt securities or purchase them.4 23 The dis-
trict court noted that when courts found similar circumstances in the pro-
fessional opinion cases, the courts held the statements of opinion in those
424cases to be actionable. Moreover, based on the Unelko framework,
"the professional opinion cases imply the general tenor of opinions such
as [Standard & Poor's] ratings is to support, not negate, the impression
the rating is an assertion of fact, or at least substantially based on facts
assessed by [Standard & Poor's]."42 5 The rating agency requested that the
County provide specific information and then employed a particular
methodology to establish the credit rating; thus, the general tenor of the
credit rating "implies statements of objective fact."4 26
The court noted the lack of hyperbolic or figurative language that
would otherwise indicate the credit rating was not a factual assertion.427
Finally, in assessing whether the credit ratings, which "were predictions
of creditworthiness," could be proven false, the federal district court con-
sidered Standard & Poor's professional status in the municipal bond in-
dustry, the County's allegations of reasonable reliance on the credit rat-
ings, and the professional opinion cases (including the Supreme Court's
419. Unelko, 912 F.2d at 1054-55 (finding "the statement 'It didn't work' is not shielded from
liability" because the statement "is essentially factual"); see also McGraw-Hill Cos., 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22459, at *18.
420. McGraw-Hill Cos., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22459, at *18 (quoting Unelko, 912 F.2d at
1054).
421. No. SA CV 96-0765-GLT, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22459 (C.D. Cal. June 2, 1997).
422. See id. at *18 (alleging Standard & Poor's to be "an expert" in rating municipal bonds).
423. Id. at *18-19.
424. Id. at *18-19; see also Va. Bankshares, Inc., 501 U.S. at 1093-94; Bily v. Arthur Young
& Co., 834 P.2d 745, 768-72 (Cal. 1992).
425. McGraw-Hill Cos., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22459, at *19 (noting the County's allegation
that "S&P knew or could reasonably anticipate reliance on the ratings it prepared" because of
"S&P's superior knowledge and expertise in evaluating the creditworthiness of the proposed debt
offerings"); see also Unelko, 912 F.2d at 1054-55.
426. McGraw-Hill Cos., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22459, at *19-20 & n.5 (noting the County
retained Standard & Poor's to issue a credit rating).
427. Id. at *21 (noting the second prong of the Unelko test); see also Unelko, 912 F.2d at
1053-54.
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Virginia Bankshares), and concluded that "the predictive nature of the
ratings does not, as a matter of law, permit S&P to escape liability."428
429
Thus, the credit ratings were actionable.
Anschutz Corp. v. Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc.30 provides another ex-
ample of a professional opinion case in which a federal district court
found the First Amendment protections, including the actual malice rule,
did not bar claims against the credit rating agencies for negligent misrep-
resentation.431 This case concerned unregistered securities that could be
sold only to a circumscribed group of investors.432 The credit rating
agencies argued that credit ratings are statements of opinion, and thus,
the agencies cannot be liable for common law claims for negligent mis-
representation.433 However, the Northern District of California noted that
in certain cases, "expressions of professional opinion are treated as rep-
resentations of fact."4 34 For example, if the defendant has superior
knowledge or special information or expertise concerning the matters at
issue and the plaintiff is deemed to "reasonably rely" on the defendant's
expertise, information, or knowledge, then the alleged misrepresentation,
albeit in the form of an opinion, "may be treated as one of material
fact."435 Moreover, if the defendant does not honestly believe the state-
ment of opinion, then such statement is actionable.43 6 Thus, if the rating
agencies "helped structure the securities" and, therefore, possessed
superior knowledge of the securities, then the agencies' representations
concerning those securities are actionable.437 Additionally, if the rating
agencies did not honestly believe the credit ratings when the agencies
assigned them, then the agencies may be liable for negligent misrepre-
sentation.
428. McGraw-Hill Cos., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22459, at *21 (noting the third prong of the
Unelko test); see also Va. Bankshares, Inc., 501 U.S. at 1093-94; Unelko, 912 F.2d at 1054-55.
429. See McGraw-Hill Cos., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22459, at *21.
430. 785 F. Supp. 2d 799 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
431. Id. at 824-25, 830-32.
432. Id. at 807 ("[The securities] at issue were not available to the public in general. Instead,
because these securities were unregistered, they were available only to a limited group of'qualified
institutional buyers."').
433. Id. at 823 ("The Rating Agencies' overriding argument is that their ratings cannot be
subject to a common law negligent misrepresentation claim because the ratings are opinions and not
statements of fact.").
434. Id at 823-24 (quoting Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 768 (Cal. 1992)).
435. Id at 824 (quoting Bily, 834 P.2d at 768).
436. Id at 824 (quoting Ogier v. Pac. Oil & Gas Dev. Corp., 282 P.2d 574, 580-81 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1955)).
437. Id. at 825 (citing Bily, 834 P.2d at 768); see also Ogier, 282 P.2d at 581.
438. Anschutz Corp. v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 785 F. Supp. 2d 799, 824 (N.D. Cal. 2011)
("[Plaintiff] may bring negligent misrepresentation claims against the [r]ating [a]gencies if plaintiff
alleges that the [a]gencies did not honestly entertain the opinions about the ratings at the time they
were issued."); cf Anschutz Corp. v. Merrill Lynch & Co. (In re Merrill Lynch Auction Rate Sec.
Litig.), No. 09 MD 2030, 2011 WL 536437, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2011) (dismissing negligent
misrepresentation claims against credit rating agencies because plaintiff did not make a factual
allegation that the credit ratings were inaccurate when they were offered).
329
330 DENVER LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:2
Moreover, the court found that the plaintiff sufficiently pled that the
credit rating agencies had a duty to the purchasers of the securities.4 39
The rating agencies allegedly assisted in structuring the particular securi-
ties, knew that these securities needed to be "investment-grade" in order
to be sold to the intended group of purchasers, and knew that sale of the
securities was limited solely to that select group of purchasers.40 Thus,
the credit rating agencies specifically undertook the responsibility to
provide information and guidance to the intended group of purchasers
concerning the purchase of the particular securities and, therefore, may
be subject to liability."' Further, as the rating agencies were allegedly
privy to information that was not made available to the public, the plain-
tiff's reliance on the credit ratings could be considered to be reasona-
ble.442
The district court also found that the First Amendment does not
shield the rating agencies from liability.44 3 In contrast to Compuware,
Jefferson Cnty., and In re Enron, the plaintiff in this case "specifically
identified" the allegedly negligent misstatements, and there is no indica-
tion that the credit ratings are predictive opinions that are "too indefinite"
to connote a statement of fact that may be proven as false.4" Moreover,
the district court rejected the rating agencies' argument that the actual
malice standard applies." Here, private figures issued the securities and
distributed them only to a select class of investors; thus, the ratings were
not a matter of public concern."4 Notably, the court considered the credit
ratings to be a form of commercial speech."
439. Anschulz Corp., 785 F. Supp. 2d at 825-26 ("[A] defendant may be held liable for negli-
gent misrepresentation 'in the dissemination of commercial information to persons who were "in-
tended beneficiaries" of the information."' (quoting Bily, 834 P.2d at 770)).
440. Id. at 826 (noting the securities could be marketed and sold only to "the select group of
[qualified institutional buyers]").
441. Id. at 825-26 ("[If] a supplier of information has [specifically] undertaken to inform and
guide a third party with respect to an identified transaction . . . [then] liability is imposed on the
supplier." (quoting Glenn K. Jackson Inc. v. Roe, 273 F.3d 1192, 1200 n.3 (9th Cir. 2001))); see also
Bily, 834 P.2d at 769-70.
442. Anschutz Corp., 785 F. Supp. 2d at 826-27.
443. Id. at 830-32.
444. Id. at 830-31 ("[P]laintiff has specifically identified the alleged misstatements at issue,
and nothing in the record at this stage suggests that the structured [securities] ratings at issue are, in
fact, predictive opinions by their nature 'too indefinite' to imply a false statement of fact."); cf
Compuware Corp. v. Moody's Inv'rs. Servs., Inc., 499 F.3d 520, 522, 528-29 (6th Cir. 2007) (find-
ing the credit rating did not imply any factual statement that may be proven as false); Jefferson Cty.
Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody's Inv'r's Servs., Inc., 175 F.3d 848, 855 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding the
credit rating agency article not sufficiently specific to be proven as false); Newby v. Enron Corp. (In
re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig.), 511 F. Supp. 2d 742, 825 (S.D. Tex. 2005)
(finding the plaintiff did not identify any factual statements that could be proven as false).
445. Anschutz Corp., 785 F. Supp. 2d at 831.
446. Id. at 831-32 (citing Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 651 F.
Supp. 2d 155, 175-76 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding the actual malice standard did not apply to credit
ratings for a structured security that was available only to a select group of purchasers)); see also In
re Nat'l Century Fin. Enters., Inc., Inv. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 2d 630, 639-40 (S.D. Ohio 2008) (find-
ing the actual malice rule did not apply where the securities were "issued by a privately-held compa-
ny, and . . . targeted to a select class of institutional investors"); cf Enron Corp., 511 F. Supp. 2d at
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Nevertheless, while the professional opinion cases and Unelko indi-
cate that a credit rating agency does not have absolute immunity under
the First Amendment for its ratings, if those ratings are disseminated to
the public, then the rating agency's expression will have the First
Amendment protection of the actual malice rule.48
B. Are the First Amendment Protections Justified?
As discussed in Section I.A.3.b, the credit rating agencies generally
have been afforded protection under the First Amendment for the credit
ratings assigned to debt securities.4"9 While the credit rating agencies
have maintained that a credit rating is "the world's shortest editorial"
450and, thus, entitled to First Amendment protection, one may query
whether this protection is warranted. For example, a report issued by the
staff of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs has questioned
whether credit ratings are truly "the equivalent of editorials" printed in a
newspaper.451 The staff found that the market appears to use credit rat-
ings primarily as a certification of whether or not a particular security is
investment grade rather than as a form of information.452 Thus, the staff
asserted that the use of credit ratings as certifications indicates that the
"ratings are not the equivalent of editorials" published in a newspaper.453
Further, as maintained by the staff, the First Amendment protections
provided to the credit rating agencies "should not preclude greater ac-
countability."454
Moreover, the case law has held that when the credit rating agency
steps outside the traditional newsgathering activities of a journalist and
instead "plays an active role in structuring" a security that it rates, then
the credit rating agency is not entitled to the protections of the journal-
825 (applying the actual malice standard because Enron was a Fortune 500 company and, thus, the
ratings concerned a public matter).
447. See Anschutz Corp., 785 F. Supp. 2d at 822 (noting that, in a case against the credit rating
agencies for negligent misrepresentation, "California has a strong interest ... in deterring miscon-
duct with respect to commercial speech").
448. Cty. of Orange v. McGraw-Hill Cos. (In re Cty. of Orange), No. SA CV 96-0765-GLT,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22459, at *21-22 (C.D. Cal. June 2, 1997) (noting S&P "is a publisher
which renders opinions about certain debt issues and disseminates those opinions to the public[;
thus,] S&P's expression is entitled to protection under the First Amendment" and the actual malice
rule will apply); see also Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1093-94 (1991); Unelko
Corp. v. Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049, 1054-55 (9th Cir. 1990).
449. See discussion supra Section I.A.
450. PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS, supra note 3, at 96 (quoting Statements of Charles
Brown, Fitch General Counsel).
451. Id. at 97 ("[T]he fact that the market seems to value the agencies' ratings mostly as a
certification [of whether the security is investment grade] . . . and not as information . .. seems to
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ist's privilege.4 55 Yet, in the case of structured securities in the recent
financial crisis, such as mortgage-backed securities,456 the credit rating
agencies "stepped outside" the role of a newsgatherer and instead
"played a[n] . . . [active] role in . . . structuring" those securities.457 The
issuers worked with the credit rating agencies in order "to ensure" that
the securities were structured in a manner that would result in high rat-
ings.458 Inevitably, the credit rating agencies' high level of involvement
in structuring mortgage-backed securities resulted in the agencies being
in the incongruous "position of 'rating their own work."'4 9 While it is
455. Am. Say. Bank, FSB v. UBS PaineWebber, Inc. (In re Fitch, Inc.), 330 F.3d 104, 110-11
(2d Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (concluding the journalist's privilege is not applicable when the credit
rating agency issues ratings based on "client needs" rather than as part of the traditional activities of
a newsgatherer and the "level of involvement with the client's transactions . . . is not typical of the
relationship between a journalist and the activities upon which the journalist reports"); cf Compu-
ware Corp. v. Moody's Inv'rs Servs., Inc., 324 F. Supp. 2d 860, 862 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (finding the
journalist's privilege is applicable when the credit rating agency "did not participate in the structur-
ing of the debt it was rating" and, thus, did not "step[] outside its role as an information gatherer").
456. See N.J. Carpenters Vacation Fund v. Royal Bank of Scot. Grp., PLC, 720 F. Supp. 2d
254, 258 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (explaining mortgage-backed securities as securities whose cash flow is
derived from underlying mortgage loans that are "pooled together" in the form of a security and
subsequently sold on the secondary market to investors (quoting Consolidated First Amended Secu-
rities Class Action Complaint at para. 40, N.J. Carpenters Vacation Fund v. Harborview Mortg. Loan
Trust, No. 08-CV-5093, 2009 WL 1455319 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2009))).
457. Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 651 F. Supp. 2d 155, 166
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) ("Although a rating agency's role as an unbiased reporter of information typically
requires the rating agency to remain independent of the issuers for which it rates notes, the [r]ating
[a]gencies played a more integral role in the structuring and issuing of [structured securities].");
Compuware, 324 F. Supp. 2d at 862; accord Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund v. Standard & Poor's
Fin. Servs. LLC, 700 F.3d 829, 834 (6th Cir. 2012) (alleging that the credit rating agencies "as-
sistled] arrangers in structuring their securities to achieve certain credit ratings"); Wyo. State Treas-
urer v. Moody's Inv'rs Serv., Inc. (In re Lehman Bros. Mortg.-Backed Sec. Litig.), 650 F.3d 167,
172 (2d Cir. 2011) (alleging that the credit rating agencies "exceeded their traditional roles by ac-
tively aiding in the structuring and securitization process"); N.J Carpenters Vacation Fund, 720 F.
Supp. 2d at 259 (alleging the credit rating agencies "played a substantial role in the securitization
process" by assisting in the decision of which "loans were to be included in the mortgage pools
underlying the [securities] and thereafter [in] the structure of [those securities]"); In re Nat'l Century
Fin. Enters., Inc., Inv. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 2d 630, 644 (S.D. Ohio 2008) ("[W]ith asset-backed
securities, rating agencies commonly instruct how the [securities] . . . should be structured in order to
get the desired bond rating."); CARNELL ET AL., supra note 317, at 374 ( "Rating agencies began to
participate in an unprecedented way in the actual structuring of financings."); see also Fitch, 330
F.3d at 110-11 (finding the credit rating agency was not entitled to the journalist's privilege because
the agency was not engaged in traditional newsgathering activities and instead was actively involved
in structuring the security); cf Compuware, 324 F. Supp. 2d at 862 (finding the credit rating agency
was entitled to the journalist's privilege because the agency was not involved in structuring the
security and, therefore, did not step outside the role of newsgatherer).
458. CARNELL ET AL., supra note 317, at 374 ("[Clredit rating agencies helped issuers decide
how many layers of rated debt and how much of an equity cushion would be best, and, most im-
portant what sort of steps should be taken (called 'credit enhancement') to improve the rating, and
hence the marketability of a particular issue. Issuers might, for example, purchase insurance, in-
crease the size of the equity cushion, or provide more than 100% collateral . . . ."); see also Morgan
Stanley & Co., 651 F. Supp. 2d at 166 (noting credit rating agencies "worked directly" with the
investment bank "to structure the [securities] in such a way that they could qualify for the [r]ating
[a]gencies' highest ratings").
459. See Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund, 700 F.3d at 834 ("[T]o attract the significant rating
fees paid by [mortgage-backed securities] arrangers, the [a]gencies 'became intimately involved in
the issuance of [mortgage-backed securities]' by assisting arrangers in structuring their securities to
achieve certain credit ratings, turning the process into a form of negotiation and placing the
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unlikely that the journalist's privilege to withhold information requested
by a subpoena would be available to the rating agencies under these cir-
cumstances, the lower courts have still shielded the rating agencies from
liability for fraudulent or negligent credit ratings under the guise that the
ratings are opinions and, thus, fully protected speech under the First
Amendment.4 60
However, the tower courts have misapplied this First Amendment
protection. The lower courts have employed the New York Times case
and its progeny to shield the credit rating agencies from liability in cases
where the rating is disseminated to the public unless the plaintiff can
prove actual malice.461 One of the primary rationales for the Supreme
Court's rulings was that the press will be "unduly chilled" if it has to
worry about liability for damages caused by defamatory statements even
if the damages were limited to actual damages.462 However, as Justice
White has stated, "[O]ther commercial enterprises in this country not in
the business of disseminating information must pay for the damage they
cause as a cost of doing business .... "4 6 3 As noted by the Supreme
Court, "The fact that dissemination of information and opinion on ques-
tions of public concern is ordinarily a legitimate, protected ... activity
does not mean, however, that one may in all respects carry on that
activity exempt from sanctions designed to safeguard the legitimate
interests of others."464 Moreover, the necessity of the New York Times
actual malice rule is debatable since the press was certainly "free and
vigorous" before that decision was laid down.465 Furthermore, "[n]othing
in the central rationale behind New York Times demands an absolute im-
munity from suits ... where the plaintiff cannot make out a jury case of
actual malice."4 66
These arguments ring exceedingly true in the case of the credit
rating agencies. As one scholar has maintained, "If the agencies truly are
private entities . . . they should be susceptible to the same sorts of
[a]gencies in the position of 'rating their own work."' (quoting Complaint, supra note 8, at paras. 56,
80)).
460. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text; see also discussion supra Section I.A.3.b.
461. See discussion supra Section I.A.3.b.
462. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 771-72 (1985)
(White, J., concurring) (explaining that "the New York Times standard was formulated to protect the
press from the chilling danger of numerous large damages awards" and noting the proposition "that
even without the threat of large presumed and punitive damages awards, press defendants' commu-
nication will be unduly chilled by having to pay for the actual damages caused" by their defamatory
statements).
463. Id. at 772.
464. Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 150 (1967).
465. See Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. at 772 (White, J., concurring) ("[I]t is difficult to
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lawsuits any similarly-situated private entity would be."4 67 For example,
auditors that prepare and provide opinions with respect to financial
statements and security analysts that evaluate equity securities must pay
for damages they cause.468 Why should the credit rating agencies, which
occupy a role very similar to auditors and security analysts,469 be treated
any differently? While the credit rating agencies have argued in recent
times that holding the agencies liable for their credit ratings would have a
470chilling effect on the dissemination of financial information, can an
independent, credible argument be made that the credit rating agencies
were even slightly chilled by the threat of liability prior to the New York
Times decision? Further, when New York Times itself does not demand
an absolute immunity in defamation cases where actual malice is not
shown,4 71 why do the lower courts feel obliged to provide an absolute
immunity to the credit rating agencies?472
Moreover, the Supreme Court has recognized that newspapers and
magazines are profit-making enterprises.473 Thus, similar to other
businesses that cause damage, newspapers and magazines must pay for
such injury, and the injured party should not be forced to accept remedies
that are "difficult or impossible" to attain "unless strong policy consider-
ations demand."4 74 While many arguments have been made regarding the
important public policy concerns involved in the protection of a free
press,4 7 5 the same cannot be said regarding protection of the credit rating
agencies. What exactly is the policy consideration in providing absolute
467. Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for the
Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U.L.Q. 619, 711 (1999) ("[A]gencies should not simultaneously
benefit from ratings-dependent regulation and be insulated from lawsuits alleging negligence or
misrepresentation.").
468. See supra notes 387-388 and accompanying text; see also infra note 523 and accompany-
ing text.
469. See supra note 345 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 518-522 and accompany-
ing text.
470. See, e.g., In re Nat'l Century Fin. Enters., Inc., Inv. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 2d 630, 639 (S.D.
Ohio 2008) ("Moody's argues that holding a credit rating agency liable for its bond ratings would
have an oppressive effect on the publication of important financial information to the public.").
471. See Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. at 772 (White, J., concurring).
472. See Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund v. Standard & Poor's Fin. Servs., LLC, 813 F. Supp.
2d 871, 877 & n.l (S.D. Ohio 2011) (noting the rating agencies' argument that credit "ratings enjoy
absolute immunity under the First Amendment" and explaining that "[c]ourts have traditionally
extended First Amendment protection to credit ratings of publicly-held companies, where the ratings
were offered to the investing public at large as an informational service" (citing Compuware Corp. v.
Moody's Inv'rs Servs., Inc., 499 F.3d 520, 525-26 (6th Cir. 2007); and Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re
Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig.), 511 F. Supp. 2d 742, 826-27 (S.D. Tex. 2005))),
off d, 700 F.3d 829 (6th Cir. 2012).
473. Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 147 (1967) ("Newspapers, magazines, and
broadcasting companies are businesses conducted for profit and often make very large ones." (quot-
ing Buckley v. N.Y. Post Corp., 373 F.2d 175, 182 (2d Cir. 1967))).
474. Id. ("Like other enterprises that inflict damage in the course of performing a service
highly useful to the public . . . [newspapers and magazines] must pay the freight; and injured persons
should not be relegated (to remedies which) make collection of their claims difficult or impossible
unless strong policy considerations demand." (first alteration in original) (quoting Buckley, 373 F.2d
at 182)).
475. See supra notes 27, 34 and accompanying text.
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immunity to the credit rating agencies? As the cases indicate, the credit
rating agencies have cloaked themselves in the blanket of First Amend-
ment protection by claiming they are publishers providing opinions of
public interest.476 However, the issuer of a security hires and pays the
credit rating agencies to provide a credit rating.477 This is a very different
function than that of a newspaper. Moreover, why is the public interest in
a credit rating regarding a debt security any different than the public
interest regarding the evaluation of an equity security? I would argue that
there is no difference. Yet, security analysts and auditors are subject to
liability while the credit rating agencies are not.478
One commentator has argued against extending the tort of negligent
misrepresentation to the credit rating agencies based on the concern that
"any showing less than recklessness" would have a "potential chilling
effect" on the publication of credit ratings.47 9 This commentator argues
that "the state's interest in compensating relying investors must give way
to the first amendment's concern for the free flow of commercial infor-
mation."480 Thus, this commentator believes that our "[s]ociety must rely
on the market and competition to keep rating agencies operating at their
negligence threshold, not on courts and juries."481 This contention echoes
that of the credit rating agencies that have argued that "the market should
be the appropriate means for ensuring the reliability of credit opinions
and of rating agencies."482 Even the courts have defended the position of
the credit rating agencies by acknowledging the public policy interest in
the efficient operation of the capital markets and the "significant role"
played by the credit rating agencies in those markets, which at least one
court believed "would be chilled by unlimited potential liability" from
483
assigning credit ratings.
However, the financial crisis has proven that the market and compe-
tition are not suitable adversaries for an oligopolistic industry484 in which
the players have been permitted to play with no rules and no conse-
476. See discussion supra Section I.A.3.b.
477. Commercial Fin. Serys., Inc. v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 94 P.3d 106, 110 (Okla. Civ. App.
2004) (finding the credit rating agencies issued a rating regarding the creditworthiness of bonds "as
professionals being paid to provide their opinions to a client"); see also infra notes 577-78 and
accompanying text.
478. See supra notes 12, 402-03 and accompanying text; see also infra note 503.
479. Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody's Inv'r's Servs., Inc., 175 F.3d 848, 856 n.3
(10th Cir. 1999) (quoting Gregory Husisian, Note, What Standard of Care Should Govern the
World's Shortest Editorials?: An Analysis of Bond Rating Agency Liability?, 75 CORNELL L. REV.
411, 460 (1990)).
480. Husisian, supra note 479.
481. Id.
482. Newby v. Enron Corp (In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig.), 511 F.
Supp. 2d 742, 814-15 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
483. Id. at 827.
484. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, REP. TO CONGRESS ON ASSIGNED CREDIT RATINGS 8
(2012) (estimating "that, as of December 31, 2011, approximately 91% of the outstanding credit
ratings for structured finance products were determined by the three largest" credit rating agencies,
Standard & Poor's, Moody's, and Fitch).
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quences. Moreover, the credit rating industry is not the press. The consti-
tutional amendment to protect a free press could not have been intended
to protect an industry in which the information that is being publicly dis-
seminated is plagued by inherent conflicts of interest as discussed in Part
III.485 The notion that credit ratings are pure expressions of opinion akin
to speech regarding political matters,4 86 such as the civil rights move-
ment,487 is clearly misguided. The state's interest in protecting relying
investors (and our society's interest in protecting the economy) is strong-
er than the constitutional concern in protecting this type of speech.
It is not in the best interests of our society to provide credit rating
agencies with First Amendment protection in the form of the actual
malice rule-a standard that "poses such a high barrier that it virtually
insulates the speaker from liability." 488 Even the Supreme Court has
cautioned "against 'blind application' of the actual malice rule.489 Yet,
the lower courts have engaged in such blind application of the actual
malice standard490 and, thus, inappropriately shielded the credit rating
agencies from liability.
In sum, credit rating agencies should not be treated as journalists
entitled to the heightened protection of the actual malice standard when
hired to provide a rating even if that rating is disseminated to the public.
Credit ratings are not pure statements of opinion entitled to full constitu-
tional protection. Rather, credit ratings are a form of commercial speech
that expresses a fact-based opinion; credit ratings are based on factual
information and convey a factual assertion regarding the creditworthiness
of the subject of the rating whether a particular security issue or a specif-
ic company. Moreover, credit ratings are statements of fact-based
opinion made by professionals. Thus, credit rating agencies should be
subject to liability for fraudulent or negligently prepared credit ratings
that are false or misleading.
485. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also infra Part 111.
486. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) ("The protection given speech and
press was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and
social changes desired by the people.").
487. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 334 (1974) ("The Times ran a politi-
cal advertisement endorsing civil rights demonstrations by black students in Alabama and impliedly
condemning the performance of local law-enforcement officials." (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sulli-
van, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (finding the advertisement contained expressions of opinion and
provided information concerning the civil rights movement, "whose existence and objectives are
matters of the highest public interest and concern"))).
488. PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS, supra note 3, at 96.
489. Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 148 (1967) (noting the Court has "counseled
against 'blind application of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan' and considered 'the factors which arise
in the particular context"' (quoting Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 390 (1967))).
490. See discussion supra Section I.A.3.b.
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II.THE REGULATORY PROTECTIONS
This part will first explain the business model of the credit rating
agencies and the regulatory designation of certain rating agencies. This
part will then examine the regulatory protections afforded to the credit
rating agencies.
A. Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations
Credit rating agencies have been providing ratings regarding the
creditworthiness of debt securities and the issuers of those securities for
close to a century.491 Prior to 1975, credit rating agencies gathered and
employed information that was publicly available to provide unsolicited
credit ratings regarding the creditworthiness of various corporations, and
the agencies charged a fee to investors who wished to receive the rat-
i492ing. Then, in 1975, the Commission designated specific redit rating
agencies as "nationally recognized statistical rating organization[s]" also
known as "NRSROs."49 3 For example, the Commission has designated
Standard & Poor's, Moody's Investors Services, Inc., and Fitch, Inc. as
NRSROs.49 4 Among other requirements, the credit rating agency must be
"nationally recognized" in order to obtain the NRSRO designation.495 As
explained by the Commission, this requirement was intended to ensure
that the agency's ratings "were credible and reasonably relied upon by
the marketplace."4 96 Thereafter, the credit rating agencies began working
directly for the issuers of the securities; thus, the rating agencies were
491. ROLE & FUNCTION, supra note 2, at 5 ("For almost a century, credit rating agencies have
been providing opinions on the creditworthiness of issuers of securities and their financial obliga-
tions.").
492. Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 651 F. Supp. 2d 155, 164
(S.D.N.Y 2009) (noting the information was obtained from publicly available sources such as filings
with the Commission).
493. Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig.), 511 F.
Supp. 2d 742, 817 n.77 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (quoting PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS, supra note 3, at
105) ("[I]n 1975 . . . the SEC developed an informal procedure for designating certain rating agen-
cies as NRSROs."); accord ROLE & FUNCTION, supra note 2, at 5 (explaining the Commission used
the "no-action letter process" to recognize certain credit rating agencies as "'nationally recognized
statistical rating organizations,' or 'NRSROs.'); PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS, supra note 3, at 79
(explaining that, in 1975, the SEC promulgated Rule 15c3-1 requiring the securities held by broker-
dealers to be rated by NRSROs); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7 (2012) (providing for formal registra-
tion of nationally recognized statistical rating organizations); 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-1 (2015) (discuss-
ing application procedures for registration as a nationally recognized statistical rating organization).
494. ROLE & FUNCTION, supra note 2, at 5; see also Am. Say. Bank, FSB v. UBS PaineWeb-
ber, Inc. (In re Fitch, Inc.), 330 F.3d 104, 106 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that the Commission has desig-
nated Standard & Poor's, Moody's Investors Services, Inc., and Fitch, Inc. as NRSROs).
495. ROLE & FUNCTION, supra note 2, at 6.
496. Id. at 6; see also Morgan Stanley & Co., 651 F. Supp. 2d at 164 ("[T]he SEC created a
special status to distinguish the most credible and reliable rating agencies . . . to help ensure the
integrity of the ratings process.").
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able to obtain nonpublic information to be employed in the ratings as-
sessment and were paid directly by the issuer of the securities.497
The Second Circuit has observed that issuers will obtain ratings for
their securities because investors rely on the assessment of creditworthi-
ness made by the rating agency, and thus, the sale of the security will be
498easier if the security receives a favorable rating. Moreover, the ratings
assigned by the NRSROs had "regulatory significance" because, prior to
the Dodd-Frank Act, many regulated institutional investors were limited
in the choice of investment securities based on the ratings assigned by
the NRSROs.4 99
B. Statutory Liability and Regulatory Exemption
In Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, Congress provided for
civil liability for false or misleading statements of material fact in a
registration statement.500 Specifically, Section 11 prohibits making "an
untrue statement of a material fact" in a registration statement or
"omitt[ing] to state a material fact" that is required to be included in the
registration statement or otherwise necessary in order to make the infor-
mation included in the registration statement "not misleading."50 1
Purchasers of securities issued under such false or misleading registra-
tion statements may bring a private action against certain categories of
potential defendants, including anyone who was a signer of the registra-
tion statement, any director or partner of the issuer, any underwriter of
the security, and certain experts.502
With respect to experts, the statute expressly provides for liability
for accountants, appraisers, and engineers, as well as any other profes-
sional who has given consent to be named as a preparer or certifier of
any portion of the registration statement or of "any report or valuation
which is used in connection with the registration statement."503 Based on
the statute, a credit rating agency had potential expert liability under
497. See Morgan Stanley & Co., 651 F. Supp. 2d at 164 (noting that after 1975, issuers began
hiring the credit rating agencies to rate their securities and provided nonpublic information to the
rating agencies); see also infra notes 577-78 and accompanying text.
498. Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 888 F. Supp. 2d 431, 441
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing Fitch, 330 F.3d at 106).
499. Fitch, 330 F.3d at 106 ("[M]any regulated institutional investors are limited in what types
of securities they may invest based on the securities' NRSRO ratings."). Notably, the Dodd-Frank
Act has required the removal of reliance on credit ratings from federal statutes and regulations, such
as banking regulations. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 939A(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1887
(2010).
500. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2012) (codifying Section II of the Securities Act of 1933); see also
William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The Due Diligence Defense Under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933,
44 BRANDEIS L.J. 549, 549 (2006) (explaining Section II civil liability and the due diligence de-
fense); Krista L. Turnquist, Note, Pleading Under Section II of the Securities Act of 1933, 98 MICH.
L. REV. 2395, 2395 (2000) (discussing Section I I pleading requirements).
501. 15 U.S.C. § 77k.
502. Id. § 77k(a); Sjostrom, supra note 500, at 549; Turnquist, supra note 500, at 2395.
503. Id. § 77k(a)(4).
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Section 11 for false or misleading credit ratings that were contained in a
registration statement provided the agency gave "consent [to be] named"
in the registration statement as an expert.50
However, in 1981, the Commission issued a "new policy" in order
to encourage credit ratings to be disclosed in registration statements.505
To facilitate this policy, the Commission promulgated Rule 436(g)(1)
which provided the credit rating agencies with an exemption from liabil-
ity for Section 11 claims.s06 The rule provides that the credit rating for
certain securities, including debt securities, assigned by an NRSRO
"shall not be considered a part of the registration statement prepared or
certified by a person within the meaning of [S]ection[] ... 11 of the [Se-
curities] Act of 1933."sm The Commission expressly stated that the pur-
pose of the new rule was to exclude from Section 11 civil liability "any
nationally recognized statistical rating organization whose security rating
is disclosed in a registration statement."50 8 Thus, Rule 436(g)(1) ex-
empted these credit rating agencies from liability for false or misleading
credit ratings listed in a registration statement.509
Even the courts have expressly acknowledged the Rule 43 6(g)(1)
exemption from liability for the credit rating agencies.51o For example,
the district court in In re Enron cited to the exemption in analyzing
whether the credit rating agencies were generally subject to liability
either under the case law or by federal regulation.5 t ' The court concluded
that the Rule 436(g)(1) exemption was a further indication of the lack of
authority to hold the credit rating agencies liable.512 Moreover, in a 2002
report issued by the staff of the Senate Committee on Governmental Af-
504. See id.
505. Wyo. State Treasurer v. Moody's Inv'rs Serv., Inc. (In re Lehman Bros. Mortg.-Backed
Sec. Litig.), 650 F.3d 167, 183 n.11 (2d Cir. 2011); see also Disclosure of Security Ratings in Regis-
tration Statements, 46 Fed. Reg. 42,024, 42,024 (proposed Aug. 18, 1981) (issuing a policy state-
ment and proposals "to permit the voluntary disclosure of security ratings assigned by nationally
recognized statistical rating organizations . . . in registration statements").
506. See Wyo. State Treasurer, 650 F.3d at 183 n.11 (citing SEC Written Consents Rule, 17
C.F.R. § 230.436(g)(1) (2015)); Disclosure of Security Ratings in Registration Statements, 46 Fed.
Reg. at 42,028 (explaining that under Rule 436(g), "the rating organization would not be subject to
civil liability as an expert pursuant to Section II of the Securities Act").
507. 17 C.F.R. § 230.436(g)(1).
508. Disclosure of Security Ratings in Registration Statements, 46 Fed. Reg. at 42,024.
509. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.436(g)(1); 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2012); see also PRIVATE-SECTOR
WATCHDOGS, supra note 3, at 82 ("SEC Rule 436, promulgated under the Securities Act, expressly
shields NRSROs from liability under Section II of the Securities Act in connection with an offering
of securities.").
510. See, e.g., Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig.),
511 F. Supp. 2d 742, 816-17 (S.D. Tex. 2005) ("[T]here is even a statutory exemption under the
Securities Act of 1933 for Section 11 claims against credit rating agencies .. . that have been desig-
nated 'nationally recognized statistical rating agencies' or 'NRSROs."'); see also id. at 817 n.77
(explaining that "[r]ule 436(g)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. § 230.436(g)(1) provides
for exemption of liability" with respect to the credit ratings issued by an NRSRO included in a
registration statement).
511. Id at 815-17 & n.77.




fairs, the staff noted that the liability of the credit rating agencies "tradi-
tionally has been limited both by regulatory exemptions and First
Amendment protections" provided by reviewing courts.'13
C. Accountability and Elimination of the Regulatory Exemption
However, in the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress found that credit
ratings have "systemic importance."5 14 The investing public, including
both institutional and individual investors as well as financial regulators,
515rely on credit ratings. Moreover, the credit rating agencies occupy a
significant role in the capital markets by promoting confidence in the
markets, facilitating the growth in capital, and furthering economic
516efficiency. Thus, the functioning and accuracy of the rating agencies
"are matters of national public interest."517
Congress further found that credit rating agencies occupy "a critical
'gatekeeper' role" in the market for debt securities. This role is "func-
tionally similar" to the role of other "financial 'gatekeepers"' that include
the auditors who prepare a company's financial statements and the secu-
rity analysts who occupy a role in the equity markets that is very compa-
rable to the role of the rating agencies in the debt markets.519 Credit
rating agencies and security analysts analyze and evaluate the relative
quality of the securities in their respective markets for the benefit of
clients.52 0 Thus, the issuance of a credit rating is "fundamentally com-
mercial in character" akin to the services other "financial 'gatekeepers'".
provide.52 1 Accordingly, Congress found that credit rating agencies,
including NRSROs, "should be subject to the same standards of liability
and oversight" that are applicable to securities analysts, investment
bankers, and auditors.522
In particular, Congress found that the credit ratings assigned to
structured securities, such as collateralized debt obligations, were "inac-
curate."523 Moreover, the "inaccuracy" of these credit ratings "contribut-
513. ROLE & FUNCTION, supra note 2, at 17-18 (citing PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS, supra
note 3, at 90 ("It is difficult not to wonder whether lack of accountability-the agencies' practical
immunity to lawsuits and non-existent regulatory oversight-is a major problem.")).
514. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 931(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 1872 (2010).
515. Id
516. Id. ("[C]redit rating agencies are central to capital formation, investor confidence, and the
efficient performance of the United States economy.").
517. Id.
518. Id § 931(2).
519. Id. § 931(2)-(3).
520. Id.
521. Id. § 931(3)
522. Id. (emphasis added).
523. Id. § 93 1(5) ("In the recent financial crisis, the ratings on structured financial products
have proven to be inaccurate."); see also Curry, Remarks Before the American Securitization Forum,
supra note 141, at 2 (noting the "flawed credit ratings" assigned to mortgage-backed securities
"suggest[ed] that the mortgage securities in question were as safe as investment-grade corporate
bonds"); Pfinsgraff, Remarks Before the Risk Magazine Credit Risk Conference, supra note 20, at 2
340 [Vol. 93:2
2016] THE N.Y. TIMES AND CREDITRATING AGENCIES 341
ed significantly" to the failure of investors to appropriately manage the
risks of these highly complex structured securities; these investors in-
cluded financial institutions such as banks that relied on these inaccurate
524
ratings in their investment decisions. Thus, Congress determined that
the credit rating agencies should be subject to "increased accountabil-
ity."525
In accordance with its mandate, Congress attempted to increase the
accountability of the credit rating agencies by providing that, in a private
action, "[t]he enforcement and penalty provisions of [the securities laws]
shall apply to statements made by a credit rating agency in the same
manner and to the same extent as such provisions apply to . . . a regis-
tered public accounting firm or a securities analyst."526 Thus, Congress
determined that credit rating agencies should be held accountable for
their statements to the same extent, and in the same manner, as account-
527
ants and securities analysts. Moreover, any such statements made by a
credit rating agency will not be considered "forward-looking statements"
under the safe harbor rules of Section 21E of the Securities Exchange
Act.528 Thus, the credit rating agencies cannot use this safe harbor to
avoid liability for false or misleading statements.52 9
With the intention of providing meaningful reform, Congress
concluded that Rule 436(g), which shielded the credit rating agencies
(stating the proposition that credit rating agencies "mis-rate[d] tens of billions of subprime securiti-
zations and their derivative [collateralized debt obligations]").
524. See Dodd-Frank Act § 931(5) ("[T]he mismanagement of risks by financial institutions
and investors . . . in turn adversely impacted the health of the economy in the United States and
around the world."); see also TESTIMONY OF JOHN WALSH, supra note 21, at attachment A, 2 ("Is-
sues surrounding credit ratings were a significant factor in market overconfidence that contributed to
subsequent losses in the markets for mortgage-backed securities in 2008-2009."); Curry, Remarks
Before the American Securitization Forum, supra note 141, at 2 ("[I]nvestors . . . placed undue
reliance on flawed credit ratings . . .. "); Letter from Mary Frances Monroe, Vice President, Office of
Regulatory Policy, to Office of the Comptroller of the Currency et al., at 1 (Oct. 25, 2010),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2010/November/20101104/R-1391/R-
1391 102510 54036 533969644112_1.pdf (recognizing "that inadequacies in the issuance and use
of credit ratings contributed to recent financial disruptions in the U.S. markets").
525. Dodd-Frank Act § 931(5).
526. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(m)(1) (2012). The Dodd-Frank Act further provides that, with respect
to any state of mind that is required in a particular action, it is sufficient to plead facts that provide "a
strong inference" that the rating agency "knowingly or recklessly failed" to perform a "reasonable
investigation" of the facts that it relied upon in evaluating the credit risk of the security or to obtain
from other sources a "reasonable verification" of the facts. Id. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A)-(B). Thus, in a
private suit against a credit rating agency, a plaintiff will not need to plead scienter in any cause of
action under the securities laws that otherwise would require this higher level of pleading, such as a
fraud action under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule lob-5. See Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (finding an allegation of scienter is required in a private
cause of action under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule lOb-5 and
defining scienter as the "intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud").
527. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(m)(1).
528. See id.; see also id. § 78u-5(c), (i)(1)(C) (providing a safe harbor for "forward-looking
statement" defined inter alia as "a statement of future economic performance").
529. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(m)(1); see also id § 78u-5(c)(1).
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from liability, would no longer have any "force or effect."530 By repeal-
ing the Rule 436(g) exemption, Congress provided authority to hold the
credit rating agencies liable under Section 11 of the Securities Act of
1933 for false or misleading credit ratings contained in a registration
statement.531 Congress's repeal of Rule 436(g) became effective July 22,
20 10.532
D. Reestablishment ofthe Regulatory Shield
On the same day that the repeal of Rule 436(g) went into effect, the
Commission's Division of Corporation Finance issued a no-action let-
ter533 regarding the disclosure requirements in a prospectus that forms
part of a registration statement for the offering of asset-backed securi-
ties.53 4 The Commission's asset-backed securities rule known as Regula-
tion AB requires the issuer of asset-backed securities to disclose whether
a sale or issuance of such "securities is conditioned on the assignment of
a rating by one or more rating agencies."535 If the sale or issuance of an
asset-backed security is conditioned on such assignment of a credit rat-
ing, then Regulation AB requires the issuer to disclose the identity of
every credit rating agency that has provided a rating as well as the mini-
mum credit rating necessary for the sale or issuance of the asset-backed
536securities. Regulation AB also requires the issuer to explain any ar-
rangements for the credit rating to be monitored during the period in
which the securities are outstanding.537
530. Dodd-Frank Act § 939(G) ("Rule 436(g), promulgated by the Securities and Exchange
Commission under the Securities Act of 1933, shall have no force or effect."); see also Wyo. State
Treasurer v. Moody's Inv'rs Serv., Inc. (In re Lehman Bros. Mortg.-Backed Sec. Litig.), 650 F.3d
167, 183 n. I1 (2d Cir. 2011) (noting the Dodd-Frank Act "recently nullified" Rule 436(g)).
531. See Act § 939(G); 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a); see also Letter from Martha Coakley, Mass. Att'y
Gen., to Mary Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n I (Mar. 1, 2011) [hereinafter Coakley
Letter], http://www.mass.gov/ago/docs/press/2011/2011-03-07-sec-letter-attachmenti.pdf ("We
believe that Congress rescinded the rating agencies' exemption from liability with the expectation
that this would result in rating agency liability.").
532. Dodd-Frank Act § 4 ("Except as otherwise specifically provided in this Act or the
amendments made by this Act, . . . this Act and such amendments shall take effect I day after the
date of enactment of this Act."). The date of enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act was July 21, 2010;
thus, the effective date of the repeal of Rule 436(g) was July 22, 2010. See Dodd-Frank Act pmbl..
533. No-Action Letters, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N (Sept. 21, 2012),
http://www.sec.gov/answers/noaction.htm ("An individual or entity who is not certain whether a
particular product, service, or action would constitute a violation of the federal securities law may
request a 'no-action' letter from the SEC staff. Most no-action letters describe the request, analyze
the particular facts and circumstances involved, discuss applicable laws and rules, and, if the staff
grants the request for no action, conclude[] that the SEC staff would not recommend that the Com-
mission take enforcement action . . . "); see also Coakley Letter, supra note 531, at 1-2 ("Legally,
no-action letters are expressions of enforcement policy. In practice, they are public statements by
SEC staff often taken to imply legal interpretations and administrative action they do not contain.").
534. SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 19, at *2.
535. SEC Asset-Back Securities Rules, 17 C.F.R. § 229.1103(a)(9) (2015); see also 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.1120 (mandating this disclosure requirement is applicable "whether or not" the rating agencies
are NRSROs); SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 19, at *2.
536. 17 C.F.R. § 229.1103(a)(9); 17 C.F.R. § 229.1120; SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 19,
at *1-2.
537. 17 C.F.R. § 229.1120; SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 19, at *1-2.
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The repeal of Rule 436(g) results in the need to obtain the consent
of the credit rating agency to list its name "as an expert" in order to
disclose the agency's credit rating in the registration statement.
However, the credit rating agencies refused to provide the necessary
consent.3  In response, the Division of Corporation Finance issued the
July 22, 2010, no-action letter indicating that it "will not recommend"
bringing an enforcement action against an issuer of asset-backed securi-
ties if the disclosure regarding credit ratings required under Regulation
AB is not included in the registration statement.540 This no-action letter
was issued for the purpose of "facilitat[ing] a transition for asset-backed
issuers" and was initially scheduled to expire on January 24, 2011.541
Nevertheless, on November 23, 2010, the Division of Corporation
Finance issued a second no-action letter regarding the disclosure
requirements under Regulation AB with respect to credit ratings.542 In
this second no-action letter, the Division of Corporation Finance extend-
ed the no-action status regarding the omission of credit rating disclosures
required under Regulation AB indefinitely.543 The Division of Corpora-
tion Finance cited to the continued unwillingness of the credit rating
agencies to provide the needed consent and stated that an extension of
the initial no-action letter is necessary in order to permit asset-backed
securities to continue to be offered as registered securities. In balanc-
ing the benefits to investors achieved through the registration of asset-
backed securities under the Securities Act with the omission of the credit
rating information required under Regulation AB, the Division of Corpo-
ration Finance decided to extend the initial no-action letter and permit
registered offerings of asset-backed securities without the required
538. SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 19, at *1-2; see also Wyo. State Treasurer v. Moody's
Inv'rs Serv., Inc. (In re Lehman Bros. Mortg.-Backed Sec. Litig.), 650 F.3d 167, 183 n. I1 (2d Cir.
2011) ("[A]ny potential 'expert' liability requires satisfaction of the naming and consent require-
ments." (citing 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(4) (2012))).
539. See SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 19, at *1-2.
540. Id. at *2; see also 17 C.F.R. § 229.1103(a)(9) (providing disclosure requirements required
under Regulation AB with respect to credit ratings); 17 C.F.R. § 229.1120 (providing additional
disclosure requirements required under Regulation AB regarding credit ratings).
541. SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 19, at *2 ("This no-action position will expire with
respect to any registered offerings of asset-backed securities commencing with an initial bona fide
offer on or after January 24, 2011.").
542. Id. at *I.
543. Id. at *I ("Pending further notice, ... [an enforcement action will not be recommended] if
an asset-backed issuer . . . omits the ratings disclosure required by Item I 103(a)(9) and 1102 of
Regulation AB from a prospectus that is part of a registration statement relating to an offering of
asset-backed securities."); see also Coakley Letter, supra note 531, at 6 (referring to the Nov. 23,
2010 No-Action Letter extending "the no-action position indefinitely").
544. SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 19, at *I ("[W]ithout an extension of our no-action
position, offerings of asset-backed securities would not be able to be conducted on a registered
basis."). The Division of Corporation Finance also stated that its decision to extend the initial no-
action letter was further necessitated by the time needed to accomplish the regulatory initiatives
mandated by the Dodd-Frank Act. Id.
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545disclosures with respect to credit ratings. Thus, with the use of an
informal no-action letter,546 the Commission continued to shield the cred-
it rating agencies from liability in direct contravention of the express
intent of Congress and the reforms enacted under the Dodd-Frank
Act.5 47
In the statute, Congress clearly expressed its intent to subject the
credit rating agencies to the penalty and enforcement provisions of the
securities laws to the same extent and in the same manner as accountants
and securities analysts.548 Pursuant to this statutory provision and the
repeal of Rule 436(g), credit rating agencies would be subject to
Section 11 liability. 549 However, as a result of the no-action letter issued
by the Commission, credit rating agencies are not subject to Section 11
liability, and therefore, rating agencies are not subject to the enforcement
and penalty provisions of the securities laws to the same extent and in the
same manner as accountants and securities analysts.5 50 Thus, with the
issuance of the no-action letter, the Commission has nullified the express
intent of Congress.
The credit rating agencies should be subject to Section 11 civil lia-
bility for false or misleading statements in a prospectus. As noted by the
courts, experts under Section 11 may be found "liable for mere negli-
gence."55' However, the currently in force no-action letter continues the
545. See id. ("Given the . . . benefits to investor protection resulting from Securities Act regis-
tration, the Division is extending the relief issued . .. by letter dated July 22, 2010."). The Division
of Corporation Finance also referred to the "current state of uncertainty" in the market for asset-
backed securities as an additional reason for extending the initial no-action letter. Id.
546. See Procedures Utilized by the Division of Corp. Fin. for Rendering Informal Advice,
Securities Act Release No. 6235, 21 SEC Docket 315, 320-21 & n.4 (Nov. 11, 1980),
http://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/33-6253.pdf (explaining that the Division of Corporation Finance
may issue no-action letters in response "to requests for informal advice concerning the application of
the federal securities laws administered by it. . . . [M]any members of the public have come to rely
on the informal advice provided in this manner. . . . Such letters, however, set forth staff positions
only and do not constitute an official expression of the Commission's views." (quoting 17 C.F.R.
§ 202.1(d) (2015))).
547. See SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 19, at * 1-2; Coakley Letter, supra note 531, at 1,
10 ("[W]e believe the SEC's decision to take no action in this area undermines recent Congressional
reform and is inconsistent with Congressional intent. . . . In the Dodd-Frank Act, the clear intent of
Congress was to provide investors with a much-needed requirement of rating agency competence.
We are concerned that the SEC has defeated this intent."); see also Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 931(C), 124 Stat. 1376, 1872 (2010) (finding the credit rating agencies should be held to
the same standards of accountability and liability as other "financial 'gatekeepers"'); Dodd-Frank
Act § 939(G) (repealing the Commission's Rule 436(g) exemption from Section II liability for
credit rating agencies).
548. See 15 U.S.C. § 780-7(m) (2012).
549. Id.; Id. § 77k(a) (providing for liability for accountants, appraisers, and engineers as well
as any other professional who has given consent to be named as a preparer or certifier of any portion
of the registration statement or of "any report or valuation which is used in connection with the
registration statement"); Dodd-Frank Act § 939(G).
550. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a); SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 19, at *1-2.
551. N.J. Carpenters Vacation Fund v. Royal Bank of Scot. Grp., PLC, 720 F. Supp. 2d 254,
268 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting Lindsay v. Morgan Stanley (In re Morgan Stanley Info. Fund Sec.
Litig.), 592 F.3d 347, 359 (2d Cir. 2010) (explaining that with the exception of issuers, "potential
defendants under section[] I I . .. may be held liable for mere negligence.")).
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practice of "officially shield[ing]" the credit rating agencies from all
liability under the securities laws except for fraud.552 Therefore, con-
sistent with the First Amendment protections provided by the courts, this
regulatory exemption continues to provide the credit rating agencies with
the ability to avoid liability for negligently prepared credit ratings.553
E. Credit Ratings and Section 11
Alas, even if the Commission were to rescind its no-action letter,554
and even if a credit rating agency were to provide the necessary consent
to list its name as an expert in the registration statement,5 5 the likelihood
of liability under Section 11 is uncertain. At least one court has stated
that a credit rating would not be actionable under Section 11.556 Accord-
ing to the Southern District of New York, "credit ratings . . . are state-
ments of opinion, as they are predictions of future value."557 In dismiss-
ing claims against the credit rating agencies for underwriter liability, the
court found that such statements of opinion are not actionable under Sec-
tion 11 of the Securities Act.558 However, "the Supreme Court has 're-
jected the argument that statements containing . . . opinions or be-
liefs . . . could not be a basis for' an action for securities fraud."55 9 As
acknowledged by the Southern District of New York, a statement of
opinion is actionable if the opinion is "objectively untrue" and "not be-
lieved by the speaker."560 Other courts have similarly found that state-
552. See PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS, supra note 3, at 82; SEC No-Action Letter, supra
note 19, at *1-2; see also Wyo. State Treasurer v. Moody's lnv'rs Serv., Inc. (In re Lehman Bros.
Mortg.-Backed Sec. Litig.), 650 F.3d 167, 185 (2d Cir. 2011) (explaining that plaintiffs "may bring
securities fraud claims against the [r]ating [a]gencies pursuant to § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 . . . although liability under that section is . . . subject to scienter, reliance, and loss
causation requirements not applicable to § II claims"). Notably, the Dodd-Frank Act permits plain-
tiffs to avoid pleading scienter in any action that has a state of mind requirement, such as a fraud
action under Section 10(b). See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2).
553. PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS, supra note 3, at 82 (noting the regulatory exemption
"means that NRSROs are not held even to a negligence standard of care for their work"); see also
discussion supra Section I.A.3.b.
554. See supra Section II.D.
555. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a).
556. See N.J. Carpenters Vacation Fund, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 271-72.
557. Id. at 271; see also Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund v. Standard & Poor's Fin. Servs.
LLC, 700 F.3d 829, 842 (6th Cir. 2012) (noting that credit ratings are "predictive opinion[s]" (quot-
ing Compuware Corp. v. Moody's Inv'rs Servs., Inc., 499 F.3d 520, 529 (6th Cir. 2007))).
558. N.J. Carpenters Vacation Fund, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 271 (."[A]ccurate statements of histor-
ical fact and statements of opinion, including statements of hope, opinion, or belief about . .. future
performance . . . are non-actionable' under Section I1" (first and second alterations in original)
(quoting Panther Partners, Inc. v. Ikanos Commc'ns, Inc., 538 F. Supp. 2d 662, 668 (S.D.N.Y.
2008))); see also Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund, 700 F.3d at 842 (dismissing claims against
credit rating agencies for negligent misrepresentation because credit ratings are opinions about the
future and, thus, "are not actionable misrepresentations"); Anschutz Corp. v. Merrill Lynch & Co.
(In re Merrill Lynch Auction Rate Sec. Litig.), No. 09 MD 2030, 2011 WL 536437, at *12-13
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2011) (dismissing negligent misrepresentation claims against credit rating agen-
cies because "[c]redit ratings are statements of opinion" and, therefore, not actionable).
559. In re Nat'l Century Fin. Enters., Inc., Inv. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 2d 630, 639 (S.D. Ohio
2008) (quoting Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 638 (6th Cir. 1993)).
560. N.J. Carpenters Vacation Fund, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 271-72 (quoting In re AOL Time
Warner, Inc. Sec. & "ERISA" Litig., 381 F. Supp. 2d 192, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)); see also Ohio
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ments of opinion are actionable under the securities laws "if the speaker
does not believe the opinion and the opinion is not factually well-
grounded."5 6' The Southern District of New York did not address wheth-
er the agencies believed the ratings; thus, it appears the court assumed
that credit ratings could not be "objectively untrue." 62
According to the same court in a separate case, "[T]he fact that the
[r]ating [a]gencies may have given higher-but not untruthful-ratings
to retain business does not render the opinions of the [r]ating [a]gencies
actionable."56 3 This statement simply defies logic. If a credit rating agen-
cy gave a higher rating in order to retain business, then the rating cannot
be truthful because it was not the rating the agency would have given in
the absence of the monetary incentive to retain the business. Therefore,
such a rating is not only "objectively untrue" but also "not believed by
the speaker."6 Such higher rating was not factually well-grounded, and
the rating agency did not truly believe the rating when the agency issued
565
It is uncertain whether courts would take a different view if viola-
tions of the expert prong of Section 11 (rather than the underwriter
prong) were alleged against the credit rating agencies.566 Notably, the
Second Circuit has stated that the rating issued by a credit rating agency
"is the sort of expert opinion classically evaluated under the 'expert'
provision of [Section] 11.,,567 Moreover, in a case involving Section 11
claims against the underwriters of mortgage-backed securities, the
Northern District of California found that statements made by executives
of Moody's and Standard & Poor's-admitting "they were aware at the
time the subject ratings were made that the agencies' rating models were
outdated"-were sufficient to find an "actionable misstatement" con-
Police & Fire Pension Fund, 700 F.3d at 843 (dismissing negligent misrepresentation claims be-
cause the plaintiff "fail[ed] to allege that the . .. [rating] [algencies did not believe their ratings"
(first and second alterations in original) (quoting Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund v. Standard &
Poor's Fin. Servs., LLC, 813 F. Supp. 2d 871, 883 (S.D. Ohio 2011))); Merrill Lynch & Co., 2011
WL 536437, at *12 ("There is an exception to the non-actionable opinion rule in cases where the
opinion holder knew the opinion was false or did not hold the opinion expressed at the time it was
expressed.").
561. Nat'l Century Fin. Enters., 580 F. Supp. 2d at 639 (quoting Mayer, 988 F.2d at 639
("[S]tatements which contain the speaker's opinion are actionable under Section 10(b) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act if the speaker does not believe the opinion and the opinion is not factually well-
grounded.")).
562. See N.J. Carpenters Vacation Fund, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 271-72 (quoting AOL Time Warn-
er, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 243).
563. Merrill Lynch & Co., 2011 WL 536437, at *12 (dismissing claims for negligent misrepre-
sentation).
564. See supra note 560 and accompanying text.
565. Cf Mayer, 988 F.2d at 639 ("Material statements which contain the speaker's opinion are
actionable under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act if the speaker does not believe the
opinion and the opinion is not factually well-grounded.").
566. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2012).
567. Wyo. State Treasurer v. Moody's lnv'rs Serv., Inc. (In re Lehman Bros. Mortg.-Backed
Sec. Litig.), 650 F.3d 167, 183 & n. 11 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)) ("[T]he issuance of
a credit rating ostensibly falls within the 'expert' category of potential liability under § I.").
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cerning the process of rating the securities.568 Furthermore, in a case con-
cerning alleged violations of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act, the Southern District of Ohio found that credit ratings can be con-
sidered "not factually well-grounded."5 69
If credit ratings were not actionable, as the Southern District of New
York found,7 o then there would be no basis for the Second Circuit's ob-
servation regarding the applicability of the expert provision of Section 11
specifically to credit ratings.s7 1 Moreover, there would be no reason for
the Commission to have issued the no-action letter permitting the contin-
ued omission of required credit rating disclosures in a registration state-
ment involving asset-backed securities.572 Significantly, the Dodd-Frank
Act provides that any statements made by a credit rating agency will not
be considered "forward-looking statements" under the safe harbor rules
of Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act.573 Therefore, Congress
has determined that statements made by a credit rating agency should not
be shielded from liability based on the notion that such statements are
"predictions of future value" and, thus, non-actionable statements of
- * 574opinion.
In any event, since the Commission has not made any indication
that its no-action letter will be rescinded, and (without a change in the
law) a credit rating agency will likely never provide the necessary con-
sent to list its name as an expert in the registration statement, we will
perhaps never know whether the courts would ultimately find the credit
rating agencies liable for false or misleading statements under the expert
prong of Section 11 of the Securities Act.
III. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
This part will examine the conflicts of interest inherent in the issuer-
pays model of the credit rating agencies as well as the reforms provided
by the Dodd-Frank Act and the Commission's implementing rules. This
part will then consider whether these reforms effect any real change.
568. See In re Wells Fargo Mortg.-Backed Certificates Litig., 712 F. Supp. 2d 958, 973 (N.D.
Cal. 2010).
569. In re Nat'1 Century Fin. Enters., Inc., Inv. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 2d 630, 639 (S.D. Ohio
2008) (finding the plaintiff sufficiently pled that the ratings issued by the agencies "were not factual-
ly well-grounded").
570. See supra notes 556-58 and accompanying text.
571. See supra note 567 and accompanying text.
572. See discussion supra Section II.D.
573. See 15 U.S.C. § 780-7(m) (2012); see also id. § 78u-5(c)(1), (i)(1)(C) (2012) (providing a
safe harbor for "forward-looking statement" defined inter alia as "a statement of future economic
performance").
574. N.J. Carpenters Vacation Fund v. Royal Bank of Scot. Grp., PLC, 720 F. Supp. 2d 254,
271 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(m)(1).
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A. Issuer-Pays Rating Agency Model
The credit rating agencies have been blamed for being a major
cause of the financial crisis by assigning inaccurate ratings to structured
securities such as mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt
obligations.5 75 Conflicts of interest that are inherent in the "issuer-pays"
rating agency model appear to have precipitated these inaccurate rat-
ings. 57 6 Under the issuer-pays model, the rating agencies have a financial
relationship with the investment banks that were the issuers of these
structured securities.5 77 As part of this relationship, the issuers directly
paid the credit rating agencies to assign a credit rating to the debt
issue. As a result, monetary incentives and "pressure to improve the
rating" plague the issuer-pays model.579
In addition, many investment banks would shop around for a rat-
ing.580 Thus, if a credit rating agency failed to provide a rating that was
high enough, then that rating agency would not receive the business.'8 1
As a result, the rating agencies would begin with the intention to assign a
575. See supra notes 20-21, 523-24 and accompanying text.
576. See Schwarcz, supra note 122, at 15 (noting the "conflict of interest inherent in the way
that rating agencies are paid"); see also Patrick Kingsley, How Credit Ratings Agencies Rule the
World, GUARDIAN (Feb. 15, 2012, 3:00 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/feb/15/credit-ratings-agencies-moodys (explaining that
if a company wishes to be rated, it "must pay an agency between $1,500 and $2,500,000 for the
privilege . . . [and] [iun theory, this creates a conflict of interest, because it gives the agency an
incentive to give the companies the rating they want"); Timothy W. Martin, SEC Is Gearing Up to
Focus on Ratings Firms, WALL ST. J. (June 25, 2014, 1:29 P.M.), http://online.wsj.com/articles/sec-
is-gearing-up-to-focus-on-ratings-firms-1403651968 (noting Senator Al Franken and others have
stated that the issuer-pays model "gives [credit rating] firms an incentive to compromise their criteria
in order to win business").
577. See Martin, supra note 576 (explaining that under the business model employed by the
credit rating agencies "[i]ssuers of bond deals pay ratings firms to grade their deals").
578. CARNELL ET AL., supra note 317, at 372-73 ("Most credit rating agencies, particularly
Moody's, Standard & Poor's . . . and Fitch, earn money by charging issuers a fee in exchange for
assigning a credit rating to the debt obligations marketed by the issuer."); Schwarcz, supra note 122,
at 15 ("Rating agencies are virtually always paid their fee by the issuer of securities applying for the
rating."); see also N.J Carpenters Vacation Fund, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 272 ("[T]he rating agencies
were paid by the [issuing] investment banks that hired them . . . .").
579. Schwarcz, supra note 122, at 15 (noting the issuer-pays model "raises the possibility that
the issuer will use, or the rating agency will perceive, monetary pressure to improve the rating"); see
also Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund v. Standard & Poor's Fin. Servs. LLC, 700 F.3d 829, 834 (6th
Cir. 2012) (alleging that "between 2005 and 2008, this 'issuer pays' system compromised the integ-
rity of the credit rating process"); N.J Carpenters Vacation Fund, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 259 ("[T]he
shopping process allowed [issuers] to pressure rating agencies to provide high ratings . . . in order to
receive the profitable rating business.").
580. See Wyo. State Treasurer v. Moody's Inv'rs Serv., Inc. (In re Lehman Bros. Mortg.-
Backed Sec. Litig.), 650 F.3d 167, 172 (2d Cir. 2011) ("[l]ssuing banks engaged particular [r]ating
[a]gencies through a 'ratings shopping' process, whereby the [r]ating [a]gencies reviewed loan-level
data for a mortgage pool and provided preliminary ratings. The banks then negotiated with the
[r]ating [a]gencies regarding the . . . percentage of AAA [securities] for each mortgage pool." (cita-
tion omitted)); N.J. Carpenters Vacation Fund, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 259 (alleging the issuer "en-
gage[d] in 'ratings shopping' between the rating agencies").
581. Wyo. State Treasurer, 650 F.3d at 172 (noting the issuer would "choos[e] the agency
offering the highest percentage of AAA certificates"); N.J. Carpenters Vacation Fund, 720 F. Supp.
2d at 259 (explaining the issuer "would ultimately select the agency who provided the highest rat-
ing").
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high rating to the security and work with the investment bank to achieve
a structure that would seemingly support that rating.582 Moreover, the
credit rating agency would receive its fee only "if the desired rating
issued."583 Thus, under the issuer-pays model, the rating agencies had a
patent monetary incentive to provide high ratings in order to earn their
fees.5" Presumably, a higher rating also would have a greater likelihood
of ensuring that the investment bank would ask the rating agency to per-
form additional ratings work.
Notably, Standard and Poor's recently settled a lawsuit with the Jus-
tice Department based on allegations that "the rating [agency] had de-
frauded investors by issuing inflated ratings in the years preceding the
financial crisis."585 Moreover, the Government alleged that the rating
agency "falsely represented" that the ratings it issued were "objective
and uninfluenced by the firm's relationship with investment banks" when
in fact the rating agency was influenced by the "desire to boost revenue
and profits by winning business."5 86
Moreover, the rating agencies were using "flawed models" to assign
ratings to structured securities, including subprime mortgage-backed
securities and collateralized debt obligations.587 According to the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency-the regulator of national banks and
582. See Wyo. State Treasurer, 650 F.3d at 172 (noting the process described by an officer of
Moody's as first "start[ing] with a rating and build[ing] a deal around a rating").
583. Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund, 700 F.3d at 834, 836 ("[T]he [credit rating agencies']
entitlement to a fee vested when their ratings i sued."); see also Anschutz Corp. v. Merrill Lynch &
Co., 785 F. Supp. 2d 799, 809 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (alleging "that the securities could not issue and the
credit rating agencies would not get paid unless the [a]gencies provided a pre-determined AAA
rating for the securities"); Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 651 F. Supp. 2d
155, 167 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (explaining that compensation of the credit rating agencies "was contin-
gent upon the receipt of desired ratings for the [securities], and only in the event that the transaction
closed with those ratings").
584. See Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund, 700 F.3d at 834 ("At any point in this process, the
arranger could reject the [credit rating] [a]gency's proposed rating."); Anschutz Corp., 785 F. Supp.
2d at 809 ("[A]n alleged conflict of interest developed such that the [r]ating [a]gencies abandoned
their independence and relaxed their rating criteria and procedures in order to secure the business of
the investment banks in rating [highly lucrative structured] securities."); see also supra notes 576-79
and accompanying text.
585. John Kell, S&P Will Pay Nearly $1.4 Billion to Settle Financial Crisis Litigation,
FORTUNE (Feb. 3, 2015, 8:48 AM), http://fortune.com/2015/02/03/standard-poors-financial-crisis/
(explaining the settlement will be paid to the Justice Department as well as to nineteen states and the
District of Columbia).
586. Id.
587. Pfinsgraff, Remarks Before the Risk Magazine Credit Risk Conference, supra note 20, at
2 (explaining the view that rating agencies were using "flawed models" to rate mortgage-backed
securities and collateralized debt obligations backed by subprime debt); see also In re Wells Fargo
Mortg.-Backed Certificates Litig., 712 F. Supp. 2d 958, 973 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (finding the statements
made by executives of Moody's and Standard & Poor's admitting "they were aware at the time the
subject ratings were made that the agencies' rating models were outdated" was sufficient to find an
"actionable misstatement" conceming the process of rating the mortgage-backed securities); N.J.
Carpenters Vacation Fund v. Royal Bank of Scot. Grp., PLC, 720 F. Supp. 2d 254, 270-71
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) ("[T]he models relied on to rate the [mortgage-backed securities] were outdated
and unable to accurately assess their risk . . . .").
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federal thrifts588-the credit rating agencies' excessive reliance on the
fees earned through ratings of securitized products may have played a
decisive role in the agencies' continued employment of these "funda-
mentally flawed credit models."5 8 9 Thus, conflicts of interest led the
credit rating agencies to turn a blind eye to the sustained use of flawed
credit models and ultimately resulted in the assignment of inaccurate
ratings for "tens of billions" of mortgage-backed securities and collat-
eralized debt obligations secured by subprime debt.590
B. Dodd-Frank Act Reforms
In the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress addressed certain conflicts of in-
terest with respect to credit rating agencies.591 For example, the statute
grants the Commission the authority to suspend or revoke an NRSRO's
registration with regard to a particular class of securities if the Commis-
sion determines that the NRSRO "does not have adequate financial and
managerial resources to consistently produce credit ratings with integri-
ty.,
5 92
The statute also requires the Commission to issue rules "to prevent
the sales and marketing considerations .. . from influencing the produc-
tion of ratings" issued by the NRSRO.593 The statute further provides for
the suspension or revocation of an NRSRO's registration if the Commis-
sion determines that the NRSRO has violated a rule issued pursuant to
"this subsection" and that violation affected a credit rating.594
Additionally, the statute contains a "[1]ook-back requirement"
whereby an NRSRO is required to establish policies and procedures to
ensure that, if any employee of an entity that is the subject of a credit
rating had been employed by the NRSRO and participated in the deter-
mination of the entity's credit rating during the one-year period prior to
the date when any action was taken regarding the credit rating, then the
588. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2012) (granting the Comptroller of the Currency the authority to
regulate national banks); see also 12 U.S.C. § 5412(b)(2)(B) (granting the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency the authority to regulate federal savings associations).
589. Pfinsgraff, Remarks Before the Risk Magazine Credit Risk Conference, supra note 20, at
2 ("Rating agencies had become overly reliant on securitization fees which may have, in part, con-
tributed to their failure to more quickly correct fundamentally flawed credit models."); see also Ohio
Police & Fire Pension Fund, 700 F.3d at 834 (alleging that "the desire to attract business led the
[algencies to lower their rating standards [by using] ... older, more forgiving debt models over more
up-to-date ones that might result in the rejection of an arranger's proposed capital structure" (citation
omitted)).
590. Pfinsgraff, Remarks Before the Risk Magazine Credit Risk Conference, supra note 20, at
2 (noting the proposition that credit rating agencies "mis-rate[d] tens of billions of subprime securiti-
zations and their derivative [collateralized debt obligations]").
591. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(d)(2), (h)(3)-(4), (t)(2).
592. Id. § 78o-7(d)(2).
593. Id. § 78o-7(h)(3).
594. Id.
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NRSRO must determine whether the employee had any conflicts of in-
terest that influenced the rating and revise the rating if necessary.595
C. Credit Rating Agency Reform Rules of 2014
The Commission then issued rules to implement the conflicts of in-
terest provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act regarding credit rating agen-
cies.596 For example, with respect to the sales and marketing conflict, the
Commission's rule prohibits an NRSRO from assigning a credit rating
when an employee who is involved in monitoring or determining the
credit rating, or approving or developing methodologies or procedures
for assigning the credit rating, also participates in the marketing or sales
of the NRSRO (or an affiliate) or is influenced by marketing or sales
factors.59 7 As stated by the Commission, this provision is an "absolute
prohibition" of individuals involved in the sales and marketing efforts of
a rating agency from also participating in any aspect of the credit rating
function and vice versa.598 Moreover, with respect to the Commission's
authority to suspend or revoke an NRSRO's registration if the Commis-
sion determines the NRSRO has violated a rule issued pursuant to "this
subsection" and that violation affected a credit rating,599 the Commission
interpreted the phrase "this subsection" to include any rules issued under
Section 15E(h) of the Securities Exchange Act.60 This section of the
Securities Exchange Act concerns the management of conflicts of inter-
est involving NRSROs. 
60
With respect to the "look-back requirement," the Commission's rule
requires an NRSRO to "promptly determine" if any credit ratings identi-
fied in a "look-back review" to include the influence of a conflict of in-
terest involving a former employee of the NRSRO need to be modified
so that the rating "is solely a product of the documented procedures and
methodologies" that the NRSRO uses to assign credit ratings and "is no
longer influenced by a conflict of interest."602 Once the determination is
made, the NRSRO must "[p]romptly publish" either a modified credit
595. Id. § 78o-7(h)(4). The statute further provides for a board of directors in which at least one
half of the directors are independent of the NRSRO. Id. § 78o-7(t)(2).
596. See Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 79 Fed. Reg. 55,078, 55,108
(Sept. 15, 2014) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 232, 240, 249 & 249b).
597. Id. (codified as 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-5(c)(8)).
598. Id. ("In practice, the Commission believes the amendment will require an NRSRO to
prohibit personnel that have any role in the determination of credit ratings or the development or
modification of rating procedures or methodologies from having any role in sales and marketing
activities. It also will require an NRSRO to prohibit personnel that have any role in sales and market-
ing activities from having any role in the determination of credit ratings or the development or
modification of rating procedures or methodologies.").
599. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(h)(3).
600. Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 79 Fed. Reg. at 55,114 (codified
at 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-5(g)).
601. See 15 U.S.C. § 780-7(h).
602. Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 79 Fed. Reg. at 55,117-21 (codi-
fied at 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-8(c)(1)).
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rating or an affirmation of the existing credit rating.603 In addition, the
NRSRO must provide the users of its credit ratings with information
concerning the reasons for its decision.6m Moreover, as the "look-back
requirement" is contained in Section 15E(h) of the Securities Exchange
Act, the Commission has the authority to suspend or revoke an NRSRO's
registration if the Commission determines that the NRSRO has violated
this requirement.605
D. Do the Reforms Effect Any Real Change?
The reforms enacted by Congress and implemented by the Commis-
sion are certainly a step in the direction of reducing conflicts of interest
in the business of a credit rating agency. However, while it is important
to separate the marketing and sales function from the credit rating func-
tion 606 to avoid a direct conflict of interest for individual employees, such
separation is not enough to eliminate the conflicts of interest inherent in
the issuer-pays model607 of the credit rating agencies. Although an indi-
vidual employee who participates in determining the credit rating of a
security will not be involved in the sales and marketing function of the
rating agency, that individual is still an employee of the credit rating
agency, which is hired and paid by the issuer of the security. While a
direct conflict of interest may no longer be present, the inherent conflicts
of interest cannot be avoided.
Prior to the financial crisis, the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act
of 2006 provided the Commission the statutory authority to issue rules
"to prohibit, or require the management and disclosure of, any conflicts
of interest," including those conflicts of interest associated with the prac-
tice of the issuer of the security compensating the NRSRO for the as-
signment of a credit rating.60 8 However, the Commission's rules required
the rating agency to do no more than disclose that the conflict exists and
establish procedures and policies to manage the conflict.6 09 Considering
the evidence of persistent conflicts of interest involving credit ratings
that precipitated the financial crisis,6 10 simply disclosing and attempting
to manage these conflicts is not enough to eliminate the problem.
603. Id. at 55,121 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-8(c)(2)).
604. Id.
605. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(h)(3)-(4); Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations,
79 Fed. Reg. at 55,114 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-8(c)).
606. See supra notes 597-98 and accompanying text.
607. See supra Section Ill.A.
608. Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, § 4(a), 120 Stat. 1327,
1334 (2006) (codified as 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(h)(2)).
609. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-5(a)(1)-(2) (2015).
610. See supra Section IlIl.A.
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CONCLUSION
This Article demonstrates how the courts and the regulators have af-
forded the credit rating agencies protections from liability. 611 The courts
have considered credit ratings to be opinions and applied the protections
of the First Amendment o shield the credit rating agencies from liability
in actions for fraudulent or negligently prepared ratings.6 12 However,
credit ratings are not pure statements of opinion similar to a newspaper
editorial or a statement of opinion regarding a political matter. Rather,
credit ratings are fact-based opinions made by business professionals.613
Thus, credit rating agencies should be subject to the same liability as
other commercial enterprises.
Moreover, the Commission has provided credit rating agencies with
regulatory protections by shielding the agencies from liability for false or
misleading statements in a registration statement.614 Despite the express
intent of Congress to hold the credit rating agencies accountable,615 the
Commission has effectively nullified those intentions.616 These legal and
regulatory protections provided to the credit rating agencies are clearly
misguided, even more so in light of the conflicts of interest inherent in
617
the issuer-pays model of the rating agencies.
Accordingly, the courts should hold credit rating agencies liable for
fraudulent or negligently prepared credit ratings that are false or mislead-
ing. Similarly, the Commission should honor the express intentions of
Congress and hold the credit rating agencies liable for false or mislead-
ing statements in a registration statement. Finally, as long as the issuer-
pays model remains the accepted standard of practice for the credit rating
agencies, the inherent conflicts of interest endemic to this industry will
continue to persist; thus, more is needed to eliminate the conflicts of in-
terest inherent in the issuer-pays business model of the credit rating
agencies.
611. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
612. See supra notes 4, 12 and accompanying text; see also supra Section I.A.3.b.
613. See supra notes 9, 384-85 and accompanying text.
614. See supra notes 13, 505-09 and accompanying text.
615. See supra notes 17, 525-27, 530-31 and accompanying text.
616. See supra Section II.D.
617. See supra Section IlIl.A.
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